ShashiPrabha Kumar

Categories, Creation and Cognition in Vaiśeṣika Philosophy

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Dedicated to my brothers –
Sushil, Sunil and Sudhir

Preface

This book is an outcome of my engagement with Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy for the past four decades. It aims to highlight a few aspects of Vaiśeṣika system, which have not been presented earlier in this form.

Vaiśeṣika is one of the six significant schools of classical Indian philosophy, but somehow it had not received due recognition in traditional circles. However, in contemporary times, it has started gaining popularity among academia across the world. Therefore, many books and papers by Indian and foreign scholars are being published in this field. My own book titled *Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy*: *On Knowing and What Is to Be Known* is a humble addition to such writings.

The present book contains 14 chapters, out of which the first two deal with the connection of Vaiśeṣika to Veda and Yoga. The next two chapters discuss the concept of categories and creation as available in the original sources of Vaiśeṣika; the fifth and sixth chapters present the atomic theory and other scientific insights of Vaiśeṣika scholars. The seventh chapter focuses on the idea of consciousness and cognition in Vaiśeṣika, while the eighth and ninth chapters dwell upon the nature of word (*śabda*) and hermeneutical principles in Vaiśeṣika. The following chapter explores the concept of emancipation (*niḥśreyasa*) in *Vyomavatī*, a commentary on the text of Praśastapāda. The 11th chapter expounds the religious affiliation of Vaiśeṣika philosophy to Pāśupata sect of Hindu religion. The 12th chapter enunciates the ethical aspect of Vaiśeṣika, and the 13th chapter introduces five recent Sanskrit commentaries of *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*. Last but not the least, the final and 14th chapter of the book tries to outline the current status of Vaiśeṣika studies across the world.

The volume in hand is a modest tribute to the wisdom of Vaiśeṣika. It neither claims to be original in approach nor comprehensive in coverage. Nonetheless, it will definitely facilitate the study of Vaiśeṣika and assist the readers in reaching out to the original source texts of the Vaiśeṣika school.

Indian intellectual tradition enumerates 14 systems of knowledge (*caturdaśa vidyāsthānās*) in all; hence number 14 is an important one in Indian philosophical thought. Taking a cue from that standard, the present book opens up 14 windows to Vaiśeṣika which reflect upon different aspects of the school.

The labour of the undersigned would be duly rewarded, even if a few readers are benefitted from this small volume.

New Delhi, India ShashiPrabha Kumar

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I offer my sincere salutations to the Almighty for bestowing me with the capabilities to read and reflect upon the numerous gems from the rich treasures of the Indian philosophical tradition.

I am forever indebted to my late parents and my worthy teachers in life, who encouraged and motivated me to take up an academic pursuit of this nature.

In all humility, I also acknowledge the works of scholars – past and present – who have illuminated my path and enabled me to embark on this valuable journey of Indian philosophy.

I also take this opportunity to bless both my children who have constantly provided their emotional support and helped me to stay on track. I am really overwhelmed to thank my family and friends for being there with me throughout this arduous journey.

Due credit must be given to the unwavering commitment and hard work put in by Dr. Renu K. Sharma for her help in bringing this book to its present shape.

I am also grateful to the referees who went through the draft of my proposal and made valuable suggestions. Their inputs have enhanced the quality of this book.

Last but not the least, my sincere thanks to the patience of Ms. Shinjini Chatterjee and Ms. Priya Vyas from Springer who cooperated with me.

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Chapter 1
Veda and Vaiśeṣika

Abstract This chapter intends to highlight the intrinsic relationship between Veda and Vaiśeṣika. Veda is held to be the source and sustaining force in Indian philosophical tradition. Accordingly almost all the schools of Indian philosophy hold Veda as supreme authority in case of doubt and disputation. Therefore, the influence of Veda on Vaiśeṣika philosophy in general and in theorization of its concepts in particular is being discussed in the present chapter.

Keywords *Āstika · Nāstika · Agama · Amnāya · Sruti · Trayī · Mantra · Sabda · Pauruṣeya · Apauruṣeya · Anṛta · Vyāghāta · Paunaruktya · Adhiṣṭhāna · Arambhaṇa · Pracaya · Saṁpatatra · Buddhisiddha · Vyāvahārasiddha · Kārya · Ayojana · Dhṛti · Pada · Pratyaya · Sruti · Vākya · Saṁkhyāviśeṣa*

Background

The identity and authenticity of Veda are rooted in the fact that it is held to be extraordinary, and its origin is held to be *knowledge* per se; no normal human being can possess such a comprehensive and universal view as is available in the Vedas.[1] The all-encompassing, holistic and 'unitive'[2] Vedic vision is multifariously reflected in several streams of Indian philosophical thought. The impact and contribution of Veda to Indian philosophical tradition can simply be gauged from the fact that faith in Vedic testimony was held to be the criterion for classification of various systems of Indian philosophy into two groups, namely, one who believes in the testimony of Veda (*āstika*) and one who does not believe in the testimony of Veda (*nāstika*).[3]

[1] *Na hīdṛśasya śāstrasya ṛgvedādilakṣaṇasya sarvajñaguṇānvitasya sarvajñādanyaḥ sambhavo'sti*.- *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (on *Brahmasūtra*, 1.1.3), (Shatshastri, Swami Hanumandas (ed.) 1993).

[2] (Pande, G.C. 1984) *Foundations of Indian Culture*, Vol. I, p. 21.

[3] (i) *Nāstiko Vedanindakaḥ*. *-Manusmṛti*, 1.130, (Dwivedi, Pandit Girija Prasad (ed.) 1917).
(ii) *Āstika* is also termed as *śiṣṭa*: *Svīkṛtaveda-pramāṇabhāvaḥ śiṣṭaḥ*. (*Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (Shastri, Gaurinath (ed.), 1979), *Maṅgalavāda*, p. 59).

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Introduction

There is no denying the fact that since early times, the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika have been taken to be an intertwined tradition of logic and metaphysics, representing together a fine blend of epistemology and ontology. The complementary nature of these two thought structures lies in their unflinching faith in the Veda which gets manifested in more than one ways as will be clear from the following pages. It is, therefore, quite natural that while discussing the influence of Veda on Vaiśeṣika, a reference to some of the Nyāya sources will also be made, as and when relevant.

Ancient Indian tradition holds that there are 14 abodes of knowledge and Veda is the first and foremost among these[4]; even a limited acquisition of Vedic wisdom is understood to be the ground of greatness.[5] In fact, the sanctity of Veda is so supreme that whatever cannot be acquired through other sources of knowledge is to be known from the Veda.[6] The depth and width of Veda is so great that it can't be expressed through words; it has to be experienced first-hand. The expansion of Vedic literature is enormous in the sense that it has governed the mental modes of Indian intellectual tradition for centuries. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a great Naiyāyika of the tenth century, has expressed the extent of Vedic knowledge in a poetic manner as follows:

> The Veda is like a big tree which has four stems (in the form of four Vedas), has many parts (in the form of different subjects), each of its stem is adorned with various branches, fruits, flowers etc., which get manifested when the mouth of the learned ones tastes its juice.[7]

---

4 (i) *Aṅgāni Vedāścatvāro mīmāṁsānyāyavistaraḥ Dharmaśāstraṁ purāṇañca vidyā hyetāścaturdaśa.* (*Viṣṇupurāṇa*, Quoted in *Vācaspatyam*, Vol. VI, (Bhaṭṭācāraya, Tārānāthtarkavācaspati 2006), p. 4902).

(ii) *Purāṇanyāyamīmāṁsādharmaśaśtraṅgamiśritāḥ.*
Vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṁ dharmasya ca caturdaśa (*Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, 1.3), (Panśikar, Vāsudev Laxman Śāstrī (ed.) 1936).

5 *ṚksāmayajuraṅgānāmatharvāṅgirasāmapiAṇorapyasa vijñānādyo'nucānassa no mahān. -Śātātapasmṛti* Quoted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM),Vol. I, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), p. 234.

6 *Pratyakṣeṇānumityā vā yastūpāyo na vidyate Etaṁ vidanti vedena tasmād vedasya vedatā.*- Sāyaṇa in his Introduction to *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa Bhāṣya* (*Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Granthāvaliḥ*, 1896), p. 1.

7 *Catuḥskandhopetaḥ prathitapṛthagarthairavayavaiḥ Kṛtānyonyaśleṣairupacitavapurvedaviṭapaḥ Pratiskandhaṁ śākhāphalakusumasandarbhasubhagāḥ Prakāśante tasya dvijamukhanipītottama rasāḥ*.-NM, Vol. I, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), p. 239.

The Veda is described in many ways and expressed through various words in Indian tradition such as *āgama*,[8] *āmanāya*,[9] *śabda*,[10] *śruti*,[11] *trayī*,[12] *mantra*[13] and of course Veda[14] itself. Different texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools have also used these terms at various places to denote the Veda, although their connotations are not the same and they convey multiple shades of meaning depending upon their specific reference and context.

Veda as Supreme Authority

The most significant aspect of Vedic reference in the philosophy of Vaiśeṣika is that of its testimony as a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Like many schools of Indian philosophy, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars also hold that '*śabda*' is an independent source of knowledge; according to them *śabda* is the statement of a perfectly reliable person.[15] It means that verbal testimony (*śabda*) as a means of valid knowing (*pramāṇa*) is a sentence, uttered or written by a trustworthy person. In their view, reliability of a speaker is the criterion of authenticity of '*śabda*',[16] while according to Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins, '*śabda*' is a means of valid knowing (*pramāṇa*) because it is not contradicted in any way and its import is not dependent on any other cognition or cognizer.[17] It is worth mentioning here that '*śabda*' is held to be eternal by the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins[18], and hence its validity is taken to be intrinsic, but the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hold *śabda* to be non-eternal and its validity to be dependent on the reliability of the speaker.

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[8] *The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda* (VS), 2.1.17, 5.2.10, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986); *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh.), (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) (on *Nyāyasūtras* (NS), 4.1.21).

[9] VS, 1.1.3,10.2.9, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[10] *Nyāyakoṣa* (Jhalakīkar, Bhimācārya 1978), p. 802.

[11] *Śrutistu Vedo vijñeyo dharmaśāstraṁ tu vai smṛtiḥ.-Manusmṛti*, (Dwivedi, Pandit Girija Prasad (ed.) 1917), 2.10.

[12] NM, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), Vol. I, p. 235.

[13] *Nyāyasūtras of Gotama*, (NS), 2.1.69, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.), Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).

[14] *Buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtirvede.*-VS, 6.1.1, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[15] (i) *Āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ.*-NS, 1.1.7, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.), Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).
(ii) *Āptavākyaṁ śabdaḥ.-Tarkasaṁgarha*, (Athalye Y. V., (ed.), Bodas, M. R. (Eng. trans.) 1974), p. 50.

[16] *Āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeṣṭā.* -NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) (on NS, 1.1.7).

[17] *Ataśca tatpramāṇamanapekṣatvāt. Na caivaṁ sati puruṣāntaraṁ pratyayāntaraṁ cāpekṣyate* (Śabara (on *Mīmāṁsāsūtras*, 1.1.5), ('Rishi', Uma Shankar Sharma (ed.) 1980), p. 47).

[18] (i) Śabara (on *Mīmāṁsāsūtras*, ('Rishi', Uma Shankar Sharma (ed.) 1980), 1.1.6–23), pp. 61–77.
(ii) *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarājādhvarīndra, (Mādhavānanda, Swāmī, Belur Matha), *Āgamapariccheda* (Verbal Testimony), pp. 89–120.

Veda: Authored or Authorless?

This brings us to the point of authorship of the Veda. The Mīmāṁsakas propound the theory of *Vedāpauruṣeyatva* which means that the Vedic knowledge is eternal and hence not authored by anyone, not even God.[19] But the Vaiśeṣika holds a more logical view according to which Vedas are authored by God and delivered to humanity at the beginning of each creation; hence they are created by somebody (*pauruṣeya*)[20]; they may be taken to be impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) but only in the sense that no ordinary human being (*puruṣa*) has authored them. To put it more precisely, the human beings can falter in their statements, but God, being omniscient, can never be thought of faltering. His word will always hold true and valid. There are many statements in Veda itself which prove that God imparts the Veda at the beginning of each creation for the welfare of entire humanity.

The argument posited by the Vaiśeṣika for proving the divine origin of Veda is basically founded on its theism. The theistic evidence posited by Udayanācārya holds God as creator of the world and author of the Vedas. Since no effect can take place without an agent, hence, the agency of the world and the authorship of Veda are attributed to God as an eternal, omnipotent and omniscient being.

The divine authorship of Veda is given as a proof for the validity of Veda in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* as follows:

> The authority of Veda subsists in its being the word of God.[21]

Śaṅkaramiśra, the celebrated interpreter of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, has explained the above *sūtra* in following two ways due to the ambiguity of the pronoun '*tat*':

- '*tat*'signifies God, who has pronounced the Veda.
- '*tat*' implies '*dharma*', which has immediately been referred to in earlier aphorism (*sūtra*).[22]

This means that the authenticity of Veda is rooted in the following:

- It being the creation of God and
- it containing the exposition of *dharma*

In both of these meanings, the validity of Veda is proved either on the basis of its author or its content. It clearly shows that the Vaiśeṣikas uphold their theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge with reference to Veda also.

---

[19] Śabara (on *Mīmāṁsāsūtras*, 1.1.6-23; 27-32), ('Rishi', Uma Shankar Sharma (ed.) 1980), pp. 85–89.

[20] For details see Kumar, Shashiprabha. 2006. The Concept of Veda- Apauruṣeyatva. In *Pūrvamīmāṁsā From An Interdisciplinary Point of View*, K.T. Pandurangi (ed.), Volume II, Part 6, CSC, pp. 235–251.

[21] *Tadvacanādāmnāyasya prāmāṇyam.*-VS, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986), 1.1.3.

[22] *Tadityanupakrāntamapi prasiddhisiddhatayeśvaraṁ parāmṛśati.…Yadvā taditi sannihitaṁ dharmameva parāmṛśati.*-(*Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra*, (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 2002) (on VS, 1.1.3), pp. 14–15).

As regards the authenticity of Veda as ultimate testimony, it will not be out of place to mention here that Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtras*, while discussing the validity of Veda, has posited three objections from the opponents' point of view in the following way:

> That the Veda can't be held valid because the fallacies of falsity, contradiction and tautology are available therein.[23]

To refute the above three objections raised by the opponent, Gautama has given his own view as the proponent and has cited three aphorisms (*sūtras*) in the form of responses which have been interpreted as follows:

- The objection of falsity (*anṛta*) does not stand since the non-availability of visible results in case of specific actions like fire ritual (*yāga*) may occur due to incompleteness/discrepancy in any of the three factors, namely, the agent, the action or the means.
- The second objection of contradiction (*vyāghāta*) can be met by accepting the difference in time for offerings.
- The fallacy of tautology (*paunaruktya*) also does not stand since the repetition here is purposeful.[24]

After respectively responding to each of the objections put up by the opponent, the proponent has given his own argument in brief for propounding the validity of Veda as follows:

> Just as the validity of *mantra* and medicine is perceived and proved due to the reliability of their preceptors, similarly the validity of Veda has to be taken on the basis of trustworthiness of its author.[25]

In this context, the definition of a reliable person according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is also worth quoting here:

> A reliable person is he, who describes the objects as they are.[26]

It needs to be emphasized here that according to Vātsyāyana, the earliest commentator of *Nyāyasūtras*, the reliability of a speaker is not dependent on his birth in a particular clan but in his mastery of the specific subject and his purity of intent:

> He may be a sage, a noble person, a foreigner or even a robber who has direct knowledge of something and is both capable and desirous of speaking about it.[27]

---

[23] *Tadaprāmāṇyamanṛtavyāghātapunaruktadoṣebhyaḥ*.-NS, 2.1.58, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.), Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).

[24] NS, 2.1.59-61, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.), Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).

[25] *Mantrāyurvedaprāmāṇyācca tatprāmāṇyamāptaprāmāṇyat*.-NS, 2.1.69, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.), Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).

[26] *Āptastu yathārthavaktā*.-*Tarkasaṁgraha*, (Athalye Y. V., (ed.), Bodas, M. R. (Eng. trans.) 1974), p. 50.

[27] *Ṛṣyāryamlechhānāṁ samānaṁ lakṣaṇam*.-NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) (on NS, 1.1.7).

Origin of the Universe

There is no doubt about the fact that the tradition of Vedic knowledge is continued and carried forward in the later philosophical schools which are traditionally taken to be the sub-subsidiaries (*upāṅgas*) of Veda. Out of these, the Vaiśeṣika is much closer to the Vedic view due to its inclination to the visible world and the cosmological processes working behind it. The Vedic spirit of enquiry about the origin of this universe finds eloquence in the Vaiśeṣika theories of causation and creation since the roots of Vaiśeṣika are in cosmology. There is no doubt about the fact that 'the Vedic speculations on the origin and nature of the world evolve into theories of elements and doctrines of categories as exemplified by the Vaiśeṣika system'.[28]

On the other hand, Nyāya is set upon exploring the nature of reality on the basis of evidence:

> Nyāya is the examination of the object with the help of evidences.[29]

Obviously, this rational enquiry and intellectual quest about reality are very much rooted in the Ṛgvedic verses as follow:

- Immature, undiscerning in mind as I am,
- I inquire about those things which are hidden (even) from the super powers.
- Ignorant, I inquire of the sages who know not as one knowing,
- for moreover the sake of knowledge.[30]

- How many fires are there?
- How many are the suns in number?
- How many dawns, how many waters?
- I address you elders not jestingly,
- neither with rivalry, not with jealousy,
- I ask you, sages, in order to know the truth.[31]

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[28] (Halbfass, Wilhelm 1993) *On Being and What There Is*, *Classical Vaiśeṣika And the History of Indian Ontology*, p. 38.

[29] *Pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇam Nyāyaḥ*.- NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) (on NS, 1.1.1).

[30] *Pākaḥ pṛcchāmi manasāvijānandevānāmenā nihitā padāni.Vatse baṣkaye'dhi sapta tantūnvi tantire kavaya otavā u.- Ṛgveda* (RV), (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996), 1.164.5, (Bose, A.C. (Eng. trans.) 1951).

[31] *Katyagnayaḥ kati suryāsaḥ katyuṣasaḥ katyu svidāpaḥ.Nopaspijam vaḥ pitaro vadāmi pṛcchāmi vaḥ kavayo vidmane kam.*-RV, 10.88.18, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996), (Bose, A.C. (Eng. trans.) 1951).

Besides, it also needs to be noted that there are ample references available in the Vedas which can be correlated with the epistemology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika such as the mention of terms like *ūha*, *tarka*, *praśnā*, *pramā*,[32] etc.

Concept of Causality

In fact, it is the metaphysical aspect of Vaiśeṣika which is clearly rooted in the Vedic view. The theory of causation in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is known as '*asatkāryavāda*'or'*ārambhavāda*', and according to it, both the material cause and the efficient cause are different; the same is reflected in two separate words used in the Veda:

- *Adhiṣṭhāna* (what sets the place to stand on)
- *Arambhaṇa* (what becomes the material with which to work)[33]

Evidently, the usage of the term '*ārambhaṇa*'leads one to presume that the name '*ārambhavāda*' is based upon it. There is another term '*vi + aurṇaut*' (fabricates) that occurs in the same verse; this has been interpreted as a hint to the concept of the whole (*avayavin*) in the Vaiśeṣika.[34] The very idea of the whole (*avayavīn*) is held to be a combination of different magnitudes depending upon the multiplicity of causal factors and a specific type of conjunction termed as 'pracaya;'[35] (loose connection) the same is suggested by the term '*vi+aurṇaut*'.

The above discussion leads us to another important Vaiśeṣika theory which propounds that the whole (*avayavin*) is a new and different entity which comes in to being out of a number of causes or parts (*avayavas*). The basis of this idea has been suggested to be found in a Ṛgvedic verse (*mantra*) which states that the cosmic law of '*ṛta*', as well as water, fire and earth, segregated the '*camasa*'or the parts (*avayavas*) of the whole (*avayavin*); this interpretation has been given by none else than Sāyaṇa[36] himself.

As is well-known, the Vaiśeṣika theory of atomism has been refuted by Śaṅkara and other leading philosophers stating that it did not have the Vedic sanction.[37] But, the celebrated Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholar Udayana has tried to meet this objection by quoting the well-known Ṛgvedic verse wherein the word '*saṁpatatra*'occurs; the same has been taken to denote both, the atoms as material cause of creation, while

[32] For details see, Kumar, Shashiprabha. 1999. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Avadhāraṇāon ke Vaidik Ādhāra. In *Vaiśeṣika Darśana Pariśīlana*, p. 12.

[33] *Kiṁ svidāsīdadhiṣṭhānamārambhaṇaṁ katamatsvitkathāśīt.*-RV, 10.81.2, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[34] (Shastri, Acharya Vaidyanatha 1973) *Darśana-Tattva-Viveka*, (Hindi), Vol. I, p. 78.

[35] Vide (Kumar, Shashiprabha 1992) *Vaiśeṣika Darśana Mein Padārtha Nirūpaṇa* (Hindi), p. 369.

[36] Sāyaṇa in his Commentary on RV, 1.161.9, (Sāyaṇācārya. Vol.I, Mandala-I, Vaidika Samshodhan Mandala).

[37] *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (on *Brahmasūtra*, 2.2.17), (Shatshastri, Swami Hanumandas (ed.) 1993).

the merits and demerits (*dharmādharma*) of individual selves (*jīvas*) as efficient cause of creation.[38]

Another Ṛgvedic verse has also been quoted as containing a reference to atoms.[39] Interestingly, the term '*pīlu*' (which is held to be a synonym of '*paramāṇu*' according to the Vaiśeṣika) is also found at least once in the Atharvaveda[40] although its meaning is different there.

Moreover, the terms '*sat*'and '*asat*' have been used in the *Nāsadīya* hymn of Ṛgveda, and at least one of the commentators has explained them as meaning cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*) only,[41] although he has clarified that the gross and visible causes or effects were not available at that point of time. It is also to be clarified here that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of causation (*asatkāryavāda*) does not at all convey the total non-existence of the effect before production; it only means that the non-existence of the effect was established by understanding (*buddhisiddha*) but not established by behaviour (*vyavahārasiddha*).[42]

Nine Substances

Out of the nine substances from the Vaiśeṣika list of categories, the first one, i.e. earth (*pṛthivī*), is stated to be possessing the property of smell (*gandha*) while the second substance water (*jala*) as possessing the property of taste (*rasa*); the Vedic source for this theory is available in one of the verses in Atharvaveda[43] and Ṛgveda[44] each. The third substance enumerated in the Vaiśeṣika list, i.e. fire (*tejas*), is stated to be possessing luminous white colour as its property, while the Ṛgveda also mentions fire (*agni*) as containing both the colours black and white.[45] The fourth substance from the Vaiśeṣika list of substances (*dravyas*), i.e. air (*vāyu*), has been described in the Vedas in detail.[46] The fifth substance ether (*ākāśa*) is referred to in

[38] *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, 5.3, (Goswami, Mahaprabhulal (ed.) 1972), p. 579.

[39] *Yaddevā adaḥ salile susaṁrabdhā vañcateAtrā vo nṛtyatāmiva tīvro reṇurapāyata.*-RV, 10.72.6, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[40] *Tvamindra kapotayachhinnapakṣāya vañcate Śyāmākaṁ pakvaṁ* ***pīlu*** *ca varasma akṛṇorbahuḥ.*-*Atharvaveda* (AV), 20.135.12, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[41] *Asatśabdaḥ kāraṇavacanaḥ. Satśabdaḥ kāryavacanaḥ.*-Veṅkaṭamādhava in his commentary on RV, 10.129.1, (Vishvabandhu (eds.) et. al. 1965).

[42] *Buddhisiddhantu tadasat*. -NS, 4.1.50, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.), Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).

[43] *Yaste gandhaḥ prthivī saṁbabhūvā*. -AV, 12.1.23, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[44] *Yo vaḥ śivatamo rasaḥ*. -RV, 10.9.2, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[45] *Kṛṣṇā rūpāṇyaṇyarjunā vi vo made*. -RV, 10.21.3, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[46] Vide RV, 1.2.2, 5.51.5, 8.26.23, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

Veda with terms as '*samudra*','*vyoma*', etc.[47] The same has been counted in the list of synonyms for middle region (*antarikṣa*) in the Vedic lexicon *Nighaṇṭu*;[48] Yajurveda refers to Brahma as ether (*ākāśa*) and mentions that it is the highest abode (*parama vyoma*) of speech (*vāk*).[49] The next substance time (*kāla*) is clearly described in two hymns of Atharvaveda;[50] space (*dik*) is also referred in the Ṛgveda.[51] Atharvaveda makes a mention of all the directions by name which goes on to show that the seventh substance, space, accepted in Vaiśeṣika also had a Vedic foundation.[52] The eighth substance self (*ātman*) has been classified into two types in Vaiśeṣika, i.e. the individual self (*jīvātman*) and the Supreme Self (*paramātman*)[53]; the same division is again rooted in Vedic sources where the word '*ātmā*' is used in both these senses.[54] Besides, all the other aspects regarding the nature of '*ātmān*' delineated in Vaiśeṣika are also available in Veda. Last but not the least, the ninth substance of Vaiśeṣika, i.e. the integral organ or mind (*manas*), is mentioned in the Veda along with the sense organs (*indriyas*).[55] The triple process of cognition, i.e. intellect (*prājñana*), awareness (*cetanā*) and resolution (*dhṛti*) is attributed to the internal sense organ (*manas*)[56] in the Yajurveda.

Metals as Products of Fiery Atoms

Another unique theory of the Vaiśeṣika is that the metals like gold, etc. are held to be constituted of fire (*taijasa*) atoms, and various arguments have been given for proving this point, but one of the commentators of Praśatapāda has also quoted verbal testimony (*āgama pramāṇa*) in support of this as follows:

> Gold is the first progeny of fire.[57]

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[47] RV, 10.190.1, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[48] *Nighaṇṭu*, 1.3, (Sarup, Lakshman (ed.) 2002).

[49] *Bṛahmāyaṁ vācaḥ paramaṁ vyoma*.-*Yajurveda* (YV), 23.62, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[50] AV, 19.53-54, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[51] RV, 4.50.1, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[52] AV, 3.27.1–6, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[53] *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, (Jha, Shashinatha (ed.) 1963), p. 14.

[54] RV, 10.97.4, 1.51.1, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996); YV, 32.11,13.46, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[55] RV, 6.9.5, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996);YV, 34.55, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996); AV, 19.9.5, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[56] YV, 34.3, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[57] *Agnerapatyaṁ prathamaṁ suvarṇam*.-Quoted in *Vyomavatī*, (Kaviraj Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds). 1930), p. 258.

Even the very first verse of Ṛgveda[58] can be cited in support of this theory, if interpreted only on a physical plane. Another verse from the Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā[59] of Yajurveda also hints to the above.

It will also be worthwhile to discuss about the Vedic foundation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theism. In the well-known theistic volume titled *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayanacārya, the following eight proofs have been given: effect (*kārya*), motion (*āyojana*), sustenance (*dhṛti*), word (*pada*), validity (*pratyaya*), Veda (*śruti*), sentence (*vākya*) and particular type of a number (*saṁkhyāviśeṣa*).[60]

In fact, these arguments present a picture of God who is:

- The creator
- The sustainer of the universe
- The author of the Vedas
- The first and original teacher of mankind

All these four aspects of the nature of God can very well be corroborated from several Vedic verses.[61]

Vātsyāyana, the famous commentator of *Nyāyasūtra* has also quoted verbal testimony (*āgama*) for expounding God as a seer, a knower and an omniscient person.[62]

In one of the verses of Ṛgveda, God himself seems to be giving the first evidence for proving his own existence as an omnipresent sustainer of the Universe:

> Here I am, O worshipper, behold me here; in my greatness
>
> I surpass all that exists.[63]

What follows from the above is that the original theistic argument was available in the Veda in a subtle form but later developed in detail by the exponents of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

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[58] *Agnim īḍe purohitaṁ yajñasya devaṁ ṛtvijam hotāraṁ ratnadhātamam*. -RV, 1.1.1, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[59] *Eṣa vo agne priyā tanūryād ghṛtam teja eva*.-*Yajurvedīya Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā*, 3.2.6, (Satavalekar (ed.) Vikam Saṁvat 1998).

[60] *Kāryāyojandhṛtyādeḥ padāt pratyayataḥ śruteḥVākyāt saṁkhāviśeṣācca sādhyo viśvavidavayayaḥ.-Nyāyakusumāñjali*, 5.1, (Goswami, Mahaprabhulal (ed.) 1972).

[61] (a) RV, 10.10.9; 10.25.7; 10.190.3, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996); AV, 16.1.6, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996); YV, 17.18–19, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).
(b) RV, 10.121.1, 5, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).
(c) RV, 7.32.26; 10.71.3, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996); YV, 26.2, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir 1996).
(d) RV, 5.9.4; 10.71.1, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[62] *Yathā pitāpatyānāṁ tathā pitṛbhūta iśvaro bhūtānaṁāgamācca draṣṭā, boddhā, sarvajñātā iśvara iti*.-NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) (on NS 4.1.21), p. 481.

[63] *Ayamasmi jaritaḥ paśya meha viśvā jātānyabhyasmi mahnā*.-RV, 8.100.4, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

Theory of Creation

Another aspect of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which owes heavily to and depends largely upon Veda, is the theory of creation. According to the philosophy of Vaiśeṣika, the cycle of creation is beginning less and the process goes on endlessly. The following Ṛgvedic verses provide foundation to this notion as well:

- Which of these two (heaven and earth) is elder and which is younger,
- Day and night revolve very much like wheels.[64]
- The sustainer (or creator) in this cycle, as in previous ones.[65]

Of course, the desire to know about original creation has been there, right from the Ṛgveda, where it is stated:

> Who really knows, who in this world can declare it,
> whence came out this (manifested) creation?
> Whence was it engendered? Whence will it end?[66]

In another verse addressed to Viśvakarmā, the same question has been asked again, where it is questioned:

> Which is that forest and which is the tree from which the heaven and the earth were carved out?[67]

The answer to this perennial query has already been quoted above while discussing the idea of theism.

In the famous Ṛgvedic hymn titled *Nāsadīyasūkta*, the beginning of creation has been referred to as being the original mental seed of creation.

> In the beginning, there was the Divine Desire, which was the first seed of the cosmic mind.[68]

Sāyaṇa, while interpreting the above, has explained '*kāma*' as the divine desire to create (*sisṛkṣā*)[69] which arises due to the accumulated results of actions by the living beings performed in earlier lives, being ready for fructification. It will be interesting to compare this with the statement of Praśastapāda where he has also referred to the desire (*sisṛkṣā*) of Supreme Lord (Maheśvara) as the original cause for combining the two atoms and forming the first dyad[70]; he has also indicated that the potency of unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*) is the impelling factor for this first act of creation.

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[64] *Katarā purvā katarāparāyoḥ. ….vivartete ahanī cakriyeva.*-RV, 1.185.1, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996), (Bose, A.C. (Eng. trans.) 1951).

[65] *Dhātā yathāpūrvamakalpayat.*-RV, 10.190.3, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996), (Bose, A.C. (Eng. trans.) 1951).

[66] *Ko addhā veda ka iha pravocat kuta ājātā kuta iyaṁ visṛṣṭiḥ.*-RV, 10.129.6, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996), (Bose, A.C. (Eng. trans.) 1951).

[67] *Kim svidvanaṁ ka u sa vṛkṣa āsa yato dyāvāpṛthivī niṣṭatakṣuḥ.*-RV, 10.81.4, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996), (Bose, A.C. (Eng. trans.) 1951).

[68] *Kāmastadagre samavartatādhi manaso retaḥ prathamaṁ yadāśit.*-RV, 10.129.4, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[69] Sāyaṇa in his commentary on the above (Vishvabandhu (eds.) et. al. 1965).

[70] *Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 128.

It is also to be noted here that Praśastapāda proposes to enumerate the process of creation but then reverses the order while expounding the same and describes the process of destruction prior to that of creation.[71] Probably he was influenced with the *Nāsadīyasūkta* where the process of destruction (*pralaya*) is referred to earlier than the creation (*sṛṣṭī*).

The Vedic notions of penance (*tapas*) and plasmic ocean (*arṇava*)[72] are very subtle and have influenced the later Indian philosophical ideas of unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*) and invisible potency (*apūrva*). In this regard it may be said that the concept of '*ṛta*' also provided significant inputs for development of the idea of unseen force in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Vedas describe God as controller of '*ṛta*' (cosmic order),[73] while Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika enunciates him as controller of unseen force.[74]

The idea of Golden Womb (*Hiraṇyagarbha*)[75] is also very important in the Vedic cosmogony. The same is very explicitly mentioned by Praśastapāda in his theory of creation[76]; here he clearly seems to be influenced by Vedic philosophy, although he has also added some later mythological details to the same.

It is difficult to say whether Vedic cosmogony is realistic or symbolic; nonetheless, the hints about a creator as an agent, who creates the world from the material cause and the created effect, are clearly available in the Vedic verses. Accordingly, the omnipotent, omnipresent God creates this world out of a material already available. The same is very succinctly expounded in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika cosmology where the idea of God as a creator, of atoms as the material cause and the visible world as creation, is elaborated in detail along with the concept of individual selves (*jīvas*). Hence, it can be surmised that the Vaiśeṣika theory of atomistic creation is deeply influenced by Vedic view. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that there are innumerable material atoms in the universe, and a sentient agent is essentially required to combine those atoms; hence atomism and cosmology go hand in hand in this stream of Indian philosophy.

Conclusion

To conclude, it may be stated that although it is unfair to look for philosophically developed theories in Veda, yet the direct experience and realization of truth were originally suggested through Veda alone:

> No wonder later thought should regard the Vedas as the fountainhead of all religion and philosophy.[77]

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[71] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 128.

[72] RV, 10.190.1, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[73] RV, 9.73.8, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[74] *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, 1.4, (Goswami, Mahaprabhulal (ed.) 1972).

[75] RV, 10.121.1, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[76] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 129–130.

[77] Choudhary, T.P. 1952. The Vedas. In *History of Philosophy: Eastern & Western*, pp. 47–48.

Veda, being divine knowledge imparted to the seers after they reached the stage of realization, is a manifestation of the reality in secular and universal terms; it is not the knowledge of any individual or group of individuals. The Vedic knowledge was later elaborated and expounded by the founders of Indian philosophical schools. Therefore, Indian philosophy has grown and developed either in explanation of, or in opposition to, Vedic thought. To quote:

> Hence we are compelled to begin our story of Indian Philosophy with the Vedas which constitute the earlier documents of Indian Philosophy.[78]

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Chapter 2
Yoga and Vaiśeṣika

Abstract The present chapter aims at expounding and examining the interrelation between yoga and Vaiśeṣika systems of Indian philosophy, with special reference to the issue of yogic experience; Nyāya sources will also be referred wherever relevant. Yoga is undoubtedly one of the most ancient and important aspects of Indian philosophical tradition; it has pervaded across all the systems of Indian philosophy. Therefore, it is intended to discuss in detail the mutual connection between yoga and Vaiśeṣika in this chapter.

Keywords *Abhyudaya · Niḥśreyasa · Tapas · Tattvajñāna · Asatkāryavāda · Arṣajñāna · Siddhadarśana · Prātibhajñāna · Yogaja pratyakṣa · Alaukika pratyakṣa · Sāmānyalakṣaṇa · Jñānalakṣaṇa · Yamas · Niyamas · Prāṇāyāma · Pratyāhāra · Dhyāna · Dhāraṇā · Samādhi · Śravaṇa · Manana · Nididhiyāsana · Yogin · Ṛṣi · Maharṣi · Atmasākṣātkāra · Jīvanayoni prayatna · Tadanārambha*

Background

Yoga is universally accepted as the single most and the richest contribution of Indian mind to the entire humankind across the globe. The idea of yoga in the sense of mental discipline is as old as the Vedas where it has occurred at more than one places and in various references.[1] The prominence as well as pervasiveness of yoga in Indian thought is so conspicuous that it hardly needs to be mentioned.

[1] *Ṛgveda* (RV), 1.5.3, 1.18.7, 1.30.7, 10.84, 10.136, (Saraswati, Swami Satya Prakash and Satyakam Vidyalankar (Eng. trans.) 1996); *Atharvaveda* (AV), 11.5, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

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Introduction

Although the tradition of yoga is very old, the potentialities it possesses are proving to be enormously wide and varied, always in tune with the turn of the times. It is, therefore, that in the modern age of technological advancement, this technique of total personality development is more than relevant. What needs to be emphasized here is that yoga in the broader connotation is not **a** way or **one** system among many but an inherent and underlying process of all the thought structures of Indian tradition. It is not without reason then that almost all the principal schools of Indian philosophy have directly or indirectly adopted yoga and moulded it according to their own basic presuppositions.

Yoga as a system of philosophy is also very old, and we find traces of its tenets in many of the earlier Upaniṣads like Maitrāyaṇī, Kaṭha and Śvetāśvatara.[2] In most of these texts, yoga is described as a means to self-realization, the ultimate goal of life.[3]

In the later tradition of Indian philosophy, all the schools, except Cārvāka, recognize self-realization as the supreme goal of life and accept the integral discipline of yoga as the practical method for attainment of this goal.[4] In other words, yoga is held to be the best means for actualization of the final aim of beatitude in all the thought-streams of Indian philosophy; we do find ample literature in Jaina yoga and Buddhist yoga as well. It is simply because the path of yoga begins with a premise that the mental modes can be controlled and channelized in such a manner that one can reach at the culmination of concentration, the highest form of 'tapas'[5] to use the Vedic terminology.

Inclusive Nature of Yoga

Etymologically, the word yoga may be derived from the following three roots:

- √*yuj samādhau*
- √*yujir yoge*
- √*yuj saṁyamane*

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[2] *Maitrāyaṇi Upaniṣad*, 1.2, (Śrī Vāsudevaśarmā (ed.) 2003).
Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 2.6.11, (Śrī Vāsudevaśarmā (ed.) 2003).
Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 1.14, 2.8–15, 6.13, 13.24.

[3] *Ayaṁ tu paramo dharmo yadyogenātmadarśanam*.-*Yogavārtika*, 4.10, (Vidya Sagar, Jivananda (ed.) 1897).

[4] (a) *Mokṣeṇa yojanād yogaḥ*. -*Yogabindūpaniṣad*, 1.31, (Shah, Jitendra B. (ed.) 2017).
(b) *Sansārottaraṇe yuktiryoga ityabhidhīyate*.-*Yogavāsiṣtha*, 13.3, (Shastri, Pandit Sri Krishna Pant (Hindi trans.) Shastri, Pandit Mulashankar (ed.) 2016).

[5] *Ṛtaṁ ca satyaṁ cābhīddhāttapaso'dhyajāyata*.
Tato rātryajāyata tataḥ samudro arṇavaḥ.-RV, 10.190.1, (Saraswati, Swami Satya Prakash and Satyakam Vidyalankar (Eng. trans.) 1996).

Out of these, the former etymology is usually applied to the system of Patañjali; but in the second sense, Vaiśeṣika can also be stated to be a type of yoga, wherein a combination of worldly progress (*abhyudaya*) and spiritual perfection (*niḥśreyasa*) is envisaged at the very beginning of Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*. The inherent nature of Vaiśeṣika is cohesive since it does not exclude the physical or the material aspect of life rather accepts it as the initial step to the ultimate goal. In fact, Śaṁkaramiśra, one of the later commentators of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, has explained the above statement of Kaṇāda in such a way that the former (*abhyudaya*) comes out to be a means of the latter (*niḥśreyasa*).[6]

From this point of view, '*abhyudaya*' signifies exact knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) which is the valid means for the ultimate goal (*niḥśreyasa*). Obviously this type of superior knowledge does require a co-ordination between body and sense organs as also a complete concentration of the mind which implies basic discipline of yoga, defined as '*tapas*' in ancient Indian tradition.[7] Yoga as already stated is obviously the basic tendency of connecting twin aspects of the means, and the end can be marked, which the very initial, literal sense of the word yoga as is stated above. The same is also to be noticed in the fourth aphorism of Vaiśeṣika where two methods of proper knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) are explicitly enunciated such as similarity and dissimilarity.[8] It is through these two methods that one has to comprehend the true nature of categories (*padārthas*) as described in the Vaiśeṣika system. Therefore, the second etymology of the word yoga mentioned above is aptly applicable to Vaiśeṣika system.

Vaiśeṣika as Yoga

It is in the above background that various references scattered in ancient Indian tradition can be logically synthesized and understood where the Vaiśeṣika has itself been termed as yoga. To elaborate the above point, the following details are worth mentioning:

- Kauṭilya, in his *Arthaśāstra*, while enumerating various types of knowledge, brackets the three branches of Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata under one heading, 'ānvīkṣikī',[9] wherein *'anvīkṣā'* or inference (*anumāna*) is the most important. But even a cursory glance on the system of Patañjali is enough to prove that his idea of yoga does not accord any supremacy to inference than that to scripture. Therefore, it can be presumed that an ancient form of Lokāyata must be depend-

[6] *Abhyudayadvārakaṁ niḥśreyasamiti madhyamapadalopī samāsaḥ, pañcamītatpuruṣo vā. -Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* (VUp.) (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 2002); (on VS 1.1.2) (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986), p. 11.

[7] *Manasaśacendriyāṇāñcaikāgryaṁ paramaṁ tapaḥ. -Mahābhārata, Śantipārva*, 250.4, (Satavalekara, Sripada Damodara (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1929).

[8] *The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda* (VS), 1.1.3, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[9] *Sāṁkhyaṁ yogo lokāyataṁ cetyānvīkṣikī.-Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra*, (Kangle, R.P. (ed.) 1969), p. 4.

ing on inference besides perception since scripture has no place at all as an authority in the popularly known Lokāyata.

Hence, from the above statement of Kauṭilya, one is led to believe that the 'Yoga mentioned in *Arthaśāstra* after the Sāṁkhya and before the Lokāyata certainly signifies the Vaiśeṣika and through this it could also denote the Nyāya system'.[10]

- Vātsyāyana, the author of *Nyāyabhāṣya*, has himself cited the theory of causation (*asatkāryavāda*) as an exclusive doctrine of 'the yogas' and has contra- posited this against the causation theory (*satkāryavāda*) of the Sāṁkhya.[11] Obviously, this reference cannot be taken to represent the yoga of Patañjali since that is already under the Sāṁkhya. Moreover, it is a well-known fact that the causation theory of Vaiśeṣika (*asatkāryavāda*) is totally unacceptable to the Pātañjala yoga school.

Therefore it might be said that the appellation 'yoga' referred to in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* is definitely used for the Vaiśeṣika system suggesting that the same has yoga or relation to the Nyāya which is being quoted as the theory of opponents (*pratitantrasiddhānta*) here.[12]

- Again, Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika* has mentioned that the theory of sense organs as material products (*indriyabhautikatvavāda*) is an exclusive doctrine of the yoga as opposed to the sense organs being accepted as material products (*indriyābhautikatvavāda*)[13] by the Sāṁkhya. Here, also, it is certainly clear that the term yoga is referring to the Vaiśeṣika (and Nyāya as well), while the Sāṁkhya covers Patañjali's philosophy (*aṣṭāṅgayoga*) in its fold.
- In the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara also, it has been suggested under the '*yogapratyuktyadhikaraṇa*'[14] that it is a refutation of the Vaiśeṣika rather than that of Pātañjala yoga which has already been refuted under the Sāṁkhya refutation, because both of them have common theories regarding world creation and the soul. By accepting this interpretation, a more uniform order of attacking his opponents by Śaṅkara can be seen for both in the first and second sections of second chapter, namely, 'smṛtipāda' and 'tarkapāda', i.e. refutations of the Sāṁkhyas, the Vaiśeśikas, the Bauddhas, the Jainas and the Āgamikas, one after the other.[15] This can also be corroborated with the own statement of Śaṅkara in his commentary of *Bhagavadgītā* that the word yoga could connote non-*aṣṭāṅgayoga* philosophy also.[16]

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[10] Sankaranarayanan, S. 1989. Śaṅkara and the Vaiśeṣika-Naiyāyika Schools. In *Perspectives of Śaṅkara*, Balasubramanian, R., and Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban (eds.), p. 147.

[11] *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh.) (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) (on *Nyāyasūtra* (NS), 1.1.29), p. 76.

[12] Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (1970) in his Hindi Translation of NBh., p. 76.

[13] *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika* (Thakur, Anantlal (ed.) 1997) on NS, 1.1.29.

[14] *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (on *Brahmasūtra* 2. 1.3), (Shatshastri, Swami Hanumandas (ed.) 1993).

[15] Sankaranarayanan, S. 1989. Śaṅkara and the Vaiśeṣika-Naiyāyika Schools. In *Perspectives of Śaṅkara*, pp. 145–146.

[16] Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on *Srimadbhagavadgita*, Introductory part and also under verses, 2.39, 2.45, 6.23, 8.8, 9.5, (Paṅśīkar, Wāsudev Laxmaṇ Shāstrī (ed.) 1936).

On the basis of the above, it may safely be stated that in the early Indian tradition, Vaiśeṣika was infrequently referred to by the word 'yoga'. Both Kauṭilya and Bādarāyana have mentioned Vaiśeṣika as yoga after the Sāṁkhya, while Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara have also referred to Vaiśeṣika as yoga. This goes on to prove that Vaiśeṣika was a highly respected and popular system in ancient Indian thought since it had pioneered the tendency of joining (yoga) the mundane and the divine, profane and the sacred, achievement (*abhyudaya*) as well as fulfilment (*niḥśreyasa*).

Kaṇāda as a *Yogin*

Kaṇāda, the propounder of Vaiśeṣika school, was undoubtedly a seer (*ṛṣi* or a *yogin*) just like the propounders of other schools of Indian philosophy. It is, therefore, that he had himself had a direct perception of reality. The very title of Kaṇāda, given to him, signifies that he had reached the highest level of yogic practices, so much so that he was completely committed and so deeply involved in the search for truth that he had even stopped eating anything else except the very minute particles of food (*kaṇas*).[17] Interestingly, the other name given to sage Kaṇāda is Ulūka which is also suggestive of his attitude as a seer of the highest order[18] who had realized the highest truth.

Intuitive Knowledge (*ārṣajñāna*)

It is in the above background that one can justly comprehend the delineation of intuitive knowledge (*ārṣajñāna*) in Indian thought in general and Vaiśeṣika school in particular. This peculiar kind of cognition is not the usual sensory perception experienced by ordinary mortals like us; it is the extraordinary and direct apprehension of the truth which is not to be accomplished by mere scholastics or bookish learning but has to be acquired after practising lots of austerities or yogic activities culminating into the realization of the seers, the enlightened ones; this type of knowledge dawns upon those whose mind is purified and steadied. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda define this as intuitive knowledge (*ārṣajñana*),[19] while the *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali mention it as '*prātibhajñana*',[20] but interestingly both of them characterize it as realization by the seers or enlightened ones (*siddhadarśanam*). The obvious similarity in the description of this typical form of knowledge is quite significant to prove that yoga is an underlying idea of Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

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[17] *Nyāyakandalī* (NK), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 4; *Vyomavatī* (Vyo.), (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930) p. 20 (च).

[18] Cf. *Srimadbhagavadgita*, 2.69, (Paṇśīkar, Wāsudev Laxmaṇ Shāstrī (ed.) 1936).

[19] *Ārṣaṁ siddhadarśanaṁ ca dharmebhyaḥ*.-VS, 9.2.13, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[20] *Mūrdhajyotiṣi siddhadarśanam*. *Prātibhād vā sarvam*.-*Yogasūtras*, 3.32–33, (Vidya Sagar, Jivananda (ed.) 1897).

Extraordinary Perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*/*yogaja pratyakṣa*)

This brings us to the point of extraordinary perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*) in the later tradition of Vaiśeṣika. According to this theory, perception is of two types: ordinary and extraordinary. Here, six types of contact between the sense organ and the object have been enumerated for explaining the former, while an additional type of contact is accepted for explaining the latter which is again subdivided into three kinds as follows:

- *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa*
- *Jñānalakṣaṇa*
- *Yogaja*[21]

The last one among the above is a specific type of cognition which is termed as yogic perception (*yogaja pratyakṣa*) since it can be experienced only by those realized persons (*yogins*), who have acquired such an extraordinary capacity that they can perceive anything, even without having a direct sense-object contact. Not only this, there are several gradations in their yogic powers; hence the higher types of *yogins* (*yukta*) can have an immediate perception of everything at all times even without concentration, while the lesser ones (*yuñjāna*) have to make some mental effort for perceiving an object.[22]

It is worth mentioning here that this particular aspect of Vaiśeṣika epistemology speaks volumes about the influence of yoga on its development. It is through this extraordinary sort of perception alone that the Vaiśeṣika system has established its theory of atoms (*paramāṇus*) and the ultimate particulars (*viśeṣas*) from which it draws its own nomenclature. Ordinary sense perception cannot, in any way, establish or explain the existence of such subtle and minute entities; hence, they took recourse to yoga and its powers. According to Praśastapāda, it is these extraordinary persons (*yogins*) who are positively different from ordinary beings like us and do have a similar apprehension of distinctness (*viśeṣa*) in respect of the atoms (*paramāṇus*) of the four elemental substances, marked for their sameness of form and character as also with respect to the innumerable liberated souls and minds. Praśastapāda delineates the extraordinary perception of *yogins* logically as follows: It is an apprehension that marks every individual subject as separate for being peculiar and identifies it as such in spite of varied spatio-temporal conditions. It is the ultimate particulars (*antyaviśeṣas*) which are the reason for this kind of an apprehension accruing into the *yogins*, independent of any cognition external to it.[23]

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[21] *Alaukikastu pratyakṣaḥ trividhaḥ parikīrtataḥ.*
Sāmānyalakṣaṇo jñanalakṣaṇo yogajastathā.-Bhāṣāpariccheda, (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850), Verse 63.

[22] *Yogajo dvividho prokto yuktayuñjānabhedataḥ.*
Yuktasya sarvadā bhānaṁ cintāsahakaṛto'paraḥ.- Bhāṣāpariccheda, (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850), Verse 65–66.

[23] *Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 767–769.

In contrast to the above, the world is held to be imperceptible in its subtle, non-manifest state in Sāṁkhya-yoga view; although its imperceptibility is not due to any incapacity of the perceiving subjects. The *Yuktidīpikā* commentary of *Sāṁkhyakārikā* contra-posits it against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory stated above according to which atoms are accessible to yogic perception. According to it, even Kapila, the greatest sage and seer, could not see the world in original form (*prakṛti*) because it is objectively non-manifest.[24]

On the one hand, it indicates that there were and must have been *yogins* of very high order who had revealed in yoga up to such an extent that they had magnificent capacities for perceiving an object just at the thought of it without another factor.[25] And on the other hand, it also suggests that intellectually advanced people like the Indian logicians also had faith in the extraordinary powers of *yogins*, even though they could not experience those themselves.

Yogic Experience

As regards the various aspects of yogic experience in Vaiśeṣika, further elaboration is available therein as follows:

- **Preparatory Disciplines**

As already stated, both the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools have begun with an ultimate goal of liberation in mind which is to be attained through direct realization of **6** or **16** categories, respectively.[26] But this direct realization dawns upon the eligible seekers only when they have prepared themselves by practising the path of discipline laid out in the system.

The commentator, Śaṁkaramiśra, while explaining an aphorism of Kaṇāda, writes in his commentary titled *Upaskāra* that there are two types of results of actions: the visible (*dṛṣṭa*) and the invisible (*adṛṣṭa*). The invisible result is to be accrued through two causes, namely:

- *Yogajam* – which is derived by practice of yoga and gives rise to 'abhyudaya' that signifies self-realization.
- *Yāgadānādijaṁ* – which is born out of performing of rituals and offering of oblations. This type of result of actions also gives rise to 'abhyudaya', and here it is to be understood as heaven.[27]

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[24] *Srikapilabrāhmaṇairapi pradhānapuruṣāvapratyakṣau iti naḥ śāstram. -Yuktidīpikā*, (Wezler, Albrecht and Motegi, Shujun (eds.) 1998), p. 70.

[25] *Acintyaprabhāvo hi yogajo dharmo na sahakāryantaramapekṣate*.-VUp, (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 2002) (on VS, 1.1.2), p. 11.

[26] VS, 1.1.4 (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986); NS, 1.1.1, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.), Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).

[27] *Adṛṣṭaṁ phalamapūrvameva tad yadi yogajaṁ tadā'bhyudaya ātmasākṣātkāraḥ. Yadi ca yāgadānādijaṁ tadā'bhyudayaḥ svargaḥ*.-VUp, (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.). 2002) (on VS, 6.2.1), p. 347.

It is clear from the above interpretation that the former type of invisible result (*abhyudaya*) signifies self-realization and leads to the ultimate goal (*niḥśreyasa*), which can only be attained through yoga. On the other hand, the latter form of unseen result (*abhyudaya*) pertains to attaining temporary pleasures only. It means that practice of yoga is an essential preparatory discipline for accomplishment of the final goal (*niḥśreyasa*) according to Vaiśeṣika.

Nyāyasūtras enumerate 12 objects of knowing,[28] which, if known through the right means of knowing, will lead to the highest goal of liberation. Fourfold knowledge is required for attaining this end:

- Objects to be forsaken (*heya*)
- The act of forsaking those objects forever (*hāna*)
- Means for accomplishing the above (*hānopāya*)
- Attaining what is being sought (*adhigama of niḥśreyasa*)[29]

It is noteworthy here that 'niḥśreyasa' is not different from 'apavarga' in Nyāya as has been explicitly stated by Vātsāyana himself.[30] The attainment of liberation (*apavarga*) is made possible by the right kind of knowledge which can only be had when the false cognition is warded off. This, in turn, requires rejection of defects which is caused by indulgence (*pravṛtti*). Once this is thwarted, the cycle of birth will stop, and after cessation of birth cycle, all kinds of suffering will be extinguished forever. Although this conception of liberation in the form of cessation of all sorts of experiences, pleasant or painful, might appear negative at first sight, this is the highest stage of perfection, where nothing but peace prevails.[31]

On closer analysis, it becomes clear that the preparatory discipline prescribed for the attainment of right kind of knowledge in Nyāya is psychophysical in approach and is not different than the practice of five restraints (*yamas*) and observances (*niyamas*) enjoined in the *Yogasūtras*.

Gautama, in his *Nyāyasūtras*, has stated it as follows: purification of the self is required for the attainment of liberation (*apavarga*) and is to be accomplished through practice of restraint (*yamas*) and observance (*niyama*) as also other means of yoga like proper postures (*āsana*), contemplation (*dhāraṇā*), concentration (*dhyāna*), regulation of breath (*prāṇāyāma*) and abstraction (*pratyāhāra*). Such refinement of the self results in the cessation of demerit and accumulation of merit, while practising withdrawal of sense organs from their respective objects brings in cessation of attachment and aversion.[32]

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[28] NS, 1.1.9, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.) Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).

[29] NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) (on NS, 1.1.1), p. 6.

[30] *Niḥśreyasādhigamo' pavargaprāptiriti.*- NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) (on NS, 1.1.1), p. 16.

[31] *Śāntaḥ khalvayaṁ sarvaviprayogaḥ sarvoparamo'pavargaḥ.*- NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) (on NS, 1.1.2), p. 21.

[32] *Tadarthaṁ yamaniyamābhyāmātmasaṁskāro yogāccātma-vidhyupāyaiḥ.*-NS, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.), Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913), 4.2.46.

In this way, preparatory discipline for yogic experience includes pondering, practice and meditation. That is why this contemplation of suffering is to be constantly held even in case of birth, right from the beginning, since it is also mingled with suffering. Therefore, he who concentrates on this idea constantly gets detached from sensory objects and attains liberation.[33]

- **Eligibility of the Seeker**

It is also to be noted that in the very first term of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, i.e. 'atha', the interpreters and commentators have found an implication of eligibility of those who are eager to study the system of Vaiśeṣika. According to them, here, a reference is being made to one of the four prerequisites (*anubandha-catuṣṭaya*) for acquiring knowledge of any scholastic text (*śastra*) in Indian tradition. The first one of these prerequisites is also the foremost: that a genuine seeker should not only be intellectually well-equipped but also morally sound and ethically groomed for grasping the true nature of reality as and when imparted by the preceptor (*guru*).[34]

This brings us to the issue of an earnest longing in the seeker which is the most significant beginning point of any spiritual discourse. Unless the disciple is ready to listen and understand, even the most celebrated teacher cannot transmit anything. Since the Vaiśeṣika promises to lead the aspirants to the ultimate goal of life (*niḥśreyasa*), hence, only those who are desirous of attaining the final goal and have an appropriate faith in what Kaṇāda is going to enunciate approach this branch of learning.[35]

Obviously such sort of preparation is not easy to accomplish; it requires a lot of discipline and rigorous practice. That is why, the founders of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, as also of other schools of Indian philosophy, had themselves put in great amount of austerities before embarking upon the task of propounding their schools. The same is suggested by the titles of 'ṛṣi' (seer) or 'mahaṛṣi' (the great seer) before their names. They are not ordinary mortals but highly enlightened *yogin*s who have had the direct perception of the truth.

- **Preliminary Experiences**

As already stated, the main aim of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools is to lead the seekers to their ultimate goal of liberation through proper knowledge (*tattvajñāna*), which is not ordinary comprehension of objects but a direct realization of truth, unobstructed by all sorts of false perceptions. Now it may be asked here that even though constant practice might lead to true comprehension, how the removal of false cogni-

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[33] *Samāhito bhāvayati bhāvayannirvidyate nirviṇṇasya vairāgyaṁ viraktasyāpavarga iti.* - NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) (on NS, 1.1.9), p. 43.

[34] *Atheti siṣyākāṅkṣānantaryamāha. Ata iti-yataḥ śravaṇādipaṭavo'nasūyakāścāntevāsina upaseduritarthaḥ.*-VUp., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.). 2002) (on VS, 1.1.1), pp. 5–6.

[35] *Eteṣāṁ sambandhānāṁ jñānāniḥśreyasārthināmiha śāstre pravṛttiḥ, mokṣamāṇāśca munergṛhītāptabhāvā eva śāstre pravartante.*- VUp., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.). 2002) (on VS, 1.1.4), pp. 17–18.

tions presented by the ego can be guaranteed. To this, the *Nyāyasūtras* have an answer that the same can be achieved through the practice of a particular kind of meditation which has been explained in the *Yogaśāstra*.[36]

Elaborating this specific form of meditation, the commentator says as follows:

> When the mind is withdrawn from the external sense-organs and is controlled through the sustaining effort, then it gets into a particular contact with the self which is generated by the desire for right kind of knowledge. When this particular type of contact between the mind and self is operative, then cognitions regarding sensory objects do not take place, rather true knowledge occurs due to the constant practice of the specific sort of *samādhi*.[37]

The same is suggested in *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* where the true knowledge is sought to be obtained by a special kind of 'dharma'.[38]

This specialty of knowledge lies in its being born out of yogic practices:

> The uniqueness of *dharma* is also derived from yogic practices.[39]

This can also be explained in accordance with the explanation of Praśastapāda, who while interpreting proper knowledge (*tattvajñānat*) does not quote the epithet 'dharmaviśeṣaprasūtāt', in his treatise, but adds another phrase which means that the divine impelling only helps in acquiring such exact knowledge.[40]

The inspiration of God is helpful for performing and accruing special merits (*yogaja dharma*) only, according to a modern interpreter of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*.[41] Emancipation (*mokṣa*) is a state where the cycle of life and death stops forever, and it is attained through various steps for self-realization, namely, hearing (*śravaṇa*), pondering (*manana*), practising yoga (*yogābhyāsa*), contemplation (*nididhyāsana*), posture (*āsana*), regulation of breath (*prāṇāyāma*), calmness and control (*śamadamsampattiḥ*), realization of individual self and Supreme Self (*ātmaparātma-sākṣātkāra*), etc.[42]

Obviously these steps include all the yogic practices which are sufficient to prove that yogic experience in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has an important, underlying role to play.

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[36] *Samādhiviśeṣābhyāsāt.*-NS, 4.2.38, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.), Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).

[37] *Sa tu pratyāhṛtasyendriyebhyo manaso dhārakeṇa prayatnena dhāryamāṇasyātmanā saṁyogastattva-bubhutsā-viśiṣṭaḥ. Sati hi tasminnindriyārtheṣu buddhayo notpadyante tadabhyās-avaśāttattvabuddhirutpadyate.*-NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) on NS, 4.2.38, p. 583.

[38] *Dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarmasāmānya -viśeṣa -samavāyānāṁ tattavajñānanniḥśreyasam.*-VS, 1.1.4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[39] *Tattvajñānañca yogavidhisādhyam.*- VUp, (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.). 2002) on VS, 1.1.4, p. 24.

[40] *Tacceśvaracodanābhivyaktāddharmādeva.*-PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 18.

[41] *Vaiśeṣika Darśana-Vidyodaya Bhāṣya*, (Hindi) (Udayaveera Shastri, 2006) p. 14.

[42] VUp., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 2002) on VS, 6.2.16, p. 359.

- **Advanced Experiences**

As regards further details of yogic experience in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the following points need to be noted:

- The *yogin*s can directly experience anything or everything, be it perceptible or imperceptible; they can even perceive *dharma* which is usually held to be imperceptible (*atīndriya*) for ordinary human beings. This is made possible through austerities (*tapas*).[43]

  The same can be substantiated from the following statement of Vācaspati Miśra:

  The *yogin*s can perceive unmanifested objects also.[44]

- In fact, this extraordinary feature of yogic perception is born out of the piety of their hearts. Hearts of ordinary mortals like us are full of various sorts of impurities like attachment, aversion, etc. But the *yogin*s, due to a constant practice of meditation, are able to annihilate all sorts of defects; hence, their hearts are pure, and their perceptions are clear:

  Thy *yogin's* pure mind has a direct awareness of everything. The reason of this direct awareness lies in the fact that the impurities of the yogin's mind are consumed by the daily practices of meditation.[45]

- The clarity of yogic experiences is also confirmed by Vyomaśiva in his statement as follows:

  Pure knowledge which is devoid of all images, dawns upon the *yogin*.[46]

As mentioned above, the *yogin* can experience various objects simultaneously. Although the Nyāya does not propound simultaneity of cognitions for ordinary human beings, it is said by Vātsyāyana that a *yogin*, after attaining extraordinary powers, can apprehend different objects of cognition simultaneously.[47]

In the words of Udayana, the *yogin*, who is possessed of the power of yogic accomplishment, can create several bodies by mere desire which can then enjoy various fruits of several sorts.[48]

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[43] *Nanu kartavyatārūpaḥ trikālasparśavarjitaḥ.*
caksurviṣayatāmeti dharma ityatisāhasam.
Satyaṁ sāhasametatte mama vā carmacakṣuṣaḥ.
Na tveṣa durgamaḥ panthā yoginām sarvadarśinām.-NM, Vol.I, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), p. 96.

[44] *Yoginastvanabhivyaktamapi paśyantīti.-Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā*, (Thakur, Anantalal (ed.) 1996), p. 168.

[45] *Pratyahaṁ bhāvanābhyāsakṣapitāśeṣakalmaṣam.*
Yoginām tu manaḥ śuddhaṁ kamivārthaṁ na paśyati.-NM, Vol.I, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), p. 98.

[46] *Yogini sakalakalpanāvikalaṁ jñānamutpadyate*.-Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (ङ).

[47] *Yogī khalu ṛddhau prādurbhūtāyāṁ yugapajjñeyānyupalabhate.*-NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) on NS, 3.2.19, p. 397.

[48] *Yogarddhiprabhāvasampanno vividhaphalayogino vicitrasvabhāvānekadaiva bahūn kāyān icchāmātreṇaiva nirmimīte.-Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi*, (Thakur, Anantalal (ed.) 1996), p. 28.

Vyomaśiva has also remarked that on accomplishment of supernatural power called '*ṛ*ddhi', a yogī can create a multitude of bodies endowed with sense organs and enjoy several objects simultaneously.[49]

- It means that the *yogin*s can, by the sheer power of their strong will and concentration, create and experience remote objects also. Thus, when the *yogin*s consume all inner defects and acquire the highest capability of concentration, by the constant practice of meditation, they attain to faultless omniscience:

> Thus, when the sages consume all the inner defects and acquire high proficiency in the art of concentration by the constant practice of meditation, they attain to faultless omniscience.[50]

It is due to the potency of yogic powers that only a *yogin*, whose vision is purified by the application of collyrium of yoga, can experience such remote objects as the movements of star clusters, which are not vividly perceptible to an ordinary person:

> Just as gold, being slowly purified in a closed vessel, acquires matchless beauty, similarly the inner organ of a sage is capable of perceiving all knowable objects by the constant practice of meditation.[51]

- It is also worth mentioning here that according to Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika, there is a continuity of yogic powers in between two or more lives since the *dharma* produced by repeated performance of yoga follows on even in next births:

> *Dharma* produced by the repeated performance of yoga follows on even in the next births.[52]

- Last, but not the least, there is a significant point regarding yogic experience raised from the side of opponents in *Nyāyasūtras*:

The opponent asks the proponent as to what about the disturbing and diverting influence of sensory objects? Wouldn't these and other mundane experiences like hunger, thirst, etc. perturb the quietude of a *yogin* who is practising meditation (*samādhi*)? It may be that the *yogin* comes out of his concentrated state due to such obstructions and diversions.

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[49] *Yogī khalu ṛddhau prādurbhūtāyāṁ…… sendriyāni śarīrāṇi nirmāya yugapad bhogānupabhuṅkte.* -Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 411.

[50] *Tadevaṁ kṣīṇadoṣāṇāṁ dhyānāvahitacetasām.*
Nirmalaṁ sarvaviṣayaṁ jñānaṁ bhavati yoginām.-NM, Vol.I, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), p. 98.

[51] *Yathā vā puṭapākena śodhyamānaṁ śanaiḥ śanaiḥ.*
Hemaniṣpratīkāśaṁ tadyāti kalyāṇatāṁ parām.
Tathaiva bhāvanābhyāsād yogināmapi mānasam.
Jñāne sakalavijñeyasākṣātkāre kṣamaṁ bhavet.- NM, Vol.I, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), pp. 97–98.

[52] *Yogābhyāsajanito dharmo janmāntare'pi anuvartate*.-NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 1970) on NS 4.2.42, p. 586.

To this, the exponent retorts and presents following two arguments:

- Firstly, even if there be some minor disturbances, the 'samādhi' stage of the *yogin* will be able to bear fruit of proper knowledge (*tattvajñāna*), due to the potency of his yogic practices performed in earlier births. This goes on to prove the point made above.
- The second argument posited by Gautama is that it is just to avoid possibility of perturbing factors mentioned by the opponent that the *Yogaśāstra* exhorts to practice yoga in serene places like the forest, the caves or the sandy banks of the rivers, etc.:

> It has been exhorted in the *yogaśāstra* to practice yoga in places like the forest, the caves, the sandy banks of the river etc.[53]

In this way, it may be said on the basis of the brief delineation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika references quoted above that the yogic experience is a very deep and inherent foundation of this twin system.

But it does not, in any way, suggest that Indian philosophy or yogic potencies for that matter were concerned with magic or occultism because doubts and queries regarding the omniscience of *yogins* have also been raised from within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika[54] tradition itself. Of course, refutations of such dissenting voices were also made[55] subsequently, and it was, on the whole, accepted that the *yogins* could have and did have such extraordinary powers as enunciated earlier.

It was on the basis of some rationally strong arguments that such exceptions were brought in and not in the name of any dogma or occultism. It is also stated that,

> It would not be correct to speak of the yogic perception being intuitive. For it is meant to be sense-perception in which the span of sensibility-range of the sense-organs is widened as well as made more precise.[56]

There is no doubt about the fact that yoga in India has been a science as well as philosophy which was not merely preached but also practised by people of high mental calibre and advanced spiritual discipline. It is therefore, not without reason, that the tradition venerated such persons, so much so that their statements were not only accorded the status of a separate means of validity, i.e. *śabda* or verbal testimony, but it was also put on the highest pedestal of supreme authority. Such worthy souls were called the seers (*ṛṣis*[57]), and they were respected as well as trusted the most; their word was not supposed to be doubted. This can be evidenced from one of the references of a Vaiśeṣika text as follows:

In the *Tarkadīpikā* commentary of *Tarkasaṁgraha*, while enumerating the five-fold division of the third category of activity or movement (*karma*), as expounded

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[53] *Araṇyaguhāpulinādiṣu yogābhyāsopadeśaḥ.*-NS, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.) Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913), 4.2.42.

[54] *Yogino'tiriktaviśeṣamīkṣante. Evaṁ tarhi ta eva saśapathaṁ pṛcchyantāṁ kimete'tiriktaṁ viśeṣamīkṣante na veti. -Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam*, (Karl H. Potter (ed.) 1957), p. 43.

[55] VUp., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.). 2002) (on VS, 8.1.2), p. 451.

[56] (Gajendragadkar, Veena S. 1988) *Kaṇadā's Doctrine of the Padārthas*, p. 261.

[57] *Sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ.-Nirukta*, 1.6, (Sarup, Lakshman (ed.) 2002).

by Kaṇāda, an objection is put forth by Annaṁbhaṭṭa in the form of opponent's view (*pūrvapakṣa*). The question is raised as to why did Kaṇāda enunciate only five types of activity (*karma*)? If various other forms of movement such as gyration (*bḥramaṇa*), evacuation (*recana*), flowing down (*syandana*), flaming up (*ūrdhvajvalana*) and slanting motion (*tiryaggamana*) can be covered under simple going (*gamana*), then why can't the *utkṣepaṇa* (throwing up) and other three forms of activity/movement be similarly included under it? In other words, it would have been quite logical to hold only one type of activity with the name of simple going (*gamana*) which could have included all kinds of movement. But this objection is rejected by another commentator on *Tarkadīpikā*, stating that since it has been explained by none else than the seer (*ṛṣi*) Kaṇāda himself, hence, it will be sacrilegious on our part to question what is laid down by a free-willed sage.[58]

Nevertheless, it has to be reiterated here that statements like the above cannot and should not be taken to imply that Indian philosophy is dogmatic and irrational since it has always encouraged rational debate and philosophical argumentation. The issue being emphasized here is that of yogic powers and potentialities. The very acceptance of extraordinary (*yogaja*) perception in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika goes on to prove that the Indian tradition not only holds but also upholds that the human mind can cultivate its capabilities up to the maximum level where no mediate instruments are required and a direct and immediate perception of reality is experienced by a few realized ones. It does not in any way suggest that those few persons are the fortunate ones, or are favoured by divine grace, but it establishes that each and everybody can, if he or she so chooses and strives, cultivate such mental capabilities. The same is proved by the pervasive popularity which the system of yoga enjoys in Indian philosophical tradition, right from the Vedic notion of austerities (*tapas*) to the various forms of yoga propounded in the *Bhagavadgītā*.[59]

This can precisely be explained as a reason behind the yoga of Patañjali, being a separate school of philosophy and yet neither mentioning any opponent (*pūrvapakṣa*) nor establishing his own theory like other schools of Indian philosophical thought. It simply means that the principles of yoga were already in practices in Hindu as well as non-Hindu schools of philosophy; Patañjali just systematized those principles; he did not even begin his aphorisms (*sūtras)* with enunciation of any concepts, rather with the discipline of yoga:

> Now (begins) the exposition of yoga.[60]

The book of *Yogasūtras* is also not divided into chapters (*adhyāyas*) or daily lessons (*āhnikas*) like the books of other schools, but it is divided into the sections (*pādas*), according to the main topics of discussion.

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[58] *Na cotkṣepaṇatavādīnāṁ gamane'ntarbhāvo'stviti śaṁkanīyam. Svatantrecchasya niyogaparyanuyogānarhasya ṛṣeḥ saṁmatadvāditi bhāvaḥ. -Nyāyabodhinī* on *Tarkadīpikā*, quoted by Athalye-Bodas in Notes on *Tarkasaṁgraha*, (Athalye, Y. V. (ed.) Bodas, M. R. (Eng. trans.) 1974), p. 89.

[59] *Srimadbhagavadgita*, Chapters 1–18, (Paṇśīkar, Wāsudev Laxmaṇ Shāstrī (ed.) 1936).

[60] *Atha yogānuśāsanam.-Yogasūtras*, 1.1, (Vidya Sagar, Jivananda (ed.) 1897).

The ultimate goal of life according to yoga system is liberation (*kaivalya*), to be attained through control of mental modes (*cittavṛttinirodha*), which in turn is to be achieved through a discipline called eightfold path (*aṣṭāṅgayoga*).[61] It is worth mentioning here that although the Vaiśeṣika does not explicitly mention yoga as a means to the ultimate goal of *niḥśreyasa*, it does propound knowledge of ultimate reals (*tattvajñāna*) which is reduced to self-realization (*ātmasākṣātkāra*) therein and which is possible only through the highest yogic practice (*yogaja samādhi*). Hence it may be understood that yoga as the process of mental discipline does play an important role in Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Definition of Yoga in Vaiśeṣika

Yoga has actually been practised in India, both as a means and as an end; it has been understood as an instrument (*sādhana*) and also as a course of discipline (*sādhanā*) in the Vaiśeṣika system. It is a means to the highest goal (*niḥśreyasa*) no doubt but is also a preparatory code of conduct at the ordinary level for anyone who desires to get rid of suffering and earn worldly progress (*abhyudaya*). The most striking feature of yoga in Vaiśeṣika philosophy is that it is not like Patañjali's yoga (*samādhiyoga*) aiming at liberation (*kaivalya*); rather, it is a technique of fixing the mind in a more mundane manner, i.e. withdrawing it from mental activity. In between the twin aspects of the end and the means, namely, 'abhyudaya' and 'niḥśreyasa', lots of psychological processes are involved, and they have also been discussed in Vaiśeṣika system.

Accordingly Kaṇāda has defined yoga as follows: 'the absence of physical/bodily pain due to fixation of the mind upon the soul as a result of non-beginning of the mental activity'.[62]

The term 'tadanārambha' (non-beginning) in the above *sūtra* seems very much akin to restraint of mental modes (*cittavṛttinirodha*) of Patañjali, if not identical, and has been interpreted in various ways by Śaṁkaramiśra in his *Upaskāra* as follows:

- Non-beginning of activity in the mind.
- When there is no pleasure or pain due to the fixation of mind on soul.
- When the embodied soul does not experience pain, although it is dwelling in the body.
- The vital air is the sign of self (*ātman*); hence, the word *ātman* here denotes *prāṇa*.

[61] *Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ*.-*Yogasūtras*, 1.2, (Vidya Sagar, Jivananda (ed.) 1897).

[62] *Tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi śarirasya dukhābhāvo yogaḥ*.-VS, 5.2.16, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

- The action is the sign of life; hence, involuntary (*jīvanayoni*) type of effort (*prayatna*) of the self (*ātman*) is inferred on the basis of breathing; otherwise, no explanation could be given for inhaling and exhaling in deep sleep also.[63]

In the light of above interpretations, one can say that yoga according to Vaiśeṣika system is more of an epistemic process rather than an ethical one since it is possible only after the mind has been steadied. This, again, seems quite similar to the idea of yoga in Patañjali's system.

According to Vaiśeṣika view, the internal organ (*manas*) is an instrument of cognition, the senses are the means, while self (*ātman*) is the seat of consciousness. Similarly, physical character of the mind with its basis on the physiological organism is the foundation of the yoga system as well. Yoga formulates the methods by which mental attitudes including the affections and conations are to be controlled or to be made consonant with the true interests of the self. Yoga is the name for methods by which control is gained over the mind, particularly with reference to its affections and conations, by the regulation of the physiological process, the basic form of it being the regulation of breathing.

From this point of view, it will be worthwhile to compare and contrast some other important concepts in yoga as well as Vaiśeṣika (e.g. the notion of *tanmātra* and *paramāṇu*, *kāla* and *kṣaṇa*, *Iśvara* and *puruṣaviśeṣa*, *sṛṣṭi* and *vyakta*, etc.). It is in this connection that a modern exponent of Vaiśeṣika has added a new dimension by stating that the most basic distinction between Sāṁkhya-yoga and Vaiśeṣika is that the former is evolutionary while the latter is nonevolutionary; according to him, the Vaiśeṣika exposition of categories is horizontal, while the Saṁkhya-yoga model is vertical, although *puruṣa* is coordinated with *prakṛti* in a horizontal manner.[64]

The above distinction can very well be marked in the systems of yoga and Vaiśeṣika as characteristic examples of two different theories of causality (*satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*).

Conclusion

What follows from the above is that Yoga and Vaiśeṣika systems of Indian philosophy are very closely connected, so much so that a part of the tradition had termed Vaiśeṣika as yoga itself. Obviously, the appellation of yoga, used for connoting Vaiśeṣika, cannot be taken in the sense of contemporarily popular Pātañjala yoga but in its inherent tendency of joining the opposites as two complementaries, which has been a very specific feature of Indian thought.

[63] VUp., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.). 2002) on VS, 5.2.16, pp. 320–21.

[64] (Halbfass, Wilhelm 1993) *On Being and What There Is*, *Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology*, p. 55.

It is therefore quite logical to hold that the Vaiśeṣika method of yoga as available in ancient tradition basically appears to be a mode of enunciation rather than a course of spiritual discipline as charted out in Patañjali's yoga. However, the nature of yoga in later Vaiśeṣika has undergone tremendous development as is clear from the various interpretations by subsequent writers.

To conclude, it may be said that the concept of yoga has played a very significant role in the origin and development of Vaiśeṣika philosophy as also in case of other schools of Indian philosophical thought. In brief, it is appropriate to quote the words of Udayana, which mean that abundance of yogic influence is really inconceivable.[65]

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[65] *Acintyo hi yogaprabhāvātiśayaḥ.-Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi*, (Thakur, Anantalal (ed.) 1996), p. 437.

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Chapter 3
Concept of Categories in Vaiśeṣika

Abstract A basic framework of Vaiśeṣika categories (*padārthas*) is being put forth in this chapter. The Vaiśeṣika system propounds a distinct approach for explaining the entities of universe and projects six positive categories (*bhāva padārthas*); the seventh one, a negative category (*abhāva*), was added later on. A meticulously detailed delineation of all the seven categories is available in Vaiśeṣika source texts, which is the main focus of this chapter.

Keywords *Padārtha · Dravya · Guṇa · Karma · Sāmānya · Viśeṣa · Samavāya · Abhāva · Tattva · Prameya/jñeya · Sat · Bhāva · Astitva · Abhidheyatva · Jñeyatva · Sādharmya · Vaidharmya · Sādṛśya*

Background

The concept of 'category' (*padārtha*[1]) occupies a distinct place in the field of philosophical thinking right from the time of Ṛgveda[2] in Indian philosophical tradition and Aristotle[3] in western philosophical thought. Broadly speaking, the idea of category is intended to signify a metaphysical reality which is the underlying essence of existence, as also our knowledge of it. To be precise, 'A category is a mode of being, a type or kind of being, a manner of existing, a way of having ontological status, an ultimate demarcation of reality'.[4]

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[1] Colebrooke, H.T. (1837) was perhaps the first who rendered the Vaiśeṣika term *padārtha* as 'category', *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I, p. 261.

[2] *Ṛgveda*, 10.129.1–7, (Saraswati, Swami Satya Prakash and Satyakam Vidyalankar (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[3] (Aristotle 1949). The *Categories*. In *Organon*, Vol. I (Reprint) (ed.) Harold P. Cooke.

[4] Walhout, Donald. 1961. On *Categories*. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, xxxiv, 3, October: 142.

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It must be mentioned at the outset that the Vaiśeṣika scheme of categorization not only entails an idea of 'thinking inside the box' but also implies many more sets of sub-boxes incorporated within the widest one. In other words, the six categories of Vaiśeṣika subsume several sub-groups of categories within themselves, which have been delineated on the basis of various divisions envisaged from different angles. An in-depth study of this aspect of categories as conceived in the Vaiśeṣika system is the main focus of this chapter.

Introduction

Vaiśeṣika is usually held to be a pluralistic realism in the sense that it propounds six categories as types of reality and claims that all the existent, knowable and nameable entities can be covered under six categories,[5] namely: substance (*dravya*), property or attribute (*guṇa*), activity or motion (*karma*), universal (*sāmānya*), differential or ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). The Vaiśeṣika asserts that these six categories[6] are ultimate reals and not merely products of thought; they are not dependent upon human cognition for their existence, although all of them are said to be objects of knowledge.

Definition and Number of Categories

The various definitions[7] and divisions of categories (*padārthas*) available in the original Vaiśeṣika tradition aim at expounding the nature of reality and tend to claim that nothing is left out of these types of reals.[8] The course of development and systematization of the theory of categories in classical Vaiśeśika might have been gradual as

[5] *Etasyāmeva bhāvātmakaṁ viśvamantarbhavati*. – *Tārkikarakṣā*, (Sampatkumaracharya, (ed.) 2004), pp. 162–63.

[6] Later on, a seventh category *abhāva* was also added to the Vaiśeṣika list, but because this section of the chapter primarily deals with the classical sources, *abhāva* is not mentioned here. However for details on *abhāva*, please see Kumar, ShashiPrabha. 2013. *Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy*: *On Knowing and What is to be Known*, pp. 35–37.

[7] (a) *Abhidheyaḥ padārthaḥ*. – *Laksaṇāvalī*, (Jha, Shashinath (ed.) 1964), p. 1.
(b) *Pramitiviṣayāḥ padārthāḥ*. – *Saptapadārthī*, (Gurumurti, D. (ed. and Eng. trans.) 1932), p. 2.

[8] (a) 'The Vaiśeṣika system of categories (*padārtha*), with its inherent claim of comprehensive enumeration, is obviously committed to this answer…'.
'The basic claim is that all entities can be listed and classified under certain fundamental titles or categories'. (Wilhelm, Halbfass 1993) *On Being and What There Is*: *Classical Vaiśeṣika And the History of Indian Ontology*, p. 70.
(b) 'As everything whatever subjective or objective, real or unreal, existent or non-existent or subsistent, determinate or indeterminate, conceivable or inconceivable that enters or can enter into philosophical discussion, must be directly expressible or indirectly suggestible (e.g. by words like "contradictory", "conceivable", "square-circle", "meaningless") by some words or another, it can be at once seen that "Padārtha" is the widest term for Philosophy'. Datta D.M. 1956. The Interpretation of Vaiśeṣika Categories, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, XXViii: 4: 218.

suggested by some scholars.[9] This is also corroborated from the fact that even after a general acceptance of six categories in Vaiśeṣika, efforts for including many more categories in the list were continuing within and outside the tradition.[10] After a formal inclusion of *abhāva* as a category, the Vaiśeṣikas had finally accepted seven categories in principle, but no more inclusion was accorded further. Accordingly, many of the later Vaiśeṣika scholars have clearly rejected a number of entities proposed as categories by the opponents (*pūrvapakṣin*). In fact, the number of such rejected entities goes up to 23 in one of the commentaries of *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. The names of these 23 entities proposed and rejected there are as follows:

(i) *Bheda*
(ii) *Śakti*
(iii) *Śuddhi*
(iv) *Aśuddhi.*
(v) *Bhāvanā*
(vi) *Svatva*
(vii) *Kṣanika*
(viii) *Vaiśiṣṭya*
(ix) *Samūha*
(x) *Prakāritva*
(xi) *Saṁkhyā*
(xii) *Sādṛṣya*
(xiii) *Tāratva*
(xiv) *Mandatva*
(xv) *Ādhārādheyabhāva*
(xvi) *Vyañjanāvṛtti*
(xvii) *Sphoṭa*
(xviii) *Saṁsargamaryādā*
(xix) *Liṅga*
(xx) *Viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva*
(xxi) *Kāraṇatva*
(xxii) *Svarūpasambandha*
(xxiii) *Tattedantā* [11]

It follows from the above that the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of seven categories might have withstood various tests of time and finally emerged as an all-encompassing, well-structured framework for explaining the diversities of the universe in seven types of reals. Accordingly, the basic substrata of reality are posited as substance (*dravya*); the attributes and activities ascribed to them are explained as property or attribute (*guṇa*) activity or motion (*karma*); their natural commonality and ultimate particularity are described as universal (*sāmānya*) and differential or ultimate par-

[9] (Frauwallner, Erich 1973) *History of Indian Philosophy*, (Eng. Trans.) V.M. Bedekar, Vol. II, pp. 79–106.

[10] For details see Kumar, Shashiprabha (1992). *Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha-Nirūpaṇa* (Hindi), pp. 30–35.

[11] *Setu*, (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), pp. 67–99.

ticularity (*viśeṣa*); their mutual interrelation has been explained through inherence (*samavāya*), and the negative aspect of reality has been elucidated as absence or negation (*abhāva*).

The exhaustiveness of the Vaiśeṣika list of categories was carried forward to its logical culmination by Udayana when he explained the reason for non-enumeration of absence or negation (*abhāva*) in the list of categories by Kaṇāda[12] and then first subdivided these into two types – positive (*bhāva*) and negative (*abhāva*).[13] Later on, other scholars like Sivaditya,[14] Sri Vallabhacārya[15] and Sridhara[16] followed this line, and seven categories were widely accepted in Vaiśeṣika tradition.

Order of Enumeration of Categories

It must be mentioned here that even the order of enumeration of these categories is quite significant and has been justified by several Vaiśeṣika scholars.[17] Substance (*dravya*) comes first in the list, because, being the substratum of all the categories and the one and only inherent cause of various products, it happens to be the chief category; property or attribute (*guṇa*) and not activity (*karma*) follows substance (*dravya*), because, unlike activity (*karma*), it resides in all the substances and is closest to substance on account of the fact that it comes into existence and unites with substance immediately after the substance is produced. Activity (*karma*) comes before universal (*sāmānya*), because *sāmānya* is connected with it (*karma*). Universal (*sāmānya*) must come after substance, attribute and action, in which it inheres: differential or ultimate particular (*viśeṣa*) follows universal, because the former is a counter-entity to the latter. It comes before inherence (*samavāya*), because it is a related to its substrates through inherence. Inherence comes last in the list of positive categories, because it operates as a nexus of all the other five categories. And, since absence or negation (*abhāva*) is nothing but in the nature of a negative of all the six positive categories, it is quite in the fitness of things that it is placed at the end of the list of categories.[18]

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[12] *Abhāvastu svarūpavānapi pṛthak noddiṣṭaḥ. Pratiyoginirūpaṇādhīnanirūpaṇatvat. Na tu tucchatvāt.* – *Kiraṇāvalī* (Kir.), (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 6.

[13] *Sa dwividho*, *bhāvābhāvabhedāt*. – *Laksaṇāvalī*, (Jha, Shashinath (ed.) 1964), p. 1.

[14] *Pratiyogijñānādhīnajñāno'bhāvaḥ.* – *Saptapadārthī*, (Gurumurti, D. (ed. and Eng. trans.) 1932), p. 62.

[15] *Abhāvaśca vaktavyo niḥśreyasopayogitvāt*, *bhāvaprapañcavat.* – *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, (Śāstrī, Harihara (ed.) 1991), p. 16.

[16] *Nyāyakandalī* (NK), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 553–558.

[17] *Ādau dravyasyoddeśaḥ*, *sarvāśrayatvena prādhānyāt. Guṇānāñca karmāpekṣayā bhūyastvād dravyānantaramabhidhānam. Niyamena guṇānuvidhāyitvāt karmaṇāṁ guṇānantaramuddeśaḥ. Karmānvitatvāt sāmānyasya karmānantaramabhidhānam. Pañcapadārthavṛtteḥ samavāyasya sarvaśeṣeṇābhidhāne prāpte viśeṣāṇāṁ madhye kathanaṁ*. – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 17.

[18] *Dravyasya sarvapadārthādhāratvena samavāyikāraṇatvena ca prādhānyāt prathamamuddeśaḥ. Guṇajātīyasya sarvadravyavṛttitvād utpattyuttarakṣaṇamevotpannatvenātisānnidhyācca guṇasya tadānantaryam. Karmajātīyasya tadvaiparītyājjātyādhāratvācca tadānantaryam.*

Nature of Categories

In fact, various schools of Indian philosophical tradition aim at explaining the nature of ultimate reality and offer different denominations for indicating the same. Therefore, one gets several Sanskrit terms such as *tattva*, *prameya*, *jñeya*, *viṣaya*, *vastu*, *sat*, *bhāva*, *artha* and *padārtha* for denoting the reals. Needless to say that each of these terms has a different shade of meaning attached with it, which can be grasped by referring to various usages of the same in respective sources.[19] The Vaiśeṣika school has not only preferred to use the term *padārtha* for representing numerous categories of reality but has also provided fresh insights while discussing different dimensions of it. It is not without reason then that the system of Vaiśeṣika is also known as *padārthaśāstra*.[20]

The term *padārtha* literally connotes the meaning (*artha*) of a word (*pada*), i.e. an object conveyed by a name. This at once suggests that the reality is objective and can be communicated through language. Since language presupposes knowledge and knowledge leads to a corresponding real, the Vaiśeṣikas have incorporated the following three aspects as common criteria of the six categories proposed by them:

> *Ṣaṇṇāmapi padārthānāmastitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni.*[21]
>
> All the six *padārthas* have three general properties, namely: isness, nameability and knowability.

It is noteworthy here that according to Vaiśeṣika viewpoint, the above three[22] are not just common characteristics attributed to the six categories but are in fact the inherent features expressing their essential nature. It is therefore that each one of these three is substantially significant for understanding the Vaiśeṣika concept of category. "These three terms in spite of their obvious connotative differences, are thus universal in their extension; they are, therefore, interchangeable, so far as their application to reality as such, or any aspect of it, is concerned."[23] In other words, in this definition of category comprising of isness, namebility and knowability, it is already implied that the Vaiśeṣika school claims to attempt a thorough analysis of reality through a complete classification of kinds of being and that it purports to take cognizance of everything that simply is (*asti*), that is nameable (*abhidheya*) and that is knowable (*jñeya*).[24]

Sāmānyasyānuvṛttatvena tritayagatatvena ca bahuviṣayatvāt tadānantaryam. Eteṣāṁ pañcānāṁ sambandhatvena samavāyasya tadānantaryam. Ṣaṇṇāṁ niṣedharūpatvenābhāvasya tadānantaryam ityuddeśakramaḥ. – Mitabhāṣiṇīṭīkā of Mādhava Sarasawatī on *Saptapadārthī*, (Mohan, Amarendra and Chandra, Narendra (eds.) 1934), pp. 4–5.

[19] To illustrate a few, Vide **Table 3.1** – Different denominations for denoting reals, p. 46.

[20] Vide (Jha, Anand 1965) *Padārthaśāstra*, (Hindi).

[21] *Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 41.

[22] Notably, this triple characterization of Vaiśeṣika categories corresponds well with the contemporary discussion on reality, language and thought.

[23] (Bhaduri, Sadananda 1975) *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, p. 9.

[24] For an interesting current debate on this claim, see W. Perrett, Roy. 1999. Is Whatever Exists knowable and nameable? *Philosophy East and West*, 49.4: 401–414.

The main thrust of Vaiśeṣika system has been on the enumeration and enunciation of *dharma* which comprises of material achievement (*abhyudaya*) and spiritual fulfilment (*niḥśreyasa*).[25] Of these two, the former is stated to be exact knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) and also the means for attainment of the latter, which in turn signifies the highest end.[26] Interestingly, just after proclaiming to explain *dharma*, Kaṇāda, the founder of Vaiśeṣika system, proceeds to expound the six categories which does not seem congruous, and so he has also earned the ridicule of some of his opponents,[27] but a closer study reveals that even through this description of six categories, he intends to explain *dharma* only.[28] Kaṇāda has himself declared in the course of his discourse that a proper knowledge of the six categories (*padārthas*) through twin methods of similarities (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarities (*vaidharmya*)[29] among them will enable the aspirant to accomplish the final goal.

It must be emphasized here that the Vaiśeṣika philosophy aims at expounding the ultimate goal (*niḥśreyasa*) which can be attained through exact knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) of the six categories.[30] This knowledge is not just an ordinary cognition of objects but a much focused and distinct ascertainment of the true nature of the reals accepted in the school. This type of knowledge is made possible by a special kind of *dharma*,[31] which is manifested through divine benediction only.[32] It is for this special type of knowing that the twin methods of similarities and dissimilarities have been introduced by Kaṇāda, ably explained by Praśastapada and his commentators.[33] From this point of view, the source of knowing, the content of knowing and the methodology for knowing are all related to *dharma* in Vaiśeṣika view. Therefore, the notion of similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) is in fact the elaboration of *dharma*, the main theme of Vaiśeṣika.

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[25] *Yato' bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ.* – *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* (VS), 1.1.2, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[26] *Abhyudayastattvajñānaṁ niḥśreyasamātyantikī duḥkhanivṛttiḥ tadubhayaṁ yataḥ sa dharmaḥ. Abhyudayadvārakaṁ niḥśreyasamiti madhyamapadalopī samāsaḥ. -pañcamītatpuruṣo vā.* – *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* (VUp.), (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 2002), p. 11.

[27] *Dharmaṁ vyākhyātukāmasya ṣaṭpadārthopavarṇanam, Sāgaraṁ gantukāmasya himavadgamanopamam.* Quoted by S. Sankaranarayanan in *Vaiśeṣika Catuḥsūtrī, A Historical Perspective*, 2003, pp. 57–58; he has however mentioned that this might be of Venkatanatha Vedanta Desika.

[28] *Yathā dharmaṁ vyākhāsyāma iti prastutya dravyādyupadeśaḥ tatpratipattereva* – *Mahābhāṣyapradipikā* of Bhartṛhari, (Bronkhorst, Johannes (ed. and Eng. trans.) 1987), p. 2.

[29] *Dharmaviśeṣaprasūtāt dravya-guṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣa-samvāyānāṁ padārthānaṁ sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyāṁ tattvajñānānniḥsreyasaṁ.* – VS, 1.1.4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[30] *Dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṁ ṣaṇṇāṁ padārthānāṁ sādharmyavaidharmyātattvajñānaṁ niḥśreyasahetuḥ.* – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 15.

[31] VS, 1.1.4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[32] *Tacceśvaracodanābhivyaktāddharmādeva.* – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 18.

[33] *Sādhāraṇo dharmaḥ sādharmyam, asādhāraṇo dharmo vaidharmyam. Sādharmya-vaidharmye eva tattvaṁ sādharmya-vaidharmya-tattvam, tasya jñānaṁ niḥśreyasahetuḥ.* – NK., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.)1977), p. 16.

Similarities Among Categories

This brings us to the point of similarities among the categories (*padārtha-sādharmya*)[34] which is originally suggested by Kaṇāda and discussed in detail by Praśastapāda and his commentators.

Explaining the terms *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya*, Śaṅkaramiśra, the commentator of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* in his commentary, says that the former signifies common characteristic while the latter expresses differential characteristic. But these two are not mutually exclusive, since somewhere the similarity is also a dissimilarity of other; likewise whatever is stated as dissimilarity at one place may be a similarity elsewhere. So, this has to be understood by referring to the particular instances.[35]

Inter-Category Similarities Among First Three Categories

After enumerating the six categories (*padārthas*), Kaṇāda has drawn a subtle distinction between *artha* and *arthāntara* in his aphorisms by stating that the first three categories – substance (*dravya*), property or attribute (*guṇa*) and activity (*karma*) – are to be characterized as *artha*,[36] since these have the similarities of being existent (*sat*), being non-eternal (*anitya*), having a substance (*dravyavat*), being an effect (*kārya*) as well as being a cause (*kāraṇa*) and having universal and particular (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*),[37] while the remaining three, namely, universal (*sāmānya*), differential or ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*), are to be termed as *arthāntara*[38] or just *padārthas* (by which term the earlier three categories also are covered). The above-mentioned similarities among the first three categories listed by Kaṇāda can be explained as follows:

- *Sat* (existent): Substance (*dravya*), property or attribute (*guṇa*) and activity (*karma*) are characterized as *sat*, since they are related with existence (*sattā*);[39]

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[34] By mention of similarities (*sādharmya*), dissimilarities (*vaidharmya*) are also implied here, since after explaining similarities (*sādharmya*), it is clearly stated that the dissimilarities (*vaidharmya*) should be assumed as contrary to the former:

Evaṁ sarvatra viparayayāt sādharmyaṁ vaidharmyaṁ ca vācyamiti. Evamanena nyāyena sādharmyaṁ yattadeva viparyayādvyāvṛttervaidharmyaṁ, vaidharmyaṁ yat tadeva viparyayādanuvṛtteḥ sādharmyam. – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 27.

[35] *Sādharmyamanugato dharmaḥ, vaidharmyañca vyāvṛtto dharmaḥ. Yadyapi kvacit sādharmyamapi kutaścit vaidharmyaṁ kutaścit vaidharmyamapi keṣāñcit sādharmyaṁ tathāpi tādrūpyeṇa jñānaṁ vivakṣitam.* – VUp. (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 2002) on VS, 1.1.4, p. 27.

[36] *Artha iti dravya-guṇa-karmasu*. – VS, 8.2.3, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[37] *Sadanityaṁ dravyavat kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sāmānyaviśeṣavaditi dravyaguṇkarmaṇāmaviśeṣaḥ*. – VS, 1.1.8, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[38] *Dravyaguṇakarmabhyo' rthāntaraṁ sattā*. – VS, 1.2.8, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[39] This is not mere existence which is denoted by isness (*astitva*) and is a common characteristic of all the six categories (*padārthas*), but a technical term of the Vaiśeṣika system and is defined as follows:

sattāvattva or *sattva* is the notion of being related to existence and is therefore the similarity (*sādharmya*) among the three categories, namely, substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*) and activity (*karma*).

- *Anityam* (non-eternal): All the above three categories are transient because they get destroyed.
- *Dravyavat* (inherently related with substance): The first three categories are inherently related to the substance (*dravya*).[40] In other words, substance is the inherent cause for all the three: substance, attribute and activity.
- *Kāryam* (products): The three categories are produced out of their respective causes, so they are products (*kārya*). Although it might seem a repetition of the second point (*anityam*) already stated above, yet there is a minute difference in the sense that the former points to the destruction of the product while the latter hints at the production of an effect.[41]
- *Kāraṇam* (cause): Substance (*dravya*), property or attribute (*guṇa*) and activity (*karma*) are the respective causes of their effects, so they share a similarity of being a cause (*kāraṇa*), but there is also a systematic restriction for their causality as follows:
  - Substance (*dravya*) is the inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) for all the products.
  - While property or attribute (*guṇa*) and activity (*karma*) are the noninherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*) for all the products.
- *Sāmānyaviśeṣavat*: This is an expansion of the first point mentioned above which refers to the broadest possible generality, i.e. *sattā* or *para sāmānya*, pertaining to all the earlier three categories, namely, substance (*dravya*), property or attribute (*guṇa*) and activity (*karma*) in a collective manner. But the lower generality (*sāmānyaviśeṣa* or *apara sāmānya*) is also available separately in substance, property or attribute and activity each in the form of substance-ness (*dravyavat*), attribute-ness (*guṇatva*) and motion-hood (*karmatva*).

Thereafter, several other sets of similarities among different groups of categories have been elucidated by Kaṇāda which definitely help in a better and clearer understanding of the Vaiśeṣika categories. For example, both substance (*dravya*) and property or attribute (*guṇa*) are stated to possess a common characteristic, namely, giving rise to similar effects (*sajātīyārambhakatva*).[42] In simpler terms, it means that substances produce another substance and qualities produce another quality while *karma* does not produce another *karma*.[43]

Saditi yato dravyaguṇakarmasu sā sattā. VS, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986), 1.2.7, i.e. *sattā* is that which lends the notion of *sat* to the first three categories, namely, substance, attribute and activity.

[40] The suffix *matup* is used here in the sense of *nityayoga* or *nityasambandha* (i.e. *samavāya*): *Bhūmanindāpraśaṁsāsu nityayoge'tiśāyane*, *Saṁsarge'sti vivakṣāyāṁ bhavanti matubādayaḥ*. – *Kāśikāvṛtti*, 5.2.94, (Pt. Ishwar Chandra (ed.) 2010).

[41] Vide (Shastri, Udayaveera 1972), *Vaiśeṣika Darśanam* with the Hindi commentary *Vidyodaya Bhāṣya*, p. 23.

[42] *Dravyaguṇayoḥ sajātīyārambhakatvaṁ sādharmyam*. – VS, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986), 1.1.9.

[43] *Karma karmasādhyaṁ na vidyate*. – VS, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986), 1.1.11.

It is in the above background that Praśastapāda has titled his treatise as a compendium of characteristics attributed to the categories (*Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*).[44] Explaining the significance of this title, Udayana has clarified in his commentary that substance (*dravya*), etc. are the categories; similarities (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarities (*vaidharmya*) among these categories are the characteristics (*dharmas*), which are mutually qualifying each other and have been scattered in different places; a collective description of all these features at one place is the distinguishing characteristic[45] of this compendium of Vaiśeṣika.

In addition to the above similarities (*sādharmyas*) suggested by Kaṇada, Praśastapāda adds the following two common characteristics of three categories, namely, substance (*dravya*), property or attribute (*guṇa*) and activity (*karma*):

- *Svasamayārthaśabdābhidheyatvam*: It means that the first three categories are termed as *artha* because the tradition of Vaiśeṣika has followed this course of calling them as such.[46]
- *Dharmādharmakartṛtvam*: The first three categories are caused by *dharma* and *adharma* as their subsidiary causes.[47]

In contrast to the above, the remaining three Vaiśeṣesika categories, i.e. universal (*sāmānya*), differential or ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*), share the following seven similarities (*sādharmyas*)[48] according to Praśastapāda:

- *Svātmasattvam*: The three categories, namely, universal (*sāmānya*), differential or ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*), exist in themselves and are not related with the broadest generality (*sattā*) like the former three categories.[49]
- *Buddhilakṣaṇatvam*: The above three categories are to be defined through cognition (*buddhi*) only, and no other means of knowledge can prove them.[50]
- *Akāryatvam*: These three categories are not the effect of any cause, since they are eternal and hence are not produced.[51]

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[44] *Padārthadharmasaṁgrahaḥ pravakṣyate mahodayaḥ*. – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 1.

[45] *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha iti. Pādārthā dravyādayasteṣāṁ dharmāsta eva parasparaṁ viśeṣaṇībhūtāste'nena saṁgṛhyante. Śāstre nānāsthāneṣu vitatā ekatra saṁkalayya kathyanta iti saṁgrahaḥ*. – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 4.

[46] *Vaiśeṣikaiḥ svayaṁ vyavahārāya yaḥ saṁketaḥ kṛto'smin śāstre arthaśabdād dravyaguṇakarmāṇi pratipattavyāni' iti, tena dravyādīni trīṇi nirupapadenārthaśabdenocyante*. – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 45.

[47] *Dharmādharmotpattinimittatvaṁ trayāṇām.* – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 45.

[48] *Sāmānyādīnāṁ trayāṇāṁ svātmasattvaṁ buddhilakṣaṇatvamakāryatvamakāraṇatvamasāmāny aviśeṣavattvaṁ nityatvamarthaśabdānabhidheyatvañceti*. – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 49.

[49] *Svātmasattvaṁ sattāvirahaḥ*. – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 21.

[50] *Buddhilakṣaṇatvaṁ buddhimātramamīṣāṁ lakṣanaṁ pramāṇam, na tu dravyādivat pramāṇāntaramastītyarthaḥ.* – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 21.

[51] *Akāryatvamanāditvam*. – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 21.

- *Akāraṇatvam*: Universal (*sāmānya*) differential or ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) are also not the cause of any effect. It means that they do not produce anything since they are neither the material cause nor the noninherent cause.[52]
- *Asāmānyaviśeṣavattvam*: These three categories have no subclasses. In other words universal (*sāmānya*), differential or ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) do not have any generic attribute due to different impeding (*jātibādhaka*) conditions.[53]
- *Nityatvam*: The latter three categories are eternal because they are indestructible.[54]
- *Arthaśabdānabhidheyatvam*: Universal (*sāmānya*), differential or ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) are not expressed by the word *artha* like the former three categories (*dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma*).[55]

Obviously, the above account of the similarities among two groups of categories (*padārtha-sādharmya*) provided by Praśastāpāda is quite significant since it clarifies the minute difference between the above two sub-groups of categories which was briefly suggested by Kaṇāda through the terms *artha* and *arthāntara.*

More importantly, the subtle distinction among *astitva*, *sattāsambandha* and *svātmasattva* is quite pertinent from this point of view, and it is not easy to discern the same. However, it can be stated that these three terms aim to convey that *astitva* is 'being' in general and it naturally belongs to all the six categories;[56] *sattāsambandha* is the inherent relation[57] of the widest possible generality (*sattā*) with substance (*dravya*), property or attribute (*guṇa*) and activity (*karma*) only; and *svātmasattva* is self-sufficient existence, independent of the subsistence of being.[58] The first three categories, besides being existent (*sat*) in themselves, are also related to the widest possible generality[59] or existence (*sattā*), while the latter three are just existent in themselves, and they cannot be related to the widest possible generality (*sattā*),[60] the broadest possible form of universal (*sāmānya*) conceived in the

[52] *Samavāyyasamavāyikāraṇatvābhāvaḥ*. – *Vyomavatī* (Vyo.), (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 143.

[53] *Asāmānyaviśeṣavattvaṁ aparasāmānyavirahaḥ. Sa ca sāmānyeṣvanavasthānāt.* – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 22.

[54] *Nityānāṁ bhāvo nityatvamavināśitvam.* – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 143.

[55] *Svasamayārthaśabdānabhidheyatvaṁ caiteṣāṁ sādharmyam*. – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 53.

[56] *Astitvaṁ vidhimukhapratyayaviṣayatvam. Pratiyogyanapekṣanirūpaṇatvamiti yāvat.* – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 19.

[57] *Sattāsambandhaḥ samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ*. – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 20.

[58] See earlier n. 49.

[59] *Dravyāditrikavṛttistu sattā paratayocyate*. – *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Verse 8, (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850). It means that *sāmānya* can pertain to *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* only – *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* or *samavāya* cannot contain *sāmānya*. For details see *Jātibādhakasaṁgraha* of Udayana: Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 321.

[60] *Svātmaiva sattvaṁ svarūpaṁ yatsāmānyādīnāṁ tadeva teṣāṁ sattvam, na sattāyogaḥ svatvam. Etena sāmānyādīnāṁ trayāṇāṁ sāmānyarahitatvaṁ sādharmyamuktamityarthaḥ*. – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 49.

Vaiśeṣika system. Therefore, the remaining three categories are only self-existent (*svātmasat*), and *sattā* does not pertain to them.

As already stated, Praśastapāda has delineated upon this **inter-category** aspect of categories in detail and has brought out nine sets of similarities among different groups of six categories.[61] After expounding the above similarities (*sādharmyas*), it has been stated that the dissimilarities (*vaidharmyas*) can be comprehended as contrary to the former.[62] In fact, this inter-categorical classification in Vaiśesika sources has been done so minutely and precisely that it can definitely lead to the exact knowledge (*tattvajñāna*), the discerning ascertainment of each of the categories, as propounded by Kaṇāda in the beginning of his treatise.

Intra-Category Similarities Among Substances and Attributes

Just as the similarities (*sādharmyas*) among six categories are enumerated by Praśastapāda and explained by his commentators, likewise an **intra-category** aspect of the similarities and dissimilarities among the 9 substances (*dravyas*) and the 24 properties or attributes (*guṇas*) is also discussed in detail by Praśastapāda.[63]

What follows from the foregoing discussion is that this technique of similarities (*sādharmyas*) and dissimilarities (*vaidharmyas*), if applied properly, can prove to be very beneficial for gaining the right kind of knowledge. Just as the well-known Nyāya style of three-pronged discussion[64] is an external format of discussion, similarly this is an inherent method of delving deep into the core nature of reality. So this particular method of discerning the similarities (*sādharmyas*) and dissimilarities (*vaidharmyas*) is an essential contribution of Vaiśeṣesika philosophy, which also forms the basis of its realistic outlook.

In fact this twofold method of knowing is very much ingrained in the Indian philosophical tradition and has been expressed through numerous pairs of antonyms, which are frequently available in Vedic literature. The standard technique of positive concomitance (*anvaya*) and negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) adopted in the inferential process of Indian logic also speaks of similarities and dissimilarities, while the style of comparing and contrasting two objects vouches for an intensive understanding of the essence of reality. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika system has to be credited for this speciality (*vaiśiṣṭya*) in its approach which claims that once the common characteristics and the distinguishing features of the categories are com-

[61] For details see **Table 3.2** Similarities (*sādharmyas*) among categories (*padārthas*), pp. 47–48.

[62] *Evaṁ sarvatra sādharmyaṁ viparyayādvaidharmyañca vācyamiti*. PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 68.

[63] For details see **Table 3.3** Similarities (*sādharmyas*) among substances (*dravyas*) pp. 48–49 and **Table 3.4** Similarities (*sādharmyas*) among attributes (*guṇas*), pp. 49–51.

[64] *Trividhā cāsya śāstrasya pravṛttiḥ-uddeśo lakṣaṇaṁ parīkṣā* ca. – *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh.), (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (trans. Hindi) 1970) on *Nyāyasūtra* (NS), 1.1.3, pp. 21–22.

prehended, their real nature will automatically be understood and the final aim (*niḥśreyasa*) would be accomplished.[65] This not only paves the path for attaining the ultimate goal but also exhibits the rationalistic attitude of Vaiśeṣika scholars. Moreover, this distinctive outlook of understanding each entity of reality in its own nature is better suited to a pluralistic realism for explaining things as differently and uniquely as they are, rather than interpreting them in a unified ideational form in which they do not actually seem to be.[66]

It also needs to be remarked here that there have been strong arguments for refutation of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories from various schools of Indian philosophy like Jaina, Buddhist, Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta which have been duly responded by the followers of Kaṇāda. In due course of time, the Nyāya school joined hands with Vaiśeṣika, and both of them grew stronger together through mutual complementarity. Accordingly, some efforts were made to include the 16 categories enumerated in the Nyāya system within the seven categories of Vaiśeṣika[67] and vice versa.[68]

However, a question might arise here that although the founders of the system have accepted the doctrine of categories (*padārthas*) and have also discussed in detail the notion of similarity among them, why is it that the later scholars in the tradition have strongly opposed resemblance (*sādṛśya*) as an additional category posited by the Mīmāṁsakas?[69] On minute observation, a plausible response from the Vaiśeṣika point of view could be given that the concept of *sādharmya* signifies similar features and is not a metaphysical category at all; rather it can be subsumed under universal (*sāmānya*)[70] which is already an accepted category of Vaiśeṣika system. But in the earlier phase of Vaiśeṣika, this distinction between *sādharmya* and *sāmānya* might not have been very clear. It is therefore that a modern scholar has even gone to the

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[65] *Ṣaṭpadārthasādharmyavaidharmyātattvajñānaṁ muktasya niḥśreyasakāraṇamiti.* – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (च).

[66] 'Kaṇāda aims at a direct appraisal of the world of existence and he presents the structural build-up of this world in terms of the diversities evident in it, i.e. in terms of the categories. No other system of Indian thought seems to aim at this kind of a direct, simple, logical and non-speculative approach to the world of existence'. – (Gajendragadkar, Veena S.1988) *Kaṇāda's Doctrine of the Padārthas*, p. 24.

[67] *Tarkadīpikā* of Annaṁbhatta (Athalye, Y. V. (ed.), Bodas, M. R. Eng. trans.) 1974) pp. 64–65, and *Dinakarī* of Dinakara Bhaṭṭa on *Nyāyasiddhāntmuktāvalī* (NSM) of Viśvanātha, with *Dinakārī* and *Rāmarudrī*, (Śāstrī, Harirām Śukla (ed.) 1972), p. 31.

[68] NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (trans. Hindi) 1970) (on N.S.1.1.9), p. 43, and *Tarkabhāṣā*, (Ācārya Viśveśvara, (ed. and Hindi trans.) 2000), pp. 168–169.

[69] Vide *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, (Sastri, Pt. A. Subrahmanya (ed.) 1961), p. 268.

[70] The subtle difference among *sādṛśya*, *sādharmya* and *sāmānya* can be grasped through their respective definitions provided by Vaiśeṣika sources as follows:

(a) *Sādṛśyam*: *Tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhūyodharmavattvam.* – *Nyāyasiddhātamuktāvalī*, (Śāstrī, Harirām Śukla (ed.) 1972), p. 43.
(b) *Sādharmyam*: *Samāno dharmo yeṣāṁ te sadharmāṇaḥ, teṣāṁ bhāvaḥ sādharmyam.* – *Nyāyasiddhātamuktāvalī*, (Śāstrī, Harirām Śukla (ed.) 1972), p. 75.
(c) *Sāmānyam*: *Samānānāṁ bhāvaḥ sāmānyam.* – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 747.

extent of suggesting that *sāmānya* was originally a synonym of *sādharmya.*[71] We may agree with him or not, but his view is worth exploring in detail. *Sādṛśya*, on the other hand, has been explained as the availability of several similar features in two different objects and has clearly been covered under *sāmānya* by the later exponents of the system itself.[72] One of the later commentators has given an interesting argument in this regard by saying that even if *sādṛśya* be accepted as an additional category, it is not going to help in the attainment of exact knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) directly or indirectly, so there is no need to enumerate it as an independent category (*padārtha*).[73]

Conclusion

In brief, it may be stated that the Vaiśeṣika concept of categories is very comprehensive since it not only presents a profound framework for an exhaustive enumeration of reals but also outlines several significant inputs in this regard. It is due to this extensive approach that in later times, even absence (*abhāva*) was accepted as an additional category in the list of categories and the system of classical Vaiśeṣika, which first propounded the theory of only six categories, came to be known as *Saptapadārthī*. Although many more categories were subsequently proposed to be included in the Vaiśeṣika scheme of things, as is evident from the texts like *Daśapadārthī*[74] (retained in the Chinese tradition), yet till date the system of Vaiśeṣika is widely known as an exponent of seven categories.

To conclude, the doctrine of categories in Vaiśeṣika philosophy is a remarkable achievement in the history of Indian philosophical thought which has percolated in several branches of learning[75] and has influenced the Indian mind for quite long. Although much of the post-Kaṇāda and pre-Praśastapāda Vaiśeṣika literature has unfortunately been lost and the system did not get due recognition because of its materialistic orientation, its contribution to the concept of categories in Indian philosophy is undeniable. In the words of Erich Frauwallner:

> In spite of that, the historical significance of the Vaiśeṣika is immensely great and the influence, which it has exercised, can be hardly over-estimated. The manner to think-which it has created in the doctrine of the categories, has shone out far and wide and has influenced the new school of the Nyāya until the present times. The opponents of the Vaiśeṣika also could not escape its influence. They have developed and formed a large part of their doctrine in the discussions with the Vaiśeṣika. So in spite of its weaknesses or foibles, this system represents a significant limb of Indian philosophy which assumes an important place inside the whole and without which the remaining would never be fully intelligible.[76]

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[71] (Narain, Harsh 1976) *Evolution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology*, Vol. I, p. 178.

[72] *Sādṛśyam upādhirūpaṁ sāmānyam*. – *Saptapadārthī*, (Gurumurti, D. (ed. and Eng. trans.) 1932), p. 46.

[73] *Dinakarī*, (Śāstrī, Harirām Śukla (ed.) 1972), pp. 44–45.

[74] (Ui, Hakuju 1917) *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy* according to the *Daśapadārtha-Śāśtra* of Candra, F. W. Thomas (ed. and Eng. trans.).

[75] Vide (Thakur, Anantlal 2003) *Origin and Development of the Vaiśesika System*, pp. 367–450.

[76] (Frauwallner, Erich 1973) *History of Indian Philosophy*, (Eng. trans.) V.M. Bedekar, Vol. II, p. 180.

Table 3.1 Different denominations for denoting the reals

The following terms have been used in Indian philosophical tradition to connote basic entities:		
•	*Tattva*	(a) *Tattvaṁ hi samyaktvaṁ jñānadharma eva*. – Vyo. p.20 (क्त)
		(b) *Yasya vastuno yo bhāvastat tasya tattvam*. – *Nyāyakandalī*, p.16
		(c) *Sadasatī tat, tasya bhāvaḥ tattvam*. – *Nyāyavārtikam*, p.8
		(d) *Tasmād bhāvābhāvāveva tattvam*. – *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, III.8
•	*Prameya*	(a) *Yo'rthaḥ tattvataḥ pramīyate tatprameyam*. – *Nyāyabhāṣya*, Introduction to 1.1.1
		(b) *Pramāviṣayaḥ prameyamiti*. – *Nyāyasāra*, p.2
		(c) *Jñātaṁ samyagasamyag vā yan mokṣāya bhavāya vā, Tat prameyamihābhīṣṭaṁṁ na pramāṇārthamātrakam*. – *Nyāyamañjarī*, p.2
•	*Jñeya*	(a) *Jñeyatvaṁ jñānaviṣayatā*. – *Nyāyasidhāntamuktāvalī*, p.7
		(b) *Yajjñeyaṁ tat prameyam*. – *Tārkikarakṣāṇiṣkaṇṭaka*, p.118
•	*Viṣaya*	*Viṣayatāvān.Yathā ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ iti jñāne ghaṭatvaṁ viṣayaḥ. Jagat prameyam iti jñāne prameyatvena jagadviṣayaḥ*. – *Nyāyakośa*, Bhimācārya Jhalkīkar, p.791
•	*Vastu*	(a) *Saṁketaviṣayah. Yathā ghaṭagaganādi*. – *Nyāyakośa*, p.728
		(b) *Satyaṁ vastu. Sattāviśiṣṭaṁ sat ityartho bodhyaḥ*. – *Nyāyakośa*, p.943
•	*Sat*	(a) *Sattvaṁ kālatrayābādhyatvam*. – *Paribhāṣāsaṁgraha* of Pañcanana Bhattacārya, A commentary on *Vedanta-Paribhāṣā*, p.139
		(b) *Sat ca khalu ṣoḍaśadhā vyūḍhamupadekṣyate*. – *Nyāyabhāṣya*, 1.1.1
•	*Bhāva*	*Dravyādiśaṭkam. Tallakṣaṇaṁ cabhāvatvameva*. – *Dinakarī* on *Nyāyasidhāntamuktāvalī*, p.20
•	*Artha*	(a) *Artha iti dravyaguṇakarmasu*. – *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 8.2.3
		(b) *Gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇāstadarthā* – *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.14
		(c) *Arthāḥ syurindriyagrāhyāḥ*. – *Tārkikarakṣā*, verse 29
•	*Arthapada*	*Tatra heyādicaturvarge cārthyamāṇatayārthapadasūcite pramāṇādicaturvarge ca pramāṇasya prādhānyapradarśanārtham bhāṣyam*. – *Nyāāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, 1.1.1., p.13,
•	*Padārtha*	(a) *Abhidheyatvaṁ padārthasāmānyalakṣaṇam*. – *Tarkadīpikā*, p. 2
		(b) *Vyaktyākṛitijātayastu padārthaḥ*. – *Nyāyasūtra*, 2.2.9
•	*Sadvidha* or *sadbheda*	(a) *Tāsāṁ khalvāsām sadvidhānāṁ…*. – *Nyāyabhāṣya*, introduction to 1.1.1
		(b) *Ta ete sadbhedā iti sūtram*. – *Nyāyavārttika* (1.1.1), p.9
•	*Vidyamānārthā:*	*Ta etāvanto vidyamānārthā yeṣāmaviparītajñānārthamihopadeśaḥ*. – *Nyāyabhāṣya*, 1.1.1

Table 3.2 Similarities (*sādharmyas*) among categories (*padārthas*)

Similarities (*sādharmyas*) among the different groups of six categories (*padārthas*) are as follows:

Categories (*padārthas*)	**Similarities** (*sādharmyas*)
• **Six** *padārthas*: *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmanya* and *viśeṣa* –share	(i) *Astitva* (isness)
	(ii) *Abhidheyatva* (nameability)
	(iii) *Jñeyatva* (knowability)
• **Six** *padārthas*, i.e. *anityadravyas*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmanya*,*viśeṣa* and *samavāya* (excluding *nityadravyas*) –share	(i) *Āśritatva* (being subsistent)
• **Five** *padārthas*, namely, *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmanya* and *viśeṣa* –share	(i) *Samavāyitva* (being inherent)
	(ii) *Anekatva* (being mutually exclusive)
• **Five** *padārthas*, i.e. *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmanya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* –share	(i) *Nirguṇatva* (not possessing any attribute)
	(ii) *Niṣkriyatva* (not having activity or movement)
• **Three** *padārthas*, namely, *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* –share	(i) *Sattāsambandha* (being related with existence)
	(ii) *Sāmānyaviṣeṣavattva* (having generality and particularity)
	(iii) *Svasamayārthaśabdābhidheyatva* (being expressed by the term *artha* in a conventional language of the system)
	(iv) *Dharmādharmakartṛtva* (being caused by merit and demerit)
• **Three** *padārthas*, i.e. *anitya dravya*, *anitya guṇa* and *karma* (which is *anitya* by nature) –share	(i) *Kāryatva* (being effect)
	(ii) *Anityatva* (being non-eternal)
• **Six** *padārthas* except *pārimāṇḍalya* (the *parimāṇa of parmāṇus*), etc. (i.e. excluding the *parimāṇa* of *ākāśa*, *kāla* and *dik*) –share	(i) *Kāraṇatva* (being the cause to some other *parimāṇa*)
• **Three** *padārthas*, namely, *anityadravya*, *anityaguṇa* and *karma* –share	(i) *Dravyāśritatva* (being subsistent in substance)
• **Three** *padārthas*, i.e. *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* – share	(i) *Svātmasattva* (being self-subsistent)
	(ii) *Buddhilakṣaṇatva* (having *buddhi* as their sole indicator)
	(iii) *Akāryatva* (not being effect)
	(iv) A*sāmānyaviśeṣavattva* (having no subclasses)

Note: Udayana has hinted the following five more types of similarities among the six *categories* in his *Kiraṇāvalī*

Categories (*padārthas*)	**Similarities** (*sādharmyas*)
• **Five** *padārthas*, namely, *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmanya* and *samavāya* (since *viśeṣa* inheres in *nityadravya*s only) –share	*Anityadharmatva* (inhering in transient *dravyas*)
• **Five** *padārthas*, i.e. *dravya*, *guṇa*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* (since *karma* is *anitya*)–share	*Nityatva* (being eternal)

(continued)

Table 3.2 (continued)

•	**Four** *padārthas*, namely, *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma and sāmānya* (since *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* are perceptible to *yogins* only) –share	*Ayogipratyakṣatva* (being perceptible to ordinary human beings other than *yogins*)
•	**Two** *padārthas* only, i.e. *guṇa* and *karma* –share	*Asamavāyikāraṇatva* (being noninherent cause)
•	**Two** *padārthas* only, i.e. *nityadravya*s and *samavāya* (since *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are always inherent in their substrata) –share	*Asamavetatva* (not inhering in anything)

Table 3.3 Similarities (*sādharmyas*) among substances (*dravyas*)

Similarities among various groups of the nine *dravyas* as suggested by Praśastapāda are as follows:

Substances (*dravyas*)		**Similarities** (*sādharmya*s)
•	All the **nine** *dravyas*: *pṛthivī*, *jala*, *tejas*, *vāyu ākaśa*, *kala*, *dik*, *ātman* and *mana*s–share	*Dravyatvayoga* (belonging to the class of substance)
		Svātmanyārambhakatvam (bringing about effects within themselves)
		Guṇavattvam (having qualities)
		Kāryakārāṇāvirodhitvam (not being destructible by their causes and effects)
		Antyaviśeṣavattvam (having the ultimate individuality)
•	All the **nine** *dravyas*: excluding the type *avayavidravyas* of the first four (while including the type *avayavadravyas* or *paramāṇus* of them) –share	*Anāśritatva* (not being dependent)
		Nityatva (belonging to all substances except those that are made up of certain constituent parts)
•	**Six** *dravyas*, i.e. *pṛthivī*, *jala*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *ākaśa*, *ātman* and *manas* –share	*Anekatva* (being mutually exclusive)
		Aparajātimattva (having lower generalities or subclasses)
•	**Five** *dravyas*, i.e. *pṛthivī*, *jala*, *tejas*, *vāyu* and *manas* – share	(i) *Kriyāvattva* (the character of having action)
		(ii) *Mūrtatva* (being corporeal)
		(iii) *Paratva* (having distance)
		(iv) *Aparatva* (having proximity)
		(v) *Vegavattva* (having speed)
•	**Four** *dravyas*, i.e. *ākaśa*, *kāla*, *dik* and *ātman*–share	(i) *Paramamahattva* (being all pervasive)
		(ii) *Sarvasaṁyogisamānadeśatva* (having the largest dimensions and being the common receptacle of all corporeal things)
•	**Five** *dravyas*, i.e. *pṛthivī*, *jala*, *tejas*, *vāyu* and *ākāśa* –share	(i) *Bhūtatva* (being material)
		(ii) *Indriyaprakṛtitva* (being material principle of the sense organs)
		(iii) *Bāhyaikaikendriyagrāhya-viśeṣaguṇavattva* (being endowed with such specific attributes as are each perceptible by each of the respective external organs of perception)

(continued)

Table 3.3 (continued)

•	**Four** *dravyas*, i.e. *pṛthivī*, *jala*, *tejas* and *vāyu*– share	(i) *Dravyārambhakatva* (being the material cause of substances)
		(ii) *Sparśavattva* (being tangible)
•	**Three** *dravyas*, i.e. *pṛthivī*, *jala* and *tejas*– share	(i) *Pratyakṣatva* (being directly perceptible by the senses)
		(ii) *Rūpavattva* (having colour)
		(iii) *Dravatva* (having fluidity)
•	**Two** *dravyas*, i.e. *pṛthivī* and *jala* –share	(i) *Gurutva* (the character of having gravity)
		(ii) *Rasavattva* (the character of having taste)
•	**Six** *dravyas*, i.e. *pṛthivī*, *jala*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *ākaśa* and *ātman* –share	(i) *Vaiśeṣikaguṇavattva* (the character of being related to specific attributes)
•	**Three** *dravyas*, i.e. *pṛithvī*, *jala* and *ātman*– share	(i) *Caturdaśaguṇavattva* (having 14 attributes)
•	**Two** *dravyas*, i.e. *ākaśa* and *ātman*– share	(i) *Kṣaṇikaikadeśavṛtti-viśeṣaguṇavattva* (having specific attributes which last only for a single moment and exist only in certain parts of their substances)
•	**Two** *dravyas*, i.e. *dik* and *kāla* –share	(i) *Pañcaguṇavattva* (common character of containing five attributes)
		(ii) *Sarvotpattimatāṁ nimittakāraṇatva* (being the instrumental cause of all that has an origin)
•	**Two** *dravyas*, i.e. *pṛithvī* and *tejas*– share	(i) *Naimittikadravatvayoga* (connection with only such fluidity which is brought about by extraneous causes)

Table 3.4 Similarities (*sādharmyas*) among attributes (*guṇas*)

Praśastapāda has suggested several similarities among various groups of attributes as follows:		
•	**a)** *Mūrtatva*	**Ten** *guṇas*, i.e. *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *sparśa*, *paratava*, *aparatva*, *gurutva*, *dravatva*, *sneha* and *vega* (*saṁskāra*), belong to corporeal objects
	b) *Amūrtatva*	**Ten** *guṇas*, i.e. *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *bhāvanā* (*saṁskāra*) and *śabda*, belong to immaterial things
	c) *Ubhayatva*	**Five** *guṇas*, i.e. *saṁkhyā*, *parimāṇa*, *pṛthaktva*, *saṁyoga* and *vibhāga*, belong to both

•	**a)** *Anekavṛttitva*	**Four** *guṇas*, i.e. *saṁyoga*, *vibhāga*, *dvitva* and *dvipṛthaktva*, inhere in more than one *guṇa*s
	b) *Ekaikavṛttitva*	All the remaining *guṇa*s inhere in single substances
•	**a)** *Vaiśeṣikaguṇvattva*	**Sixteen** *guṇas*, i.e. *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *sparśa*, *sneha*, *dravatva* (*sāṁsiddhika*), *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā, dveṣa*, *prayatna*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *bhāvanā* (*saṁskara*) and *śabda*, are the specific attributes
	b) *Sāmānyaguṇavattva*	**Ten** *guṇas*, i.e. *saṁkhyā*, *parimāṇa*, *pṛthaktva*, *saṁyoga*, *vibhāga*, *paratva*, *aparatva*, *gurutva*, *dravatva* (*naimittika*) and *vega* (*saṁskāra*), are the generic attributes

(continued)

Table 3.4 (continued)

•	**a)** *Bāhyaikaikendriyagrāhyaguṇavattva*	**Five** *guṇas*, i.e. *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha*, are each perceptible by each one of the external sense organs
	b) *Dvīndriyagrāhyaguṇavattva*	**Ten** *guṇas*, i.e. *saṁkhyā*, *parimāṇa*, *pṛthaktva*, *saṁyoga*, *vibhāga*, *paratva*, *aparatva*, *dravatva*, *sneha* and *vega* (*saṁskāra*), are each perceptible by two sense organs
	c) *Antaḥkaraṇagrāhyaguṇavattva*	**Six** *guṇas*, i.e. *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa* and *prayatna*, are perceptible by the internal organ
	d) *Atīndriyaguṇavattva*	**Four** *guṇas*, i.e. *gurutva*, *dharma*, *adharma* and *bhāvanā* (*saṁskāra*), are beyond the sense organs

•	**a)** *Kāraṇaguṇapūrvakaguṇavattva*	**Eleven** *guṇa*s, i.e. *apākaja rūpa*, *apākaja rasa*, *apākaja gandha*, *apākaja śparśa*, *parimāṇa*, *ekatva*, *ekapṛthaktva*, *gurutva*, *dravatva*, *sneha* and *vega* (*saṁskāra*), are preceded by the qualities of the cause
	b) *Akāraṇaguṇapūrvakaguṇavattva*	**Ten** *guṇas*, i.e. *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *bhāvanā* (*saṁskāra*) and *śabda*, are not preceded by the (similar) qualities in the cause
	Note: There is no mention of the remaining *guṇas* in this group, i.e. *saṁkhyā*, *saṁyoga*, *vibhāga*, *paratva and aparatva*	

•	**a)** *Saṁyogajaguṇavattva*	**Nineteen** *guṇas*, i.e. *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *bhāvanā* (*saṁskāra*), *śabda*, *tūlaparimāṇa*, *uttarasaṁyoga*, *naimittkadravatva*, *paratva*, *aparatva* and four *pākajaguṇa*s, are produced by the conjunction of the self with the mind
	b) *Karmajaguṇavattva*	**Three** *guṇas*, i.e. *ādyasaṁyoga*, *ādyavibhāga* and *vega* (*saṁskāra*), are produced by actions
	c) *Vibhāgajaguṇavattva*	**Two** *guṇas*, i.e. *śabda* and *uttaravibhāga*, are produced by disjunction

•	**a)** *Samānajātyārambhakaguṇavattva*	**Nine** *guṇas*, i.e. *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *anuṣṇasparśa*, *śabda*, *parimāṇa*, *ekatva*, *ekapṛthaktva* and *sneha*, are productive of similar qualities
	b) *Asamānajātyārambhakaguṇavattva*	**Five** *guṇas*, i.e. *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa* and *prayatna*, are productive of dissimilar qualities
	c) *Samānāsamānajātyārambhakaguṇavattva*	**Ten** *guṇas*, i.e. *saṁyoga*, *vibhāga*, *saṁkhyā*, *gurutva*, *dravatva*, *uṣṇasparśa*, *jñāna/buddhi*, *dharma*, *adharma* and *saṁskāra*, are productive of similar as well as dissimilar qualities
	d) *Buddhyapekṣaguṇavattva*	**Four** *guṇas*, i.e. *paratva*, *aparatva*, *dvitva* and *dvipṛthaktva*, are dependent upon the intellect
	Note: The total number of *guṇas* in this group is 28, because *sparśa* and *pṛthaktva* are divided into two types	

(continued)

Table 3.4 (continued)

•	**a)** *Svāśrayasamavetārambhakaguṇavattva*	**Seven** *guṇas*, i.e. *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *bhāvana* (*saṁskāra*) and *śabda*, are productive of attributes in their own substance
	b) *Paratrārambhakaguṇavattva*	**Seven** *guṇas*, i.e. *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *sparśa*, *parimāṇa*, *sneha* and *prayatna*, are productive of attributes in other things
	c) *Ubhayatrārambhakaguṇavattva*	**Nine** *guṇas*, i.e. *saṁyoga*, *vibhāga*, *saṁkhyā* (*ekatva*), *ekapṛthaktva*, *gurutva*, *dravatva*, *vega* (*saṁskāra*), *dharma* and *adharma*, are productive of attributes in both
	Note: Two *guṇas*, namely, *paratva* and *aparatva*, have not been counted in this group, since they do not give rise to any other attributes	

•	*Kriyāhetuguṇavattva*	**a). Seven** *guṇas*, i.e. *gurutva*, *dravatva*, *vega*, *prayatna*, *dharma*, *adharma* and *saṁyogaviśeṣa*, are the causes of actions
Note: Remaining *guṇas* are not mentioned here as they are not causes of actions		

•	**a)** *Asamavāyikāraṇaguṇavattva*	**Nine** *guṇas*, i.e. *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *sparśa*, *saṁkhyā*, *parimāṇa*, *ekapṛthaktva*, *sneha* and *śabda*, are noninherent causes
	b) *Nimittakāraṇaguṇavattva*	**Nine** *guṇas*, i.e. *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna*, *dharma*, *adharma* and *bhāvanā* (*saṁskāra*), are instrumental causes
	c) *Ubhayakāraṇaguṇavattva*	**Six** *guṇas*, i.e. *saṁyoga*, *vibhāga*, *uṣṇasparśa*, *gurutva*, *dravatva* and *vega* (*saṁskāra*), are both kinds of causes
	d) *Akāraṇaguṇavattva*	**Four** *guṇas*, i.e. *paratva*, *aparatva*, *dvitva* and *dvipṛthaktva*, have no causal efficiency
	Note: The total numbers of *guṇas* in this group is 28, but it is due to the division of *sparśa* and *pṛthaktva* into two types	

•	**a)** *Avyāpyavṛttiguṇavattva* or *pradeśavṛttiguṇavattva*	**Twelve** *guṇas*, i.e. *saṁyoga*, *vibhāga*, *śabda* and all the nine *viśeṣaguṇas* of *ātman* (*buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna, dharma*, *adharma* and *bhāvanā* (*saṁskāra*), do not extend over whole of their substrates
	b) *Vyāpyavṛttiguṇavattva* or *āśrayavyāpiguṇavattva*	**Thirteen** *guṇas*, i.e. *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *sparśa*, *saṁkhyā*, *parimāṇa*, *pṛthaktva*, *gurutva*, *dravatva*, *sneha*, *paratva*, *aparatva*, *vega* (*saṁskāra*) and *sthitisthāpaka* (*saṁskāra*), extended over whole of their substrates

•	**a)** *Yāvaddravyabhāviguṇavattva*	**Nine** *guṇas*, i.e. *apākaja rūpa*, *apakāja rasa*, *apakāja gandha*, *apākaja sparśa*, *parimāṇa*, *ekapṛthaktva*, *sāṁsidhikadravatva*, *gurutva* and *sneha*, exist as long as the substance to which they belong
	b) *Ayāddravyabhāviguṇavattva*	All the remaining *guṇas*, i.e. *śabda*, *saṁyoga*, *vibhāga*, *saṁkhyā*, *paratva*, *aparatva*, *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna*, *dharma*, *adharma* and *saṁskāra*, do not exist as long as the substance to which they belong

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Chapter 4
Vaiśeṣika Theory of Creation

Abstract In Vaiśeṣika world view, the first category substance is held to be the self-subsistent, while attributes and motions are dependent on it. Out of the nine substances enumerated in the system, the first four are said to be of two types: eternal in their atomic form and non-eternal in their non-atomic form. Therefore, these four types of atoms are active participants in the process of creation and destruction with their attributes and motions. The present chapter dwells upon the details of this process.

Keywords *Maheśvarecchā · Sajātīya · Paramāṇu · Dvyaṇuka · Tryaṇuka/trasareṇu · Caturaṇuka · Mahābhūtas · Sāvayava-dravyas · Sṛṣṭi · Saṁhāra · Ārambhavāda/asatkāryavāda · Jīvas · Dharmas · Adharmas · Saṁskāras · Adṛṣṭa · Brahmā · Hiraṇyagarbha · Karma · Punarjanma · Bhoga · Sattā/parasāmānya · Svarūpavattva · Sattva/sattāsambandha · Svātmasattva · Abhāva*

Background

Vaiśeṣika is held to be a pluralistic realism. The system represents an ontological theory according to which the whole universe has been classified into six[1] (or seven in the later tradition)[2] categories (*padārthas*). All the six categories share three common characteristics, namely, isness (*astitva*), nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and knowability (*jñeyatva*).[3] Out of these six categories, the theory of creation mainly pertains to the first three, i.e., substance (*dravya*), property (*guṇa*) and activity

[1] *Dharmaviśeṣaprasūtātd dravyaguṇakarmasāmānya-viśeṣasamavāyānāṁ padārthānāṁ sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṁ tattvajñānānniḥśreyasam. – The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda* (VS), 1.1.4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[2] For details in this regard, see (Kumar, Shashiprabha 1992) *Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha Nirūpaṇa*, (Hindi), pp. 26–35.

[3] *Ṣaṇṇāmapi padārthanām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni. – Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 41.

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(*karma*) only, because the remaining three categories, namely, generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) are stated to be eternally existent. Hence, they are neither created nor destroyed.

Introduction

The Vaiśeṣika posits an atomic theory of creation. Accordingly, the atoms (*paramāṇus*) of the first four substances (*dravyas*), i.e. earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*jala*), fire (*tejas*) and air (*vāyu*), are the inherent causes (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of creation; conjunction (*saṁyoga*) of these atoms with the individual selves (*ātmans*) is the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*), and the will of God (*maheśvarecchā*) is the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) for creation.[4] These four types of atoms are the ultimate constituents of creation. When two homogenous (*sajātīya*) atoms conjoin, a dyad (*dvyaṇuka*) is produced, and when three such dyads of the same substance combine, a triad (*tryaṇuka*) is born. Accordingly, a triad (*tryaṇuka* or *trasareṇu*) consists of six atoms and is the first visible product, for it is held to have gross magnitude.[5] Subsequently, when four triads combine, a tetrad (*caturaṇuka*) is produced which contains 24 atoms, and out of these tetrads, several effects are created. This process of creation goes on until all the effects of the world have taken place.

So, the Vaiśeṣika view elucidates different details of creation with reference to the first four gross elements (*mahābhūtas* or *sāvayava dravyas*) assisted by their attributes (*guṇas*) and activities (*karmas*), while all the other forms of categories perform their role in the existence of the universe.

On closer examination, the Vaiśeṣika theory of creation reveals that the system admits three types of objects as follows:

(a)	Eternal, ultimate parts and causal entities	Atoms (*paramāṇus*) of four types, i.e. earthly (*pārthiva*), watery (*jalīya*), fiery (*taijasa*) and airy (*vāyavya*) as the ultimate causes of material products
(b)	Non-eternal, caused entities	Dyads (*dvyaṇukas*), triads (*tryaṇukas*), tetrads (*caturaṇukas*) and other wholes (*avayavins*) produced out of their respective parts (*avayavas*)
(c)	Eternal, uncaused entities	Individual selves (*ātmans*) minds or internal organs (*manas*), ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), space (*dik*), universal (*sāmānya*), particulars (*viśeṣas*) and inherence (*samavāya*)

[4] *Maheśvarecchā nimittakāraṇamatmanāmaṇubhiḥ samyogaścāsamavāyikāraṇamaṇavastu samavāyina ityaṇuṣu karmāṇyutyapadyante. – Vyomavatī* (Vyo.), (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 298.

[5] *Jālasūryamarīcisthaṁ yat sūkṣmaṁ dṛṣyate rajaḥ.*
Tasya ṣaṣṭhatamo bhāgaḥ paramāṇuḥ prakīrtitaḥ.(Anonymous) – Vide *Nyāyakośa*, (Jhalakīkar, Bhimācārya 1978) , p. 470.

Out of above three types of objects, only the former two pertain to the theory of creation. More importantly, the first type of the above entities is accepted in the form of eternal, final or ultimate parts (*avayavas*), while the middle one is stated to be:

- In the form of mediate, caused parts (*avayavas*).
- Parts as well as wholes (*avayavins*).
- Wholes for their respective causes.

Both of these, i.e. parts and the wholes are held to be two independent reals according to Vaiśeṣika. To put it more precisely, the Vaiśeṣika school holds that the whole produced out of its parts is a new beginning (*ārambha*) and a different entity. Likewise, each part of the whole has a different, real identity of its own. This fundamental pre-supposition of Vaiśeṣika is quite significant for understanding its theory of creation, which is based on its pluralistic and realistic standpoint.

From this point of view, the Vaiśeṣikas are not only committed to realism but also 'common sense realism' since they also accept the 'middle-sized objects' of everyday experience as real, composite wholes.[6] The same has been succinctly stated by Wilhelm Halbfass, a modern exponent of Vaiśeṣika ontology as follows:

> The *avayavin*, such as a tree, has an identity and individuality of its own; it is a real reference of language and cognition of words and thoughts. It is the product of parts, it does not consist of parts.[7]

It needs to be clarified here that the Vaiśeṣika theory of creation (*sṛṣṭi*) presupposes destruction (*saṁhāra*) due to its fundamental postulate of causality known as *ārambhavāda* or *asatkāryavāda*. According to it, the cause and effect are two different entities, and therefore the creation of any effect is a new beginning. In other words, the very definition of a created entity is that it is counter-positive of its own prior absence.[8] It means that an effect like a pot does not pre-exist in its present form in the cause, i.e. the lump of clay. Both these entities, the pot and the clay, are meant to serve separate purposes, so they cannot be held to be identical according to Vaiśeṣika. But at the same time, cause and effect are not totally unrelated, rather they are inherently related with each other through a unique relation called inherence (*samavāya*). In Vaiśeṣika view, the creation as such is an interplay of different types of causes mentioned above. These are initially motivated through the divine

[6] Ganeri, Jonardon, 2010. Realism in Vaiśeṣika and Navyanyāya. In *Materialism and Immaterialism in India and Europe*. Partha Ghose (ed.), Vol.XII, Part 5.

[7] (Halbfass, Wilhelm 1993) *On Being and What There Is*, *Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology*, p. 94.

[8] *Kāryaṁ prāgabhāvapratiyogi*. – *Tarkasaṁgraha*, (Athalye, Y. V. (ed.), Bodas, M. R. (Eng. trans.) 1974), p. 26.

will which is dependent on unseen factors (*adṛṣṭa*),[9] like the fruits of past actions of individual selves. So, it is a complex process involving matter, mind and motion,[10] and this basic position of Vaiśeṣika philosophy has to be underlined before we proceed to discuss further details in this regard.

Process of Destruction

In the above background, it can be stated that the Vaiśeṣika theory of creation is inherently based on the idea of destruction (*saṁhāra*). In fact, both these processes – creation and destruction – are twin aspects of the same theory. Therefore, why the Vaiśeṣika scholars expound the concept of destruction even before the theory of creation needs to be[11] explained.

In this regard it is noteworthy that in the history of Vaiśeṣika, the first reference to the theory of creation is made by Praśastapāda, the earliest available commentator on Kaṇāda's philosophy. It is he who has given a systematic and well-structured account of the process of creation and destruction. Praśastapāda has first stated that he will describe the process of creation (*sṛṣṭi*) and destruction (*saṁhāra*) from the four gross material substances (*mahābhūtas*) but has then changed the order and started this description with the details of destruction of the universe. Two of his commentators have justified Praśastapāda's stand by stating that it is with the purpose of denoting a continuity of the cycle of creation and destruction that Praśastapāda has reversed the order of enunciation and begun with the description of destruction rather than creation.[12]

In the view of Praśastapāda, the process of destruction begins, after a period of 100 years measured on the timescale of the creator (*brahmā*), when the Supreme Lord (Maheśvara) desires to destroy the world – not for his own sake but for providing some solace to the individual selves (*jīvas*) who are constantly being born and dying and are tired of this cyclical process and also for giving instant release to the present creator of the world. This divine will, coupled with the conjunction between individual selves and atoms, generates such activity that those atoms which produce bodies and sense organs, get disjoined. This disjunction results in successive activ-

[9] For details, see (Bhattacharya, Gopikamohan 1961) *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism*, pp. 128–129.

[10] Kumar, Shashiprabha. 1999. Matter, Mind and Motion in Vaiśeṣika Pluralism. In *Facets of Indian Philosophical Thought*, pp. 101–114.

[11] For various viewpoints regarding destruction in Indian philosophical thought, see (Mishra, Umesh 1936) *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, pp. 222–223.

[12] (i) *Sṛṣṭisaṁharayoranidṁprathamatāṁ pratipaddāyituṁ sṛṣṭikramamupakramya. saṁharaprakrameṇa pratipādayati-brāmheṇa māneneti. – Kiraṇāvalī* (Kir.), (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 61.

(ii) *Prathamaṁ saṁharakathanasya tu sṛṣṭisaṁhārayoḥ pravāheṇānāditvadyotanaṁ prayojanaṁ. – Setu*, (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 283.

ity, destroying conjunctions among effects of the causes up to the point of their ultimate causes, i.e. the atoms.[13]

In this way, the products of earth, water, fire and air get destroyed, respectively, and only the isolated atoms of these substances exist for the same period, i.e. 100 years measured on the timescale of the Creator Lord. In this state, these inactive atoms co-exist along with the individual selves, their merits (*dharmas*), demerits (*adharmas*) and impressions (*saṁskāras*).[14] One of the commentators of Praśastapāda has clarified here that although other eternal entities like ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*) and space (*dik*) also exist during this period, yet they are not mentioned because they do not actively participate in the process of creation.[15]

It will not be out of place to mention here that in Vaiśeṣika view, the order of destruction of products is exactly the same as that of creation. In simpler terms, the process of destruction begins with the disjunctive activity in atoms resulting in the extinction of the dyads and followed by another disjunctive activity in the dyads which causes the annihilation of triads. Subsequently, this continuous process results in the destruction of successive products and culminates in the total termination of all the effects. Nonetheless, there is a minute technical difference to be noted here between the destruction of a dyad and the destruction of a triad; this is pointed out by a later Vaiśeṣika scholar. Accordingly, the old Naiyāyikas propound that a dyad is destroyed by the destruction of its non-inherent cause, i.e. the dismantling of two atoms, and subsequent effects are destroyed due to the destruction of their inherent causes, respectively. On the other hand, the neo-Naiyāyikas hold that all the effects are destroyed due to the destruction of their non-inherent causes.[16]

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[13] (i) *Brāhmeṇa mānena varṣaśatānte varttamānasya brahmaṇo'pavargakāle sansārakhinnānāṁ sarvaprāṇināṁ.*
niśi viśrāmārthaṁ sakalabhuvanapatermaheśvarasya saṁjihīrṣāsamakālaṁ.
śarīrendriyamahābhūtopanibandhakānāṁ sarvātmagatānāmadṛṣṭānāṁ vṛttinirodhe sati.
maheśvrecchātmāṇusaṁyogajakarmabhyaḥ śarīrendriyakāraṇāṇūvibhagebhyastatsaṁyoganivṛttau teṣāmāparamāṇvanto vināśaḥ. – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 122–125.

(ii) *Brahmaṇa idaṁ brāhmaṁ teneti. Tatpunaḥ divyaṁ dvādaśasāhasraṁ kalpaṁ viddhi caturyugaṁ etat.*
sahasraparyantaṁ tadaharbrāhmamucyate. – *Vyomavatī* (Vyo.), (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 299.

(iii) *Saṁjihīrṣā-saṁhārasāmagrīviśiṣṭecchā tatsamakālamadṛṣṭānāṁ vṛttinirodhe satītyatrānvitamidaṁ. Saṁjihīrṣāsamakālaṁ- saṁjihīrṣottarakālamiti tvācāryāḥ.* – *Sūkti*, (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), pp. 280.

[14] *Tataḥ pravibhaktāḥ paramāṇavo'vatiṣṭhante dharmādharmasaṁskārānuviddhā ātmānastāvantameva kālaṁ.* – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1997), p. 126.

[15] *Digādayo'pi tiṣthanti nityatvāt. Kintvātmanāmadṛṣṭavaśāt paramaṇavaḥ punarnārapsyanta iti. Prādhānyādadṛṣṭavaśādātmaparamāṇvavasthānasaṁkirttanaṁ.* – *Nyāyakandalī* (NK), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 127.

[16] *Asamavāyikāraṇanāśāddvyaṇukanāśaḥ samavāyikārāṇanāśāttryaṇukanāśa iti saṁpradāyāḥ. Sarvatrāsamavāyikāraṇanāśāddravyanāśa iti navīnāḥ.* – *Tarkadīpikā*, (Athalye, Y. V. (ed.), Bodas, M. R. (Eng. trans.) 1974), p. 10.

Process of Creation

After elucidating the process of destruction, Praśastapāda goes on to describe the details of creation as follows:

The Supreme Lord desires to create the world again – this divine will is aroused for the sake of the individual selves experiencing the accumulated results of their past actions. This generates an appropriate activity in the dormant power of unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*), the unseen force consisting of results of actions performed earlier by the individual selves. The activated unseen force leads to a conjunction between individual selves and the atoms which results in a stir among the atoms of air; this commotion in turn causes the creation of airy dyads and triads, respectively, giving rise to the massive air with great speed. Later on, the watery atoms move and conjoin in that air and generate a vast water reservoir. Following this, the earthly atoms combine in that watery base and give rise to an earthly mass. Thereafter, the fiery atoms conjoin in that very water-body and by creating fiery dyads, triads, etc. produce an enormous fire which keeps on radiating unobstructed light.[17]

In this way, when all the four gross elements (*mahābhūtas*)[18] are produced out of their respective causes, then by mere contemplation on part of the Supreme Lord, the fiery atoms, supported by the earthly atoms, give rise to a huge ball of fire, the Big Egg. In this Egg, the Supreme Lord produces a creator, who has four faces like lotus and is the primeval ancestor of all people (and regions) along with all the worlds. The Lord then assigns to creator God (*brahmā*) the duty of creating all the born beings.[19]

Employed by the Supreme Lord (Maheśvara), the creator God is endowed with the highest form of knowledge, dispassion and powers. By means of this knowledge, he comes to recognize the good and bad results of all the beings, and on account of his dispassion, he does not act with any partiality towards anybody; and through his great power, he makes them experience the results of their past deeds. In this process of creation, he (*brahmā*) first produces his mental sons, Prajāpati and the rest and allocates them the knowledge, experience and lives in accordance with their past actions. The creator God also creates the humans, the divine sages, the sages and the hosts of other species; then out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet, he

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[17] *Tataḥ punaḥ prāṇināṁ bhogabhūtaye maheśvarasisṛkṣānantaraṁ sarvātmagatavṛttilabdhādṛṣṭāpekṣebhyas tatsaṁyogebhyaḥ pavanaparamāṇuṣu karmotpattau teṣām parasparasaṁyogebhyo dvyaṇukādiprakrameṇa mahān vāyuḥ samutpanno nabhasi dodhūyamānastiṣṭhati. Tadanantaraṁ tasminneva vāyāvāpyebhyaḥ paramāṇubhyastenaiva krameṇa mahān salilanidhirutpannaḥ poplūyamānaṣtiṣṭhati. Tadanantaraṁ tasminneva pārthivebhyaḥ paramāṇubhyo mahāpṛthivī saṁhatāvatiṣṭhate tadanantaraṁ tasminneva mahodadhau taijasebhyo'ṇubhyo dvyaṇukādiprakrameṇotpanno mahāñstejorāśiḥ kenacid anabhibhūtatvāddedīpyamānas tiṣṭhati.* – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 127–129.

[18] It is noteworthy here that Praśastapāda has used the term *mahābhūtas* but has mentioned only four of them while all the other schools in Indian tradition talk of five *mahābhūtas*.

[19] For details, see Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 64.

produces the four classes (*varṇas*) and other beings, high as well as low and accords them with appropriate duties, knowledge, dispassion and power.[20]

What follows from the above is that Praśastapāda has mixed mythological inputs derived from his own religious inclination with the philosophical discussion of the Vaiśeṣika theory of creation. Obviously, the reference to a creator God having four faces like lotus and the chronology of creation generated by him lends a mythological leaning to the otherwise purely metaphysical system of Kaṇāda. It has been pointed out that in this particular case, Praśastapāda was influenced primarily by *Manusmṛti* and secondarily by the *Purāṇas*.[21] Although several of his commentators have tried to justify the above narration by Praśastapāda on different grounds,[22] yet it is a fact that it does not contribute much in the philosophical aspect of the theory.

Moreover, the statement of the theory of creation by Praśastapāda provides a noticeable difference in the order of substances, which has been marked by B. Faddegon. He has noted that in the description of destruction, Praśastapāda gives the following order: earth, water, fire and air, while in the enunciation of creation, he suggests a different sequence such as air, water, earth and fire. Evidently, there is a change in the order of fire in the process of creation.[23] On a closer study, one could say that this might have been done intentionally since Praśastapāda wanted to put fire just before the production of Golden Egg (*Hiraṇyagarbha*), which is created out of fiery and earthly atoms.

In this case also, it seems that Praśastapāda has tried to mould the metaphysical theory of Vaiśeṣika so as to fit into the mythological framework influencing his personal beliefs.

Nevertheless, one has to sift the metaphysical from the mythical in Praśastapāda's statement and go ahead with the explanation of the theory. Accordingly, the most notable aspect of the Vaiśeṣika theory of creation is the idea of God and his role in creating the world.[24] As already mentioned, Praśastapāda is the first one in Vaiśeṣika tradition to present a systematic account of creation, and it is he who has clearly talked of Maheśvara, the Supreme Lord, as initiator of creation. It is also significant to note that although Śaṅkarācārya has refuted the Vaiśeṣika view of creation in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (2.2.12), yet he has not made any mention of God therein. In fact, the idea of origin of theism in Vaiśeṣika[25] is still a matter of debate, but it goes without saying that Praśastapāda and his commentators have preconceived the acceptance of God and his role in initiating the process of creation.

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[20] Vide NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p.131; *Setu*, (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 289.

[21] Vide Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1996. God's arrival in the Vaiseṣika System, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Springer, 24 (3), pp. 281–294.

[22] Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 64.

[23] (Faddegon, B. 1918) *The Vaiçeṣika System*, p. 164.

[24] *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, 5.1, (Cowell, E. B. (ed. and Eng. trans.) 1936).

[25] Vide Chemparathy, George. 1967. Theism and Early Vaiśeṣika System. In *Gopinath Kaviraj Abhinandana Grantha*, pp. 109–125. Lucknow.

Purpose of Creation

Here, a question might naturally arise as to what is the purpose of creation according to Vaiśeṣika. Śridhara, one of the commentators of Praśastapāda, has raised this question on behalf of some opponent who says that there is no motivation for Supreme Lord Maheśvara to create the world since there are only two possible motivators for any intelligent agent: either to achieve some desired goal or to avoid some undesired effect. Obviously, none of these can pertain to Maheśvara, since he being the Supreme Lord, has nothing to obtain. Likewise, nothing can have any unwanted effect on him. So, there seems to be no reason for him to have a desire for creation. Responding to the opponent's view, Śrīdhara says that the same has been explicitly mentioned by Praśastapāda when he says that this is only for the sake of individual selves.[26]

It means that the Supreme Lord Maheśvara does not engage in creation for fulfilling any of his own desires, but it is out of his compassion for all the living beings (so that they can experience the accumulated results of their past actions and get free) that he initiates the creation of the world. It may be objected again by the opponent, who would allege that if Maheśvara is doing it for others, then he should have created a happy world and not the one which is full of so much of pain. Again, Śridhara explains that the answer is already available in the words of Praśastapāda, who says that the Lord is aware of the fruits of past actions of living beings.[27] So, his creative operation is not arbitrary, rather it is regulated by the *karmic* tendencies of living beings.

This brings us to the acceptance of doctrine of action (*karma*) and rebirth (*punarjanma*) in Indian philosophy in general and in Vaiśeṣika philosophy in particular. In fact, the final goal of human life is to realize oneself in its true nature; this is invariably the ultimate end of all philosophizing in Indian tradition excepting Cārvāka. But this cannot be achieved until the accumulated results of all the past actions are experienced by individual selves. So, they have to take several births until the whole treasure of these fruits is exhausted by experience (*bhoga*). Now, the Supreme Lord being omniscient has knowledge of all these actions (*karmas*) performed by the individual selves and their results. Therefore, he awards them with appropriate results in accordance with their respective actions performed in different births. In this way, the Lord's supremacy will not be affected nor can the misgiving of partiality be ascribed to him, for certainly the Lord does not cease to be a Lord by according his appropriate awards on the basis of their merits.[28]

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[26] *Prāṇināṁ bhogabhūtaye.* – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 127.

[27] *Bhogabhūtaye sukhaduḥkhānubhavotpattaye maheśvarasya sisṛkṣā sarjanecchā jāyate.* – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 127.

[28] NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 133.

Concept of Existence

As far as the notion of creation is concerned, it is incomplete without the concept of existence. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika scholars have discussed different aspects of the issue in detail and have offered some valuable insights such as the following:

- The first and the foremost idea of existence according to Vaiśeṣika is expressed by the term isness (*astitva*) which is included in the common criterion of six categories by Praśastapāda. The same has been explained as self-constituting existence (*svarūpavattva*) by his commentator Śridhara.[29] Isness is the widest form of existence which pertains to all the positive entities of the world. It is therefore that Kaṇāda proclaims to explain 'all that is', under the six heads of categories expounded by him.[30]
- There is another notion of subsistence (*sattā*) which can usually be translated as existence, but in Vaiśeśika system, it is strictly a technical term which denotes the widest form of universal (*para sāmānya*) and pertains to substance, attribute and activity[31] – the first three categories.
- The next aspect of existence is an extension of the above and is expressed by the terms like *sattva* or *sattāsambandha*,[32] i.e. being related with the highest universal which is ascribed to the first three categories, namely, substance, attribute and activity.
- The fourth dimension of existence is expounded as existing in their own terms (*svātmasattva*),[33] and it is ascribed to the later three categories of Vaiśeṣika system, namely, generality, particularity and inherence.
- Last but not the least, there is another type of existence which can be and has been referred to all forms of negation (*abhāva*) as well in the later tradition of Vaiśeṣika.[34]

However, it has to be emphasized that like other systems of Indian philosophy, Vaiśeṣika also propounds the existence of the produced world as transient. But this transience needs to be explained in three steps – creation (*sṛṣṭi*), sustenance (*sthiti*) and destruction (*saṁhāra*). All these three are eternally following each other since the movement of time is cyclical in Vaiśeṣika view. It means that each creation is preceded by an earlier one and also followed by another one.[35]

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[29] *Yasya vastuno yat svarūpaṁ tadeva tasyāstitvam*. – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 41.

[30] *Yadiha bhāvarūpaṁ tat sarvaṁ mayā upasaṁkhyātavyam*. – Vyo, (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.), 1930), p. 47.

[31] (i) *Saditi yato dravyaoguṇakarmasu sā sattā*. – VS, 1.2.7, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).
(ii) *Dravyāditrikavṛttistu sattā paratayocyate*. – *Bhāṣāparichheda*, Verse 8, (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850).

[32] *Dravyādīnaṁ trayāṇāmapi sattāsambandhaḥ*. – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 43.

[33] *Sāmānyādīnāṁ trayāṇāmapi svātmasattvaṁ*. – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 49.

[34] *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, (Jha, Shashinath (ed.) 1964), pp. 1–2 and 26.

[35] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, (Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (ed.), 1940), pp. 280–289.

Conclusion

In brief, it may be said that the Vaiśeṣika theory of creation seems quite convincing since it is founded on commonsense notions of pluralism and realism. The Vaiśeṣika scholars have tried to explain the diversity of the universe in a simple and logical manner so as to appeal to all the thinking minds. The most striking feature of Vaiśeṣika realism is that each and every smallest entity of the world is explained as an independent real which has an identity of its own. But the scheme of enumerating these entities is so synchronic that all of them co-exist and co-ordinate in a pluralistic world without merging into one another.

Of course, there have been objections, reservations and interactions between the Vaiśeṣika, and other schools of thought in Indian philosophical tradition and respective scholars have tried to answer and uphold their own points of view. Unfortunately, the system propounded by Kaṇāda did not get its due over the past twenty six centuries at the hands of traditional commentators like Śaṅkarācārya and Vacaspati Misra. Later on, the popularity and primacy of its sister school, Nyāya overshadowed the significant theories of Vaiśeṣika on the one hand, and on the other hand, the attacks by stalwarts like Śaṅkarācarya were also not adequately met from within the school.

However, with the renewed advancement of rationalized thinking in modern times, theories of Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika are proving to be worthwhile, as will be evidenced from the foregoing discussion and the following statement:

> Kaṇāda aims at a direct appraisal of the world of existence and he presents the structural build up of this world in terms of the diversities evident in it, i.e., in terms of the categories. No other system of Indian thought seems to aim at this kind of a direct, simple, logical and non-speculative approach to the world of existence.[36]

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Chapter 5
Atomic Theory of Vaiśeṣika

Abstract The present chapter intends to expound and examine the atomic theory of Vaiśeṣika, which forms one of the earliest and the strongest foundations of scientific thought in ancient India. The Vaiśeṣika system represents a pluralistic point of view as it believes in the diversity of the visible world containing the matter, attributes and motion and provides an original approach for explaining the physical world. According to Vaiśeṣika, the atoms of four kinds are the ultimate constituents of all produced and perishable entities while these atoms are themselves partless and eternal.

Keywords *Aṇu · Paramāṇu · Dvyaṇuka · Tryaṇuka/trasareṇu · Caturaṇuka · Parimaṇḍala · Pārimāṇḍalya · Pākaja · Apākaja · Pīlu · Piṭhara · Ārambhaka · Anārambhaka · Samavāyikāraṇa · Asamvāyikāraṇa · Nimittakāraṇa*

Background

Vaiśeṣika is one of the six major schools of Indian philosophy, and almost all the schools in Indian philosophical tradition basically aim at understanding the diversities of visible world and reaching at the underlying essence of reality. In this process, various standpoints have emerged with reference to the ultimate nature of reality, which may be broadly divided under two heads: material and non-material. This division of course should not be taken to be exclusive in the sense that no philosopher can, in fact, neglect the material aspect of the world, more so the pluralist and the realist.

Accordingly, the system of Vaiśeṣika, which is a pluralistic realism, delves deep into the delineation of matter[1] and propounds that the reality consists of multiplicity, and the same is derived out of innumerable, ultimate particles of matter known as atoms (*paramāṇ*us).[2] In Vaiśeṣika view, the process of creation and destruction

[1] 'Intrinsically unconscious and essentially substantive *(dravya)*'. – (Mishra, Umesh 1936) *Conception of Matter According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 59.

[2] It needs to be clarified here that in Vaiśeṣika tradition, there is a subtle distinction between the two words *aṇu* and *paramāṇu*, so they should not be used interchangeably. Kaṇāda has used the term

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pertains to these atoms only which are held to be eternal and of four types: earth, water, fire and air.

Introduction

In the Vaiśeṣika scheme of things, the whole gamut of existence has been classified in six (or seven in later tradition) categories, namely, substance (*dravya*), attributes (*guṇa*), activity (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), individuality (*viśeṣa*), inherence (*samavāya*) and absence (*abhāva*).[3] Out of these, the first category substance is the foremost in the sense that it is the causal substrate (*samvāyikāraṇa*) of all the non-eternal entities and accounts for creation and destruction of the universe.[4] Accordingly, out of the nine substances, atoms are held to be the ultimate parts of the first four substances, viz., earth, water, fire and air; the remaining five substances are held to be eternal and partless. So, the whole variety of worldly objects depends upon the effects produced out of these four types of atoms which are not homogenous but are essentially and qualitatively different. Their difference basically lies in their specific properties, since different substances are stated to have different specific properties. Thus, the earth atoms have colour, taste, touch (temperate) and smell; the water atoms have colour, taste and touch (cold); fire atoms have colour and touch (hot), while the air atoms have touch (neither cold nor hot) only.[5]

As far as the generic attributes of these four substances are concerned, they are shared by all the four types of atoms.[6] Hence, all types of atoms have an unlimited number and a typical magnitude, termed as globular or spherical (*parimaṇḍala* or *pārimāṇḍalya*),[7] the minutest and eternal magnitude peculiar to the atom (*paramāṇu*). However, it needs to be clarified that in Vaiśeṣika view, the minute (*aṇu*) magnitude of a dyad (*dvyaṇuka*) is held to be derived out of dual number and is therefore different from the magnitude peculiar to the atom (*pārimāṇḍalya*), which, being eternal, does not give rise to any further minuteness.

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aṇu to denote a dimensional conception. He has not used the term *paramāṇu* according to some scholars, while others say that he has used both the terms, because in one version, there occurs a *sūtra* (4.1.6, Darbhanga: 1957) with the word *paramāṇu*.

[3] For details, see Kumar, Shashiprabha (1992) *Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha Nirūpaṇa* (Hindi), pp. 17–36.

[4] Other categories like attribute (*guṇa*) and activity (*karma*), etc. to account for creation, e.g. conjunction (*saṁyoga*) can be a causal condition of creation, and disjunction (*vibhāga*) can be a causal condition of destruction, but they are not the inherent causes like the substance (*dravya*).

[5] *The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda* (VS), 2.1.1-4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[6] *Caturṇāṁ dravyārambhakatvasparśavattve.- Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 11.

[7] (i) *Pari sarvato maṇḍalam.-Śabdakalpadruma*, Vol.III, (Dev, Raja Radhakant 2006), p. 63.
(ii) *Nityaṁ parimaṇḍalam.* -VS, 7.1.20, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).
(iii) *Pārimāṇḍalyamiti sarvāpakṛṣṭaṁ parimāṇam. -Maṇjuṣā* (Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*), (Sastry, C. Sankara Rama (ed.) 1923), p. 179.

Arguments for Positing the Atomic Theory

Here, a question naturally arises as to what is the proof for acceptance of the atomic theory being proposed by the system of Vaiśeṣika. In response to a question like this, three types of proofs have been adduced in the Vaiśeṣika tradition to prove the existence of atoms, such as the following:

- Argument based on *regressus ad infinitum*
- Inferential reasoning
- Scriptural authority

A close study of the above arguments[8] needs to be understood in view of the following presuppositions which are the underlying theories of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics:

- Theory of causation, according to which every effect is a new beginning and does not pre-exist in its cause (*ārambhavāda* or *asatkāryavāda*).[9]
- The cause and effect are essentially different entities; they are not one and the same (*kārya-kāraṇa-bheda*).[10]
- There is an inherent relation (*samavāya*) between the cause and the effect,[11] and so anything cannot be produced out of anything.
- The effect produced in the form of a composite (*avayavin*) is a distinct entity, over and above the parts (*avayavas*).[12] It is not just an aggregate of its parts as the Buddhists hold but is something new and independent, having a separate existence of its own.
- The properties pertaining to the cause and effect are similar, since the properties of the effect are produced out of the properties of the cause.[13]
- There is, however, a singular exception to this general rule, in case of the gross (*mahat*) magnitude of the triad (*tryaṇuka*) which is different than that of its cause, i.e. the dyad (*dvyaṇuka*). The gross magnitude of the triad is stated to be derived out of the plural number (*bahutva*) of the dyads and not out of their minute magnitude; otherwise, the same should have been more minute than that of its cause.
- The Vaiśeṣika treats earth, water, fire and air, the four tactile substances of limited magnitude as ultimate material substrates which are neither transmutable into one another nor reducible to a common essence.

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[8] For details, see Gangopadhyaya, M.K. (1980) *Indian Atomism*, pp. 22–30.

[9] *Kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvāt prāgasat*. -VS, 9.1.1., (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[10] *Asataḥ kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvādarthāntaram.* -VS, 9.1.3, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[11] *Ihedamiti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ.* -VS, 7.2.26, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[12] *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Verses-36–37, (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850) and *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, (Śāstrī, Harirām Śukla (eds.) 1972), p. 112.

[13] *Kāraṇapūrvakaḥ kāryaguṇo dṛuṣṭaḥ*.-VS, 2.1.24, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

Since the Vaiśeṣika theory of atomism cannot be comprehended in isolation, hence the above issues need to be noted as they are vitally connected with the basic metaphysical position of Vaiśeṣika.

The crux of the above arguments is that all visible products of the world are constituted of parts, which can again be divided in their parts. This process will go on endlessly if one does not stop somewhere, and this will lead to an illogical position that a small pot and the entire round earth are equal in size[14] since both of them have infinite parts. To avoid such an incongruous situation, it is the demand of logical reasoning that we stop somewhere. So we have to posit an ultimate entity which is uncaused and does not have any parts; this leads to the postulation of atoms. Besides, just as we have to accept the highest limit of gross magnitude in ubiquitous substances, similarly, we must accept the ultimate limit of minute magnitude, i.e. the minutest atom (*paramāṇu*).[15]

Nature of Atoms

Once the existence of atom as the ultimate material cause is proved, the issue of its nature and definition in Vaiśeṣika is worth considering. In this regard, it must be mentioned that though Kaṇāda has not explicitly used the term '*paramāṇu*', there is hardly any doubt that we have a fairly developed form of atomic theory in his treatise; he has just mentioned '*aṇu*' by name and has cited a well-known argument to prove his point: the effects/products are the signs which lead us to their successive causes and ultimately to the final cause,[16] i.e. the atom.

However, in the later tradition of Vaiśeṣika, we come across several definitions of atom such as the following:

- Atom is partless but active.[17]
- Atom is the eternal and corporeal (matter).[18]
- Atom is the subtlest and the first part of wholes but is itself partless and invisible.[19]

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[14] *Anantakāraṇairārabdhā golakarūpā pṛthivī tathā ghātādi kāryamapītyekākāratāprasaṅgaḥ. -Vyomavati* (Vyo.), (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 224.

[15] *Aṇuparimāṇatāratamyṁkvacidviśrāntaṁparimāṇatāratamyatvāt,mahatparimāṇataratamyavat, yatredaṁ viśrāntaṁ yataḥ paramaṇurnāsti sa paramāṇuḥ. -Nyāyakandalī* (NK), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 79.

[16] *Tasya kāryaṁ liṅgam*. -VS, 4.1.2, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[17] *Niravayavaḥ kriyāvān paramāṇuḥ.- Saptapadārthī*, (Gurumurti, D. (ed. and Eng. trans.) 1932), p. 88.

[18] *Nityo mūrtaḥ paramāṇuḥ. -Mānamanohara*, (Yogindrananda, Swami (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1973), p. 14.

[19] *Paramāṇuḥ paramasūkṣma ādiravayavaḥ svayaṁ niravayavaḥ atīndriyo nitya iti.-Prabhā* (commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*), (Sastry, C. Sankara Rama (ed.) 1923), p. 89.

The Vaiśeṣika holds that at the beginning of a new creation,[20] these atoms are first set in motion by an unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*), which in turn results in combining of two atoms. Due to this combination, a new product is created which is still minute *(aṇu)* in size and is known as a dyad (*dvyaṇuka*). Thereafter, three dyads combine to form a triad (*tryaṇuka*, *trasareṇu* or *truṭi*) which is the smallest visible form of matter[21]; it is held to be the beginning of gross *(mahat)* magnitude, derived out of plural number of its constituents. Subsequently, four triads join to form a tetrad (*caturaṇuka*), and the creation of gross bodies takes place. Details of formation of gross worldly objects from the four types of atoms are given by Praśastapāda in his *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*.[22]

Specific Features of Atoms

As far as the several characteristics of atoms in the Vaiśeṣika view are concerned, the following points are worth mentioning:

- Atoms are the ultimate, minutest parts of matter.
- Atoms are partless in themselves.
- Atoms are eternal and indivisible.
- Atoms are innumerable; each one of them is distinct from others due to its own individuality called differential or ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*).
- No single atom can create anything, since if it is accepted, then its creative activity would have to be accepted forever, and this process would never stop, because there would be no other factor required for the same.[23]
- Atoms are imperceptible individually as well as collectively; ordinary human beings cannot grasp these with any of the sense organs. But the *yogins* have a direct perception of atoms just as of other minute objects, since they have extraordinary capabilities to do so.
- Atoms are not homogenous in nature, they are essentially of four types, since they are the ultimate parts of products created from earth, water, fire and air; the material cause is always of that class to which the product belongs.

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[20] In Vaiśeṣika view, the process of creation and destruction is a continuous cycle which has no beginning. For details, see *Setu*, (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 287.

[21] *Jālasūryamarīcisthaṁ yat sūkṣmaṁ dṛśyate rajaḥ.*
Tasya ṣaṣṭhatamo bhāgaḥ paramāṇuḥ sa ucyate. – Quoted in *Nyāyakośa*, (Jhalakīkar, Bhimācārya, 1978), p. 470.

[22] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 127–131.

[23] *Sa caiko nārambhakaḥ ekasya nityasya cārambhakatve kāryasya satatotpattiḥ syādapekṣaṇīyābhāvāt, avināśitvañca prasajyeta.*-NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 79–80.

Chemical Action (*Pāka*)

According to Vaiśeṣika view, the four properties of colour, taste, touch and smell pertaining to the products of earth are non-eternal and undergo a chemical change when heat is applied to them. This change in the four earthly properties caused due to extraneous heat is technically termed as chemical action (*pāka*).[24] In other words, the above-mentioned four qualities inhering in earthly products are held to be transformed due to application of heat (*pākaja*) while inhering in other material products, i.e. pertaining to water, fire and air – they are stated to be unchanged even after application of heat (*apākaja*), e.g. a raw mango (which is an earthly product) turns its green colour to yellow, sour taste to sweet, hard touch to soft and acid smell to fragrant one on ripening due to application of heat natural or otherwise. On the other hand, if heat is applied to naturally cold water, it will become hot for a while but would return to its normal cold temperature after a short duration since the change in properties of water is not material and actual. So, chemical action is relevant only in the case of the earth atoms and their products.

There are several views regarding the subtle, technical differences in the processes of chemical action as also in the time moments involved[25], details of which are available in the Vaiśeṣika sources. But more significantly, this is one aspect of the atomic theory which has been differently interpreted in the schools of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya. According to Vaiśeṣika view, the process of chemical action takes place successively and separately in each atom (*pīlu*), while the Nyāya subscribes to the simultaneous chemical action of a whole (*piṭhara*). It is therefore that in Indian philosophical tradition, the former are known as exponents of successive chemical action in each atom (*pīlupākavādins*) while the latter as proponents of simultaneous chemical action in the whole (*piṭharapākavā*dins).[26]

Atoms and Motion

As stated above, a composite product (*avayavīn*) is formed out of the atoms as its parts (*avayavas*) in Vaiśeṣika view. This process involves several conjunctions (*saṁyogas*) which are brought about by motion (*karman*). Therefore, the issue of atoms as the ultimate material cause and creation of various effects out of them is crucially connected with that of motion. Accordingly, the Vaiśeṣika sources assert that while atoms are the inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of worldly products,

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[24] *Pāko nāma vijātīyastejaḥsaṁyogaḥ.-Nyāyabodhinī* (commentary of *Tarkasaṁgraha*), (Athalye, Y. V. (Eng. trans.) Bodas, M. R. 1974), p. 17 (It is noteworthy here that the properties pertaining to other three material substances, water, fire and air are held to be eternal and unchanging).

[25] *Kaṇādarahasyam*, (Dwivedi, Vindhyeshwari Prasad (ed.) 1917), pp. 60–67.

[26] *Pīlupākavādo vaiśeṣikāṇāṁ....Iha piṭharapākavādino naiyāyikāḥ.-Padārthīyadivyacakṣuḥ*, (Mishra, Dhirananda (ed.) 1961), pp. 35–36.

conjunction of individual selves with atoms is the non-inherent *(asamavāyikāraṇa)* but essential cause of these, while God (assisted by the cumulative *adṛṣṭa* of the *jīvas*) is the efficient or instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*).[27]

Motion is defined as the cause of conjunction and disjunction in Vaiśeṣika, while it is stated to be caused by weight, effort, conjunction and liquidity.[28] So initially, when conjunction is generated between two atoms, motion takes place and contributes to the formation of gross bodies. But it needs to be clarified here that the motion of atoms is held to be of two types in Vaiśeṣika, viz. productive (*ārambhaka*) and nonproductive (*anārambhaka*).[29] The former gives rise to further effects and is produced in two atoms of the same kind, just when the process of creation begins. However, a productive conjunction can occur only between two atoms of the same sort and never between atoms of different kind. In other words, two earth atoms may combine to form an earth-dyad, but an earth atom combined with a water atom cannot produce a dyad.

This process of creation pertaining to gross physical objects from atoms as the ultimate constituent parts of matter propounded by Vaiśeṣika has been termed as '*paramāṇukāraṇavāda*', and several objections against it have also been raised by Śaṅkarācharya, the commentator on *Brahmasūtras*.[30] Even though most of these objections can be met with plausible arguments in favour of the atomic theory posited by Vaiśeṣika, there are a few points which really need to be reformulated. One of such points is the necessity of a dyad (*dvyaṇuka*) in between an atom and a triad, when a triad can suffice to account for the size differences among bigger and smaller products. In fact, Raghunatha Śiromaṇi, one of the scholars who belongs to the later period of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition itself, has raised this point and questioned as to why can't one start from a triad (*tryaṇuka*) as the ultimate particle of matter rather than the atom?[31] According to him, it is unnecessary to infer atoms and dyads.[32] Although, some of the later Vaiśeṣika scholars like Veṇīdatta have again tried to answer the question from the traditional standpoint and have argued that this view is not acceptable.[33] In any case, Raghunatha's opinion has a logic which seems to be

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[27] *Maheśvarechhā nimittakāraṇamātmanāmaṇubhiḥ saṁyogāścāsamavāyikāraṇamaṇavastu samavāyina ityaṇuṣu karmāṇyutpadyante.*-Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 298.

[28] *Ekadravyamaguṇaṁ saṁyogavibhāgeṣvanapekṣakāraṇamiti karmalakṣaṇam.*-VS, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986), 1.1.17.

[29] *Teṣāṁ śarīrendriyāṇāmānārambhakeṣvaṇuṣu dravyārambhakasaṁyoganivṛttau dvayaṇukavināśe tadārabdhasyāpi nivṛttirityāha maheśvarecchātmāṇusaṁyogajakarmabhyaḥ śarīrendri yakāraṇāṇuvibhāgebhyaḥ paramāṇuryāvat tāvadvināśa iti.*
Dravyārambhakasaṁyoganivṛttiḥ svakāraṇāṇuvibhāgebhyas te ca maheśvarechhātmāṇusaṁyogajakarmabhyaḥ -Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 298.

[30] *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (on *Brahmasūtra Tarkapāda*, 2.2. 11–17), (Shatshastri, Swami Hanumandas (ed.) 1993).

[31] *Paramāṇudvyaṇukayośca mānābhāvaḥ truṭaveva viśrāmāt. -Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam*, (Potter, Karl H. (ed.) 1957), pp. 31–32.

[32] For details, see (Bhaduri, Sadananda 1975) *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, pp. 66–69.

[33] *Padārthamaṇḍanam*, (Nene, Gopal Shastri (ed.) 1930), pp. 6–7.

more intelligible from a common-sense point of view. Besides Raghunatha, Padmanābha Mishra also poses a different view in this regard. He maintains that the ultimate unit should be a dyad or a triad.[34] Although he as well as Raghunatha[35] agree that the ultimate unit is indivisible.

Nonetheless, it is true that the traditional Vaiśeṣika view of atoms being the ultimate, indivisible and partless constituents of the material objects is based on logical presuppositions of the system and has stood the test of time. So, it should be evaluated in the light of those very grounds and within the perspective of philosophical speculations.

As regards the antiquity of atomic theory in India[36] or the issue of similarities between Greek and Indian atomism[37] and the question of Greek influence on Vaiśeṣika theorization, nothing sums up the matter better than the following words of Max Mueller:

> It is no doubt, very tempting to ascribe a Greek origin to Kaṇāda's theory of atoms. But suppose that the atomic theory had really been borrowed from a Greek source, would it not be strange that Kaṇāda's atoms are supposed never to assume visible dimensions till there is a combination of three double atoms (*tryaṇuka*), neither the single nor the double atoms being supposed to be visible by themselves. I do not remember anything like this in Epicurean authors, and it seems to me to give quite an independent character to Kaṇāda's view of the nature of an atom.[38]

Conclusion

What follows from the above brief delineation is that the Vaiśeṣika system has offered a fairly developed atomic theory wherein various hints of physics and chemistry can be traced. Evidently, the Vaiśeṣika standpoint cannot be judged from the scientific standards of current conceptions:

> When therefore modern science is not itself convinced of the finality of its own conclusions, where is the justification of our rejecting a philosophy which gives us a clearly imaginable picture and a fairly intelligible theory of the structure of the material world?[39]

In fact, the theory of atoms has itself been outdated from the contemporary scientific circle; however, the credit of innovative contribution cannot and should not be denied to Kaṇāda, the founder of Vaiśeṣika, and his followers, whose vision has

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[34] *Setū*, (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), pp. 206–207.

[35] However, it has been contended that Raghunatha might have borrowed this view from Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas or Vaibhāṣika Buddhists.- Vide Gangopadhyaya, M.K. 1980) *Indian Atomism*, p. 20.

[36] See Jacobi, H. 1978. The Atomic Theory. In *Studies in the History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol.III, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (ed.), p. 143.

[37] See (Faddegon, B. 1918) *The Vaiçeṣika System*, p. 13 and (Keith, Arthur Berriedale 1921) *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 16.

[38] Vide (Muller, Max 1971) *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 446.

[39] (Bhaduri, Sadananda 1975) *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, p. 70.

essentially helped in projection, revision and (may be!) rejection of the theory in later times. To conclude:

> With their serious methodology, invincible logic and strong commonsense, they were best fitted to follow a scientific line of thought without any bias or hindrance. Thus, they fought, all along, for the atomic theory and sought to develop it against the relentless tirade of the idealists though the ages for a period extending over about 1500 years.[40]

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Chapter 6
Vaiśeṣika Insights into Science

Abstract The chapter intends to highlight select theories of Vaiśeṣika which may provide significant inputs for different domains of science in ancient Indian thought. Accordingly, Vaiśeṣika theories of matter and motion along with the concept of chemical action, causation and dream cognition are being discussed in this chapter.

Keywords *Bhūtadravyas · Paramāṇus · Yogins · Pāka · Pīlupākāvāda · Piṭharapākavāda · Taijasa · Ākaraja · Naimittika · Dravatva · Bhāsvara śukla rūpa · Karma · Prayatna · Nodana · Abhighāta · Dravatva · Svapna*

Background

Vaiśeṣika is held to be one among the six major systems of knowledge (*śāstras*) in Indian philosophy and is stated to be beneficial for comprehending all other branches of Indian learning.[1] In the Indian philosophical tradition, '*śāstra*' has been stated as an equivalent term for denoting science or a scientific treatise,[2] since it not only enunciates the nature of reality but also enjoins human beings to think and act in a systematic manner, so that they can attain the goal of final beatitude.[3]

The system of Vaiśeṣika is classified as a 'nature-philosophical school'[4] since it mainly deals with the external world. As compared to other philosophical schools in Indian tradition, the Vaiśeṣika stands out distinctly because it endeavours to explain the world around us in a realistic and scientific manner rather than the 'world-negating attitude of some forms of Vedānta and Buddhism'.[5]

[1] *Kāṇādaṁ Pāṇinīyaṁ ca sarvaśāstropakārakam*.- (Anonymous).

[2] (i) (Williams, Monier 2005) *Sanskrit English Dictionary*, p. 1069.
(ii) (Potter, Karl H. 1977) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, p. 737.

[3] *Śreyaḥsādhanābhidhāyakaṁ śāstram*. -*Saptapadārthī*, (Gurumurti, D. (ed. and Eng. trans.) 1932), p. 153.

[4] (Frauwallner, Erich 1973) *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, English translation by V.M. Bedekar, p. 3.

[5] (Matilal, B.K. 1977) *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 112.

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Introduction

Both science and philosophy essentially deal with the same problem, i.e. understanding the world in its entirety, although their methods might be different. Science approaches the world through observation and experimentation, while philosophy handles it through introspection and reflection. It is not without reason then that philosophy is said to begin from where physical science ends.[6] The same is duly connoted by their appellations: *physics* and *metaphysics*. From this point of view, both science and philosophy are mutually complementary because science aims at exploring the reality and formulating theories thereof, while philosophy tries to expound and examine those theories.

In the above background, it is not surprising that since ancient times several philosophers have also been scientists and vice versa. Kaṇāda, the propounder of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, is one of such sage scientists born in India (600 B.C. approx.) who has harmonized physics and philosophy in his theories.[7] While explaining the physical nature of universe, he has not only discussed the material world but also tried to explain the mental aspect of reality and even hinted at the realm of the spiritual. The school of Vaiśeṣika is so designated because it distinguishes itself from other schools of Indian philosophy in the sense that it focuses upon individual difference of each of the innumerable atoms of the universe rather than dwelling upon their inherent identity.[8] Obviously, such a rationalistic and pluralistic system suits the modern mindset prone to rationalistic aptitude.

The Basic Theme of Vaiśeṣika

The scientific outlook of Kaṇāda is visible right from the beginning of his treatise where he defines '*dharma*' as a source of material achievement (*abhyudaya*) and spiritual fulfilment (*niḥśreyasa*)[9] and declares that the true knowledge of six categories (*padārthas*) propounded by him can be acquired through twin methods of knowing similarities (*sādharmyas*) and dissimilarities (*vaidharmyas*) which would enable one to obtain the ultimate goal of life.[10] This technique of blending the binary

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[6] (Jeans, James 1948) *Physics and Philosophy*, p. 17.

[7] 'The philosophy dealing with the composite structure of matter starting with *Vishesha* is called the Vaiseshikadarshana-Emperio-dialectics or Physical Science.' -*Vaisheshikadarshana* with *Vedabhāskara* Commentary, (Sharma, Pandit Kashinath 1972) Introduction, p. xv.

[8] 'The word 'Vaiśeṣika' is derived from Viśeṣa, which means difference, and the doctrine is so designated, because, according to it, diversity, and not unity, is at the root of the universe.' – (Hiriyanna, M. 1932) *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 225.

[9] *Yato* '*bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ*. – *The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda* (VS), 1.1.2, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[10] *Dharmaviśeṣaprasūtāt dravyaguṇakarmasāmānya -viśeṣasamavāyānāṁ padārthānāṁ sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṁ tattvajñānānniḥśreyasam*. -VS, 1.1.4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

aspects of reality is a clue to the philosophy of Kaṇāda which sets in explaining the inclusive nature of reality such as the visible and the invisible, the gross and the subtle, matter and the spirit, substance and the attributes, generality and particularity, etc. The very idea of first classifying the whole universe into six (or seven in the later tradition of Vaiśeṣika) types of categories (*padārthas*) and claiming that nothing remains out of these categories[11], then proclaiming that all of these six categories are existent, knowable and nameable[12], is thoroughly scientific in its approach. What is more important to note is that all this has been done by Kaṇāda and his followers purely with an intuitive vision and without the assistance of any laboratory or equipment.[13] It is through the well-practiced austerities of the seers (like him) that they are endowed with intuitive insights[14] into the nature of reality. But at the same time, the Vaiśeṣika scholars give due cognizance to the day-to-day experience of ordinary human beings as well. That is why the system is also known as 'common-sense realism'.[15]

The Vaiśeṣika theories of atomic creation, chemical action, classification of metals as fiery substances, kinetic discussion of activity, elucidation of acoustic processes with reference to the origin and reception of sound (*śabda*), physiological functions within the human organism as also the acceptance of life in plant-bodies, exposition of psychological processes like cognition and dream, etc. are a clear example of scientific insights available in Vaiśeṣika sources. An in-depth discussion of few of these theories is being presented below.

Theory of Matter

The most notable contribution of Vaiśeṣika system to the history of scientific thought has been its atomic theory.[16] In fact, it is due to this theory that the propounder of Vaiśeṣika school was given the popularly known name, i.e. **Kaṇāda** (atom-eater).[17] According to Kaṇāda, the physical world comprises of three types of reals:

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[11] *Etasyāmeva bhāvātmakaṁ viśvamantarbhavati*. *-Tārkikarakṣā*, (Dwivedi, Vindhyeshvari Prasad (ed.) 1903), pp. 162–163.

[12] *Ṣaṇṇāmapi padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni*. *-Praśasatapādabhāṣya* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 41.

[13] 'We might even be tempted to contrast some of the discoveries of modern chemists and physicists with the crude but shrewd ideas of Indian philosophers prosecuting their investigations more than 2000 years ago without the aids and appliances now at every one's command.' – (Williams, Monier 1974) *Indian Wisdom or Examples of the Religious*, *Philosophical*, *and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus*, p. 81.

[14] *Ārṣaṁ siddhadarśanaṁ ca dharmebhyaḥ*. -VS, 9.2.13, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[15] Ganeri, Jonardon, 2010. Realism in Vaiśeṣika and Navyanyāya. In *Materialism and Immaterialism in India and Europe*. (ed.) Partha Ghose, Vol.xii, Part 5.

[16] For details, see Chap. 5 of this volume titled 'Atomic Theory of Vaiśeṣika'.

[17] *Kaṇān attīti Kaṇādaḥ*.*-Vyomavati* (Vyo.), (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20.

- **Matter in the form of four elemental and eternal substances.**[18]

  Atoms (*paramāṇus*) are held to be the ultimate, eternal, uncaused constituents of these four substances:
  →earth (*pṛthivī*)
  →water (*jala*)
  →fire (*tejas*)
  →air (*vāyu*)

- **Living bodies (*śarīras*) of four types**.

  These four types of earthly bodies are constituted of earth atoms:
  →embryonic (*jarāyuja*) like human beings and animals
  →egg-born (*aṇḍaja*) like birds, serpents and fishes
  →engendered by heat and sweat (*svedaja*) like mosquitoes and lice, etc.
  →germinating from the earth (*udbhija*) like plants and herbs, etc.

- **Sense organs (*indriyas*), created out of the atoms of above four substances**,[19] namely**:**

  →olfactory sense (*ghrāṇa*)
  →sense of taste (*rasanā*)
  →organ of sight (*cakṣuḥ*)
  →sense of touch (*tvak*)

(along with the eternal, uncaused auditory sense organ (*śrotra*) which is not different from ether (*ākāśa*) and similarly eternal uncaused inner sense organ/mind (*manas*) as instrument of mental awareness).

It is worth reiterating in this regard that in Vaiśeṣika view above four types of atoms are accepted to be the ultimate and eternal material cause of the universe. The various visible products of the world are created out of different conglomerations of these invisible atoms. More significantly, each of the innumerable atoms of the universe is distinct in itself, since it has an individual identity (*viśeṣa*) of its own. The Vaiśeṣika acceptance of atoms as the ultimate, partless parts of all the visible products is based on the logical postulate of avoiding *regressus* ad infinitum.[20] Accordingly, each visible object is held to be constituted of parts, and these parts are again divisible into further smaller parts. But since this process cannot go on indefinitely, hence one is forced to set an ultimate limit and stop somewhere. This final

[18] *Sadakāraṇavannityam*. -VS, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986), 4.1.1.

[19] It is worth noting that the Vaiśeṣika holds fifth substance – ether (*ākāśa*) to be eternal which is not divisible. Therefore, the fifth sense organ (*śrotra indriya*) is held to be of the nature of ether (*ākāśa*) itself, not a product of it.

[20] For details on the nature and features of these atoms (*paramāṇus*), see (Gangopadhyaya, M.K. 1980) *Indian Atomism*: *History and Sources*, p. 22.

limit of divisibility is stated to be '*paramāṇu*' in several source texts of Vaiśeṣika,[21] and its existence is mainly proved through inferential process,[22] although it is said to be perceptible for the contemplative ones (*yogins*), and verbal testimony is also adduced in this regard.[23]

The Vaiśeṣika theory of atoms is undoubtedly a starting point in the history of physical concepts for explaining the universe in a causal framework. To quote:

> The ground layer consists of indivisible, invisible and indestructible atoms (*aṇu*, *paramāṇu*). It is the aggregation of these atoms that gives rise to different destructible compound substances. These atoms are ideals, representing unities of fundamental attributes. In this sense, they are quite similar to the concept of such elementary particles of modern physics which are proposed on theoretical grounds.[24]

Theory of Chemical Action

Theory of chemical action (*pāka*) in the atoms of earth is another significant feature of Vaiśeṣika which can be taken to be the earliest available theoretical reference in the field of chemistry in India. '*Pāka*' is defined as application of heterogenous external heat[25] which results in the change of colour, taste, smell and touch pertaining to earth. This assertion is based on the notion that the four properties mentioned above are basically of two types: eternal and non-eternal; those inhering in eternal substrata are held to be eternal, while those pertaining to non-eternal objects are non-eternal. But there is an exception in case of earth, because these four properties abiding in earth are always held to be non-eternal and prone to change due to chemical action (*pāka*). In other words, when heat is applied to any earthly object, then the colour, taste, smell and touch of that object are changed forever,[26] while in case of other material substances, this change is only temporary.

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[21] (i) *Tathā ghaṭadikāraṇakāraṇeṣvalpatarādibhāvaḥ kvacidviśrāntaḥ taratamaśabdavācyatvānmahāparimāṇavat. Yatra viśrāntāste paramāṇava iti.*-Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 224.

(ii) *Aṇuparimāṇatāratamyaṁ kvacid viśrāntaṁ parimāṇatāratamyatvād mahatparimāṇatāratamyavat, yatredaṁ viśrāntaṁ, yataḥ paramāṇurnāsti sa paramāṇuḥ. -Nyāyakandalī* (NK), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 79.

[22] *Tasya kāryaṁ liṅgam*. -VS, 4.1.2, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986) for details see *Vaisheshika Darsana with Rasāyana Commentary*, (T. Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur 1958), pp. 141–44.

[23] For details, see (Kumar, Shashiprabha 1992) *Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha Nirupaṇa* (Hindi), pp. 608–630.

[24] (Kak, Subhash 2003) *Indian Physics: Outlines of Early History*, p. 12.

[25] *Pāko nāma vijātīyastejaḥsaṁyogaḥ. -Nyāyabodhinī* (commentary on *Tarkasaṁgraha*), (Athalye, Y. V. (Eng. trans.) Bodas, M. R. 1974), pp. 17–18.

[26] Vide Kumar, Shashiprabha. 1991. Nyāyavaiśeṣikayoḥ guṇānāṁ pāka-prakrīyā. *Sāgarikā*, 29.1: 53–62.

There are a lot of details available in the Vaiśeṣika texts regarding the process of chemical action and the different ideas about time limit pertaining to it.[27] Although it is not relevant to refer to all of them here, yet one cannot avoid mentioning that the Vaiśeṣika posits a theory of simultaneous chemical action in each of the atoms gradually (*pīlupākavāda*), while the Naiyāyika rejects this and proposes a theory of chemical action in the whole as an object (*piṭharapākavāda*).[28] To explain these two theories through the popular example of pot, it might be said that Vaiśeṣika upholds successive baking of each atom in a pot, while the Nyāya propounds simultaneous baking of the complete finished product, e.g. the pot. It will not be out of place to add here that the modern method of heating through a microwave oven clearly proves that the Vaiśeṣika standpoint is more scientific.

Theory of Causation

Significantly, the Vaiśeṣika theory of causation in general and of homogenous material causes in particular, besides the creation of a new whole which is different than its parts, is also worth examining from the scientific point of view. In the history of Indian thought, Kaṇāda is the first to have defined and described the relation between cause and effect from this perspective.[29] He explains the visible world by accepting and stating the basic notion of causality, i.e. the cause is a factor which points towards a substance, either because the effect inheres in it or because there is a connection which is operating from its base.[30] More importantly, cause and effect are both having an individual identity in Kaṇāda's system as against the Sāṁkhya doctrine of shared identity between the cause and the effect. According to Kaṇāda and his followers, both the cause and effect, although two different entities, are inseparably tied through a unique relation termed inherence (*samavāya*).[31] It is due to this distinct theory of causation that in Vaiśeṣika view, each product is held to be a new beginning (*ārambha*) which was not existing before its production and will also not be present after its destruction. But the eternal causal factors, being different than the effect, were there and will be there:

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[27] *Kaṇādarahasyam*, (Dwivedi, Vindhyeshwari Prasad (ed.) 1917), p. 61.

[28] *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* (VUp.) (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 2002) (on VS 7.1.6, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986)), p. 371.

[29] Vide (Saraswati, Satyaprakash 1988), *Prācīna Bhārata ke Vaijñānika Karṇadhāra* (Hindi), p. 281.

[30] (i) *Iṣṭāniṣṭakāraṇaviśeṣādvirodhācca mithaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoarthāntarabhāvaḥ*. -VS, 10.1.1, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).
(ii) *Saṁśayanirṇayāntarābhāvaśca jñānāntaratve hetuḥ*. -VS, 10.1.2, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).
(iii) *Tayorniṣpattiḥ pratyakṣalaiṅgikābhyām*. -VS, 10.1.3, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[31] *Ihedamiti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*. -VS, 7.2.26, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

> It is a point to note that Kaṇāda is not dealing with causality in the empirical or practical sense, i.e. the sense in which the term is taken to connote mainly the process by which one thing or condition, say 'a' is said to bring about an event or a condition, say 'b'. He treats of causality as a phenomenal feature of the world existence.[32]

Details regarding the chemical processes involved in the production of a new whole (*avayavī*) from its constituent parts (*avayavas*) also need to be discussed in scientific manner, which is well demonstrated by a modern exponent of Vaiśeṣika.[33]

Theory of Metals

The Vaiśeṣika view of holding the metals (like gold, glass, silver, iron, etc.), which are produced out of mines (*ākaraja*) as fiery objects (*taijasa*), is also very important in this regard. It needs to be noted here that fire (*tejas*) implies both heat and light according to Vaiśeṣika. Kaṇāda has not explicitly mentioned anything about the classification of metals under fire (*tejas*), but he has stated that the metals like tin, glass, iron, silver, gold, etc. share a common feature with water, i.e. instrumental liquidity (*naimittika dravatva*).[34] But his followers have argued that the metals are fiery objects.

There are two clear-cut views in this case – the first view is held by the opponents of Vaiśeṣika who assert that the metals like gold, etc. are earthly objects.[35] According to the second view, which has been put forth by several Vaiśeṣika scholars, metals like gold, etc. have to be taken as fiery products since their liquidity (*dravatva*) is not extinct even after application of excessive heat, while it is not so in the case of other substances like earth, water, etc.[36] Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika argues that metals like gold, etc. cannot be classified under earthly objects. The metals like gold, etc. cannot be covered under watery objects as well, since water has natural liquidity, while the liquidity in metals is only instrumental. Besides, the luminous white colour (*bhāsvara śukla rūpa*) ascribed to fiery metals is also unique, for the earth and water have nonluminous white colour (*abhāsvara śukla rūpa*). Moreover, the metals can also not be classified under air because air does not have colour at all, while the metals have luminous white colour.[37]

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[32] (Gajendragadkar, Veena 1988) *Kaṇāda's Doctrine of The Padārthas*, p. 71.

[33] Vide (Pahi, Biswambhar 2000) *Vaiśeṣika Padārtha-Vyavasthā kā Paddhatimūlaka Vimarśa* (Hindi), pp. 189–200.

[34] *Trapusīsa-loha-rajata-suvarṇānāmagnisaṁyogāddravatvamadbhiḥ sāmānyam*'. -VS, 2.1.7, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[35] *Kaṇādarahasyam*, (Dwivedi, Vindhyeshwari Prasad (ed.) 1917), p. 20.

[36] VUp. (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 2002) (on VS, 2.1.7), (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986), p. 120.

[37] The fifth material substance – ether (*ākāśa*) neither has colour nor liquidity, so metals like gold, etc. cannot be clubbed with it too.-*Vivṛtti* on *Nyāyalilāvatīprakāśa*, (Śāstrī, Harihara (ed.) 1927) p. 166.

In this way, through the process of elimination as mentioned above, one is left with no choice but to accept that the metals are fiery objects. It needs to be noted here that several objections have been raised against the Vaiśeṣika view of holding metals as fiery objects from within the tradition of Indian philosophy, but various Vaiśeṣika scholars have not only tried to respond to those but have also stood by their point of view on the basis of different logical arguments.[38]

However, there seems to be at least one empirically proved factor which supports the Vaiśeṣika standpoint in this regard. Since metals are certainly known to be good conductors of heat, so they must belong to the same type of substance which is inherently associated with heat. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika view of holding the metals as fiery products stands vindicated from common experience as well.

Theory of Motion

The Vaiśeṣika exposition of motion (*karma*) is quite remarkable in the sense that it evinces a subtle analysis of numerous physical activities rather than discussing it as an act, process or verb (*kriyā*) as has been done in several other schools of Indian philosophy. Accordingly, the Vaiśeṣīka source texts explain a variety of physical motions such as throwing upwards (*utkṣepaṇa*), throwing downwards (*avakṣepaṇa*), contraction (*ākuñcana*), expansion (*prasāraṇa*) and movement (*gamana*) besides flowing of water (*syandana*) and falling down of weighty objects (*patana*), evacuation (*recana*), flaming up (*ūrdhvajvalana*), curvilinear motion (*tiryaggamana*), etc. All these types of activity pertain to five material substances (*mūrta dravyas*) only, namely, earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*jala*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*) and mind (*manas*) according to Vaiśeṣika.[39]

In this context, it is interesting to note that motion, invariably produced in any one of the five material substances, is devoid of properties in itself but is an independent cause for producing two properties, i.e. conjunction and disjunction according to Kaṇāda.[40] Praśastapāda, while explaining the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, has listed several properties as different factors which cause various types of motions in five material substances.[41] Prof. B.N. Seal has classified all these factors first into two groups such as mentioned below:

- Motions caused without any contact with material substances (*saṁyogājanya karma*).
- Motions produced by contact with matter (*saṁyogajanya karma*).[42]

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[38] Vide Kumar, Shashiprabha.1993. Vaiśeṣikanaye Suvarṇādidhātūnāṁ Taijasatva-Siddhiḥ. *Viśva-Saṁskṛtam*, 30.2:49–54.

[39] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 56–57.

[40] *Ekadravyamaguṇaṁ saṁyogavibhāgeṣvanapekṣakāraṇamiti karmalakṣaṇam*. -VS, 1.1.17, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[41] For details, see PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 697–698.

[42] (Seal, B.N. 1991) *Positive Sciences of The Ancient Hindus*, pp. 131–136.

Subsequently, various types of motions and their causes have been discussed by him under these two heads as follows:

(A) **Motions caused without any contact with material substances.**

- Motion caused through effort (*prayatna*):

In this case, activities like moving of hand for picking up food or for kicking an enemy[43] are cited in which there is no contact with matter at the level of production of the said activity.

- Motion caused through weight (*gurutva*):

When a fruit falls from the tree due to its own weight and without any contact with matter, then the action would be covered under this group. In fact, contact with matter in such cases acts as a deterrent to falling, e.g. the contact of a bird's nest with the tree does not let it fall, even though it is prone to fall due to its weight.[44]

- Motion caused through flowing of liquids (*dravatva*):

Liquids like water etc. always flow downwards due to their natural and inherent liquidity.[45]

- Motion caused through unseen factors (*adṛṣṭa*)[46]:

There are several such motions which arise without any visible and explicable contact with matter; all these movements have been classified under this head. Initial motion in atoms, flowing upwards of fire, curvilinear motion of air, moving upwards of water in trees, etc. are all enumerated under this group.[47] Moreover, mental activities like outgoing (*upasarpaṇa*) and incoming (*apasarpaṇa*) which take place after the death of physical body, are also explained by Praśastpāda[48] as occurring due to unseen factors (*adṛṣṭa*).

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[43] *Ātmasaṁyogaprayatnābhyāṁ haste karma*.-VS, 5.1.1, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986) and PPBh. with NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 713–14.

[44] *Saṁyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam*. VS, 5.1.7, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986) and *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.). 2002) on the above, pp. 299–300.

[45] *Dravatvāt syandanam*. -VS, 5.2.4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986) and VUp. on the above, p. 311.

[46] It needs to be clarified here that all those activities which are ascribed to *adṛṣṭa* by Kaṇāda are in fact purely physical activities which were unexplainable up to his time. Later interpreters have, however, suggested moral implications of the term *adṛṣṭa* which does not seem correct.
For details of changes in the meaning of unseen factor (*adṛṣṭa*) from literal to moral aspects in the history of Vaiśeṣika, see Kumar, Shashiprabha.1999. Nature and Role of Adṛṣṭa in Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. In *Facets of Indian Philosophical Thought*, pp. 115–123.

[47] VS, 5.2.2, 5.2.5–7, 5.2.13, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[48] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 736–38.

Interestingly, Praśastapāda has also talked of mental activities pertaining to contemplative saints (*yogins*), who have acquired special capabilities to transmit their mental faculties to the desired place and call these back as and when they wish to do so. Likewise, the initial mental activity for getting associated with a new physical body in the beginning of creation is also said to be caused by merit (*dharma*).[49]

(B) **Motions caused through contact with matter.**

- Motions caused through pressure (*nodana*):

Pressure (*nodana*) is a specific type of continued contact which is either created out of a collection of these four properties -weight, liquidity, velocity and effort or out of any one, two or three of these. The motion in four material substances is generated through pressure only; e.g. the motion of an object pushed or pulled by hand, the motion of mud below the heavy stones, the motion of arrow due to the continued pressure exerted by the bow-string, the motion of bow-string due to the continued pressure of elasticity of the bow before it receives its original shape, the motion of clouds, of volumes of dust, of balloons filled with gas,[50] sailing vessels and other vehicles under the impelling force of the wind etc. come under this category.[51]

- Motions produced out of impact (*abhighāta*):

Impact (*abhighāta*) is also a specific sort of contact which causes disjunctive motion in material substances through its velocity (*vega*); e.g. when a stone falls against a hard object, the potter's stick strikes the wheel or the mortar strikes against the pestle.[52] It is noteworthy here that impact (*abhighāta*) presupposes instantaneous disjunction, because if the contact is continued, then it will result into pressure (*nodana*).[53] However, in some cases, disjunction might occur after continued pressure, i.e. a rebound.

- Motions caused by elasticity (*sthitisthāpakatā*):

When any material object, after being pulled for a while, exercises a moving force due to its elasticity and regains its original form, then the motion in that object is caused by its elasticity. For example the motion of a bow string due to the force exercised by the bent bow is caused due to elasticity of the same.[54]

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[49] In later Vaiśeṣika treatises, merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) were equated with *adṛṣṭa*. Vide *Bhāṣāpariccheda* of Viśvanātha: Verse 161 – *Dharmādharmavadṛṣṭaṁ syāt* (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850).

[50] *Kiraṇāvalī* (Kir.), (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 57.

[51] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 725–26.

[52] NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p.727.

[53] 'Thus while pressure is a contact that persists, impact is an instantaneous contact which is immediately followed by disjunction'. – (Bhaduri, Sadananda 1975) *Studies In Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, p. 122.

[54] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 722–23.

- Motions caused through velocity or momentum (*vega*):

This includes all such motions which take place due to contact with a body which itself is in contact with something else having impressed motion. In other words, such motion arises in an object which is in contact with any thing already moving with velocity; momentum is the outcome of transmission of that moving object. This momentum in turn causes movement in the former object. For example when an arrow starts moving, then its subsequent motion is caused due to the momentum already present in the moving arrow and the same continues till such time that it falls due to loss of momentum and weight.[55]

It is noteworthy here that since motion is held to be momentary[56] and it cannot be caused by another motion according to Vaiśeṣika theory, hence the acceptance of velocity as one of the factors for successive movement in an object is essential for explaining the continuity of motion. The Vaiśeṣika idea of accepting and explaining velocity (*vega*) as one of the significant causal factors for motions not only bears remarkable resemblance with Newtonian laws of motion[57] but also proves the scientific attitude of Vaiśeṣika scholars.[58]

In addition to the above eight exclusive factors responsible for causing motion, Praśastapāda has mentioned that in some cases, two of the above factors are also seen operating jointly as follows:

- Pressure (*nodana*) and velocity (*vega*)
- Impact (*abhighāta*) and velocity (*vega*)
- Pressure (*nodana*) and impact (*abhighāta*)
- Weight (*gurutva*) and velocity (*vega*)[59]

Besides discussing these causal factors for producing various types of motion, Praśastapāda and other scholars have also explained some other specific motions such as vertical motion (*saṁmūrchhana*),[60] vibratory motion (*kampana*),[61] rotatory

[55] *Nodanādādyamiṣoḥ karma tatkarmakāritācca saṁskārāduttaraṁ tathottaramuttaraṁ* ca. -VS, 5.1.17, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986) (VUp.) (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.). 2002) on the above), p. 306.

[56] It is here that the Vaiśeṣika scholars discuss the idea of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) of motion, since motion is momentary by definition. However, the Vaiśeṣika idea of momentariness does not amount to the Buddhist identification of existence and flux, since it covers phases of several moments. -Vide PPBh. and NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 65.

[57] Vide (Dongre, N. G. 1979) *Vaiśeṣikasiddhāntanāṁ Gaṇitīyapaddhatyā Vimarśaḥ*, pp. 82–83.

[58] 'They had a good grasp of the concept of force and were able to indicate the resultant motion when a particle was subjected to a number of forces or motions. The direction depends on the fact that pressure impact is made in the original or opposite direction'. – (Radhakrishnan, S. 1967) *History of Philosophy: Eastern & Western*, Vol. I, pp. 460–461.

[59] PPBh. with NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 714–724.

[60] NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 119.

[61] *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Verses 157–159, (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850).

motion (*bhramaṇa*),[62] current motion or downward flow (*syandana*), upward motion (*ārohaṇa*)[63] and capillary motion (*abhisarpaṇa*).[64]

Theory of Dream

As regards the Vaiśeṣika theory of cognitive processes, it is usually discussed under the property called *buddhi* or *jñāna* in Vaiśeṣīka treatises. The classification of cognition (*buddhi*) as described by Praśastapāda[65] is given as follows:



Details of all the processes listed above are not meant to be provided here, but a special mention must be made of the dream (*svapna*) cognition which is more relevant for the present discussion. Accordingly, dream (*svapna*) is still being widely discussed in applied psychology and might need further explanation in the future as well since it is a very complex psychophysical experience which evades explanation. As delineated by Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda, dream is a mental cognition which

[62] NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 732.

[63] VS, 5.2.4–5, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986) and *Upaskāra* (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.). 2002) on the same, pp. 311–312.

[64] *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM), (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), Vol. II, p. 51.

[65] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 411 and 441.

arises out of previous impressions but is different from memory.[66] Dream is classified under invalid cognition, since there is no real ground for its existence in the external world and there is no actual contact between the sense organ and the object.

In other words, dream is a unique mental experience which takes place when all the physical senses are inactive but mind is active. It has several psychophysical aspects as will be clear from glancing through the triple factors which cause three types of dreams as follows:

- Psychological (*saṁskārapāṭavajanya*) – which occurs due to the continuity of mental impressions gathered during daytime. It is due to the freshness and intensity of these impressions that such dreams arise.
- Physiological (*dhātudoṣajanya*) – which appears on account of physiological imbalances. This type of dreams is actually based on the triple interrelation of essential constituents (*dhātu*) within the human organism which are discussed in Āyurveda.
- Inexplicable (*adṛṣṭajanya*)[67] – There are some such dreams which have no direct link with the physical or mental experiences of the person involved, but there is no denying the fact that one does have dreams of this type too. So all such dreams can be covered under this head.

Interestingly, the Vaiśeṣika scholars have also talked of dream-end (*svapnāntika*)[68] cognition which refers to the experience of 'dream within a dream'. Since such an experience occurs towards the end of dream, hence this is termed as dream-end (*svapnāntika*). However, there is a difference of opinion regarding its classification; Kaṇāda has not specified its grouping different than the dream (*svapna*), while Praśastapāda and his commentators seem to be putting it under memory.[69] Vyomaśiva has clearly stated that dream is a mental experience which takes place after the external sense organs have stopped operating, but dream-end is a form of recollection.[70]

Conclusion

What follows from the above brief delineation is that the scientific approach of Vaiśeṣika system is well reflected in its enunciation of physical phenomena as well as in exposition of mental processes.

In short, it would not be incorrect to say that the Vaiśeṣika texts provide a rich repository of scientific insights in diverse areas such as physics, metaphysics, chemistry, physiology, psychology and metallurgy, etc. Vaiśeṣika views on the nature of

[66] For details, see Kumar, Shashiprabha 1999. Vaiśeṣika Manodarśana mein Svapna-Siddhānta. In *Vaiśeṣika Darśana Pariśīlana* (Hindi), pp. 64–75.

[67] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 439.

[68] *Svapnāntikam*. -VS, 9.2.8, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[69] PPBh. with NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 441–442.

[70] Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 549.

sound, number and negation are also worth exploring in this regard. In the traditional circles of Indian philosophy, the system of Vaiśeṣika might not have been respected, and eminent scholars like Śaṅkara have not only characterized it as 'not committed to Veda' (*vedavirodhī*) but have also branded it as 'semi-nihilist' (*ardhavainā sika*); however in the modern rationalistic and scientific approaches, it is bound to gain ground as can be evinced from the growing worldwide interest in the study of Vaiśeṣika. The same has been echoed by a modern Vaiśeṣika scholar in the following manner:

> On the other hand, the realistic, physicalistic, and analytical orientation of the Vaiśeṣīka and allied Nyāya system has attracted the special attention of modern Western and Indian scholars. It has been claimed as an exemplary expression of the non-mystical, secular, analytical, and scientific potential of Indian thought. James R. Ballantyne was convinced that the rediscovery and propagation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in India would provide a basis and framework for the introduction of modern Western science.[71]

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[71] (Halbfass, Wilhelm 1993) *On Being and What There Is*: *Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology*, p. 81.

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Chapter 7
Consciousness and Cognition in Vaiśeṣika

Abstract In this chapter the basic issues pertaining to consciousness and cognition as expounded in the original sources of Vaiśeṣika will be discussed. In Vaiśeṣika view, the self is held to be the substratum of consciousness and not conscious by nature; it is said to become conscious when involved in the process of cognition. Since both these concepts are interrelated, hence it is appropriate to examine them both in relation to each other.

Keywords *Buddhi · Jñāna · Manas · Ātman · Caitanya · Pramātā · Prameya · Pramāṇa · Pramā · Vidyā · Avidyā · Pratyakṣa · Laiṅgika · Smṛti · Ārṣajñāna · Viparyaya · Svapna · Anadhyavasāya · Apekṣābuddhi · Dvitva · Saṁkhya · Viṣaya · Viṣayin · Anuvyavasāya*

Background

The Vaiśeṣika scholars have discussed the idea of consciousness[1] in relation with the process of cognition[2] (*jñāna*[3] or *buddhi*)[4] and the more fundamental postulate of substance and its attributes. Accordingly, the nature of consciousness has been propounded in the Vaiśeṣika tradition as being the substratum of *jñāna* or cognition (*jñānavattva*)[5] which is enumerated as one of the nine specific attributes of the self

[1] *Caitanya*, n. (Tr. *Cetana*) Consciousness. – Williams, Monier (2005) *A Sanskrit English Dictionary*, p. 402.

[2] The term is being used here in a broad sense and as an equivalent for the Sanskrit term *jñāna* which is much wider in semantic range than the English word 'knowledge'. For details regarding translation of Sanskrit term *jñāna*, see Ganeri, Jonardon (2018) Epistemology from a Sanskritic Point of View, p. 12 Vide https://www.academia.edu/36068038/Epistemology_from_a_Sanskritic_Point_of_View_2018_.

[3] (Potter, Karl H. 1977) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, pp. 126–27 and also Index, p. 721.

[4] (Halbfass, Wilhelm 1993) *On Being and What There Is*, p. 216.

[5] *Caitanyaṁ jñānavattvam*. – *Dinakarī* of Dinakara Bhaṭṭācārya (A Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*) under verse 47 of *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850), p. 154.

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(*ātman*).[6] In other words, self (*ātman*) as an eternal substance is the seat of cognition,[7] which in turn is produced[8] and not eternal in individual selves (*jīvas*), but when God was accepted in Vaiśeṣika tradition, then His knowledge was held to be eternal.

Introduction

The concept of cognition is expressed through numerous Sanskrit terms used in Vaiśeṣika texts such as *buddhi*, *upalabdhi*, *jñāna* and *pratyaya.*[9] All these are various aspects of knowledge which can only arise through and subsist in a substance called self.[10] In Vaiśeṣika view self is not held to be conscious by nature but said to become conscious when it is involved in the process of cognition. Moreover, it is the controller (*adhiṣṭhātā*) of body and sense organs, etc. In other words self indirectly brings consciousness to the body as well as sense organs.[11] It is noteworthy that one of the recent commentators of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* has clearly characterized self as non-material (*ajaḍa*).[12]

Nature of Consciousness

This brings us to the dependent nature of consciousness in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It means that in the Vaiśeṣika scheme, consciousness is held to be dependent upon the conjunction of body and inner sense organ (*manas*) with the self. It gets manifested only when the self is embodied and is expressed through various modes of cognition, which will be discussed in due course of this chapter. It has to be highlighted here that in the historical development of the nature of consciousness in Indian thought, this first step of positing self as the seat of consciousness[13] was very important, and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contributed immensely to the nature of self being postulated as an independent substance.[14]

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[6] *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Verses 32–33, (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850).

[7] *Jñānādhikaraṇamātmā. Tarkasaṁgraha*, (Athalye, Y. V. (ed.), Bodas, M. R. (Eng. trans.) 1974), p. 12.

[8] *Janyajñānādhikaraṇatvam.Siddhāntacandrodaya* of Srīkṛṣṇa Dhūrjaṭi, Commentary on *Tarkasaṁgraha*, (Lele, V. R. (ed.) 1923), 1, p. 12.

[9] *Buddhirupalabdhirjñānaṁ pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ. Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 410.

[10] *Tathā ca ya eva cetayate sa eva buddhyate jānātyupalabhate pratyeti ceti nārthāntara- kalpanā yukteti dik. -Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* (VUp.), (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.) 2002), p. 449.

[11] *Indriyādyadhiṣṭhātā. Indriyāṇāṁ śarīrasya ca paramparayā caitanyasampādaka ityarthaḥ. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, (Śāstrī, Harirām Śukla (ed.) 1972), p. 154.

[12] *Ajaḍa ātmā. Sugamā Vaiśeṣīkasūtravṛttiḥ*, (Śrī Raṅganāthācārya (ed.) 1979), p. 4.

[13] *Pramātā ātmā bodhāśrayatvāt. Nyāyakandalī* (NK), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 472.

[14] (Mishra, Umesh 1936) *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 358.

However, there seems to be one visible exception to this non-eternal and dependent nature of consciousness even in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. According to it, the eighth substance self (*ātman*) is classified in two kinds: individual self (*jīvātmā*) and the Supreme Self or God (*paramātmā*). Knowledge being an attribute of a substance called self is divided in two types: eternal (*nitya*) and non-eternal (*anitya*). The knowledge attributed to God or Supreme Self is propounded as eternal, while in the case of individual selves, it is described as non-eternal.

Here a question might arise that according to Vaiśeṣika system, God is not held to be embodied and still said to possess eternal knowledge (which in turn is not accepted as different from consciousness and is said to be expressed only when the self comes in contact with body and inner sense organ). Apparently it seems to be intriguing.

But on closer study, it may be noted that some of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers have suggested that even though the Supreme Self/God does not have a body like other selves (*jīvas*), eternal atoms could be held to be God's body.[15] Nonetheless, irrespective of whether there is God's body, that God's knowledge is eternal is a corollary of the proofs given for the existence of God.[16] So what holds true of non-cognitive states does not necessarily apply to God's knowledge that is eternal, just as what holds of non-eternal substances does not necessarily apply to eternal substances.

States of Consciousness

Another significant point in this regard is that consciousness is discussed in Vaiśeṣika philosophy only with reference to the waking state (*jāgrat avasthā*); dreaming state[17] (*svapna-daśā*) and deep sleep[18] (*nidrā* or *suṣupti*) are also briefly hinted in select Vaiśeṣika texts,[19] but not as states of consciousness (as has been done in the Upaniṣads and Advaita Vedānta) – rather as types of cognition only.

[15] *Vyomavatī* (Vyo.), (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 305.

[16] In fact the issue of soundness of the proofs for the existence of God is complex, and it has been dealt in detail by Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (5.1). Cowell, E. B. (ed. and Eng. trans.), 1936.

[17] For details, see Kumar, Shashiprabha. 1999.Vaiśeṣīka Manodarśana mein Svapna-Siddhānta. *Journal of Ganganath Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha*, Allahabad: (1992–93), 1999:265–276.

[18] *Nyāyasiddāntamuktāvalī* with *Dinakarī*, (Śāstrī, Harirām Śukla (ed.) 1972), pp. 183–184.

[19] *The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* (VS), 9.2.7–8, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986); PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 436–441.

Nature and Process of Cognition

It is also to be underlined here that various cognitions in Vaiśeṣika view are not simultaneous, but they are successive in nature, since the inner sense organ (*manas*), which is the instrument of cognition, is held to be minute (*aṇu*) in magnitude,[20] and so it cannot connect itself with more than one objects at the same time.

It is noteworthy here that cognitive process in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition incorporates following four aspects:

- The knower or the *pramātā* as an agent/subject
- The knowable or the *prameya* as an object
- The means of knowing or *prāmāṇa* as means
- The result of knowing or *pramā* as an end[21]

Evidently no cognitive act can take place unless a conscious person undertakes it. Hence the acceptance of self as an agent was imperative for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, but being realists at heart, they give equal importance to the objective world outside and propound that no cognition can take place if there is no object[22]; faculty of cognition is in fact the manifestation of objects.[23]

On the other hand, consciousness is also explained to be nothing but the manifestation of objects, as has been stated by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*:

> The self becomes conscious when it is connected with cognition, without that connection, it is unconscious (*jaḍa*) since we do not hold consciousness to be anything else than the revealing of objects.[24]

However, it is also to be noted that:

> Knowledge according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is formless. The form which appears in presentative knowledge belongs to the object which is directly grasped without any mediation……It may be noted here that the directness or immediacy, in a way, belongs to the object and not to knowledge. Thus, knowledge and the soul are both divested of their glory, luminosity or consciousness in order to invest the object, the focus of realism, with full-blooded reality.[25]

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[20] *Ayaugapadyājjñānānāṁ tasyāṇutvamihocyte*. *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Verse 85, (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850).

[21] *Sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭayasannikarṣādavitatham avyapadeśyaṁ yajjñānamutpadyate tatpratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam, prameyā dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ, pramātātmā, pramitirguṇadoṣamādhyasthyadarśanamiti*. -PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 474–475.

Cf. Tatra yasyepsājihāsāprayuktasya pravṛttiḥ sa pramātā, sa yenārthaṁ pramiṇoti tatpramāṇam, yo'rthaḥ pramīyate tat prameyam, yadarthavijñānaṁ sā pramitiḥ. Catasṛṣu caivaṁvidhāsvarthatattvaṁ parisamāpyate.-*Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh.), (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) 1970) (on *Nyāyasūtras* (NS), 1.1.1), p. 3.

[22] *Na cāviṣayā kācidupalabddhiḥ*.- NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) 1970) (on NS, 4.1.32), p. 489.

[23] *Arthaprakāśo buddhiḥ*. -*Lakṣaṇāvalī*, (Jha, Shashinath (ed.) 1964), p. 22.

[24] *Sacetanāścitā yogāttadyogena binā jaḍaḥ.*
Nārthāvabhāsādanyāddhi caitanyaṁ nāma manmahe.-*Nyāyamañjarī* (NM), Part II, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana 1998), p. 6.

[25] (Shastri, D.N. 1976) *Critique of Indian Realism*, p. 473.

More precisely, the contact among the following four factors in a cognitive act (e.g. perceptual cognition) is essential according to Vaiśeṣika:

- Sense organ (*indriya*)
- Object (*artha*)
- Inner sense (*manas*)
- Self (*ātman*)[26]

It is only after these four are successively conjoined that the cognition of an object takes place in the form of 'this is it' (*idamasti*) which is technically termed as cognition (*vyavasāya*) in the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Significantly, cognition is neither an object of its own nor is it self-revelatory in Vaiśeṣika view. In other words, cognition cannot cognize itself; it is cognized through another subsequent cognition in the form of 'I know it' (*idamahaṁ jānāmi*), which is technically termed as cognition after cognition (*anuvyavasāya*)'.[27]

Types of Cognition

This brings us to the types of cognition envisaged by Kaṇāda: there are basically two types of cognition according to him – incorrect/invalid (*avidyā*) and correct/valid (*vidyā*). These have been defined as faultless and faulty cognitions, respectively.[28] The former is again divided into four types, namely, perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*laiṅgika*), memory (*smṛti*) and intuitive cognition (*ārṣa*); the latter is also said to be of four types, i.e. doubt (*saṁśaya*), erroneous cognition (*viparyaya*), indecisive cognition (*anadhyavasāya*) and dream (*svapna*).[29] Details of all these types of cognition are discussed in the commentaries[30] of various Vaiśeṣika texts, and it is not intended here to delve deeper into those. But what emerges from going through these sources is that all types of cognitions are based in the agent of knowing, i.e. the self or the substratum of consciousness. So the differences in cognition are not only due to the differences of objects but also on account of subjective experiences of them. For example, the erroneous cognition of an object will arise if the person looking at it is either inattentive or affected by some other external condition since the same object can be cognized in a different, may be correct, manner by another person at the same time. This goes on to suggest that consciousness plays an important part in the process of cognition as such.

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[26] *Antareṇātmamanaḥsaṁyogaṁ mana-indriyārthasaṁyogamindriyārthasaṁyogaṁ ca pratyakṣābhāvāccatuṣṭayasannikarṣḥaḥ kāraṇam*.NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 445.

[27] *Tasmāt jñānāntarasaṁvedyaṁ saṁvedanaṁ vedyatvāt ghaṭādivat*. Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 529.

[28] *Taddusṭajñānam*; *Aduṣṭaṁ vidyā*. VS, 9.2.11–12, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[29] PPBh., Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977, p. 411 and 44.

[30] Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), pp. 521–624; *Kiraṇāvalī* (Kir.), (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), pp.170–247 and NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 410–630.

Cognition of Number Two *(dvitva saṁkhyā)*

It will also be interesting to briefly mention here the process regarding cognition of number two (*dvitva saṁkhyā*) according to Vaiśeṣika view which has been discussed in a purely theoretical way with reference to the eternal consciousness of the divine and non-eternal, non-simultaneous cognitions of the human beings. This cognition of number in general and number two in particular has been said to be one of the most difficult of Vaiśeṣika theories and also one of its distinguishing features from the Nyāya school.[31] Various details have been discussed in this connection in Vaiśeṣika texts,[32] but the most significant point regarding the cognition of number two in Vaiśeṣika view is that it is said to be produced by relative cognition (while number one is said to be unproduced because it is eternal).

According to Śrīdhara, it is well known that an external object can be produced by a relative cognition.[33] However, Vyomaśiva clarifies that since an attribute cannot be the material cause of an attribute, hence in this case, the material cause of number two is taken to be the two substances, the nonmaterial cause is the two number ones, and the efficient cause is cognition.[34] The concept of a relative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) as a special form of cognition plays an important part in the cognition of numbers[35] according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Various explanations of the term have been given by several scholars, but the most important aspect about this term is its reference to the notion of agent hood of a conscious person. This is another indication to prove that the Vaiśeṣikas have discussed the nature of consciousness with special reference to the process of cognition and vice versa.

Cogniser and Cognised

It is worth mentioning here that the self or seat of consciousness according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy may be both the knower as well as the known, but not simultaneously; at one point in time, it is the knower, while at another point in time, it may be the object of knowledge itself. It can also be substantiated from the fact that Praśastapāda, the commentator of Vaiśeṣika, has enumerated knowability (*jñeyatva*)

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[31] *Dvitve ca pākajotpattau vibhāge ca vibhāgaje.*
Yasya na skhalitā buddhistaṁ vai Vaiśeṣikaṁ viduḥ. – Quoted under the chapter on *Aulūkya Darśana* in *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, ('Rishi', Umashankar Sharma, (ed.) 1964), p. 419.

[32] For details see (Miyamoto, Keichi 1996) *The Metaphysics And Epistemology of the Early Vaiśeṣikas*, pp. 59–66.

[33] *Tadaitāṁ buddhimapeṣyaikatvābhyāmekaguṇābhyāṁ svāśrayayordravyayordvitvamārabhyate*. NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 274.

[34] *Atha ca svāśrayayoriti samavāyikāraṇanirdeśaḥ tathaikatvābhyāmityasamavāyikāraṇasya. Tāmapekṣyetyapekṣābuddhernimittakāraṇatvam.* -Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 457.

[35] For details, see (Kumar, Shashiprabha 1992) *Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha Nirūpaṇa* (Hindi), pp. 357–359.

as a common criterion for all the six categories accepted by Kaṇāda. So, the state of being known of the self is not debatable at all; it is the knower aspect of the same which needs to be established, more so because the self is not accepted conscious in its nature; rather it is said to be the seat of consciousness. It needs to be emphasized that according to Vaiśeṣika, both these aspects – self being a substance (*dravya* as *dharmin*) and cognition (*jñāna* as *dharma*) or consciousness being an attribute (*guṇa*) – are said to be two different entities[36] which are related through an inseparable relation called inherence (*samavāya*) according to Vaiśeṣika.

Therefore, the self in Vaiśeṣika view is not cognition as such but a substantial principle in which the attribute of cognition or knowing inheres. In other words, the self is, in itself, neither material nor mental; it is a neutral substance which comes to have the attribute of intelligence or consciousness in its relation to the body.[37] Self is not knowledge, rather the knower, an ego-consciousness or I-consciousness (*ahaṁkārāśraya*); but as already stated above, this consciousness is not natural/eternal in *ātman*; it gets produced when the self comes in contact with the body, mind and sense organs.

Relation Between Consciousness and Cognition

Coming back to the relation between consciousness and cognition, it may be stated that according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy, consciousness is not self-luminous as conceived in other schools of classical Indian philosophy; rather it is said to be revealed through the process of cognition.

Accordingly in Vaiśeṣika view, there are three factors in the process of cognition:

- Object (*viṣaya*)
- Subject (*viṣayīn*)
- Cognition (*jñāna*)

Out of these, the third one is an attribute of the second, but none of these three is held to be conscious by nature. It is only when the process of knowing takes place that consciousness is revealed in the subject. This interrelation of consciousness and cognition is expressed in clear terms by Udayana when he says that cognition (*buddhi*) is an attribute, which inheres in the self and reveals it in the form of 'I know that I know (*jānāmi*)', i.e. inward perception (*anuvyavasāya*).[38] Śrīdhara explains it in another way when he says that cognition is nothing but of the nature of understanding (*bodha*)[39] of an object (*viṣayī*) by the self (*viṣayin*).

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[36] *Na ca dharmī dharmaścetyekam tattvaṁ.* -VUp., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (Hindi trans.). 2002), p. 449.

[37] Vide (Chatterjee, S.C. 1965) *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 149.

[38] *Yasmin satyātmani 'jñāmi' ityanuvyavasāyo bhavati sā buddhiḥ.* -Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 170.

[39] *Jñānañca bodhātmakatvam.*- NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 198.

In the above background, it needs to be noted that in Indian philosophical tradition, there are usually three views[40] with regard to the relation between consciousness and cognition as follows:

- Theory of cognition revealing the objects (*Viṣaya-prakāśa-vāda*)

This is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view according to which cognition only reveals the objects as they are; it is in turn revealed by another following cognition, in the form of inward perception.

In simple terms, every cognition is perceptible in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view; it is held to be perceived by a cognition other than itself which immediately follows the first one; it is sometimes called introspection, inward perception or a cognition after-cognition (*anuvyavasāya*).[41]

In this respect, Jayanta Bhāṭṭa has quoted the view of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, the *pūrvapakṣins* in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, who hold that consciousness can never reveal itself; it can only reveal the objects it cognizes and is itself inferred by the result. They have also cited an example of the eye which cannot reveal itself; it can only reveal the objects it cognises.[42]

To this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars have objected and stated that consciousness cannot reveal an object if it is not cognized itself. As far as the example given above is concerned, it is also not accurate, because the eye is neither the knower nor the known; it is just an instrument of knowing in the process of cognition.

- Theory of self-luminosity of cognition (*Sva-saṁvedana-vāda*)

This is the Buddhist view which calls it the 'self-awareness of awareness'. The Buddhists hold that knowledge is self-luminous, so it illumines itself in the form of the object being cognized. According to them there is no other aspect besides the cognition and the cognized, which are one and the same.[43] Therefore, every case of awareness is also a case of self-awareness. In other words, cognition is self-revelatory. The Vedāntins also hold that consciousness is not different from knowledge and is therefore self-aware.

The Vaiśeṣika scholars have refuted this view saying that if consciousness is held to be self-aware, then the same should always be perceived in ordinary life as well,[44] but this is not so. Hence, the above view stands rejected.

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[40] For details see Matilal, B.K. 1988. Knowing That One Knows. *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, 8:19–48.

[41] *Anu paścād vyavasitiḥ vyavasāyaḥ*. -NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 626.

[42] *Ātmeindryārthamano'rthsannikarṣe sati jñānākhyo vyāpāra upajāyate sa ca na pratyakṣaḥ, arthasyaiva bahirdeśasambaddhasya grahaṇādākāradvayapratibhāsābhāvādagṛhītasyāpi tasya cakṣurādivadupāyatvāt parokṣo'pi cāsau viṣaya prakāśatālakaṣaṇena phalena kalpyate.*-NM, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), Part I, p. 16.

[43] *Sarvacitta-caittānāmātmasaṁvedanaṁ.-Nyāyabindu*, 1.10, (Peterson, Peter (ed.) 1929).

[44] *Etenaitadapi pratyuktaṁ yadāhureke 'svasaṁvedanamātmano nijaṁ caitanyaṁ' iti, saṁsārāvasthāyāmapi tasyāvabhāsaprasaṅgāt*. -NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 235.

- Theory of self-revelation of cognition (*Sva-prakāśa-vāda*)

'Self-revelation theory of awareness' is the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā view which means that the knowing self is also simultaneously revealed besides the object and the cognition itself in a cognitive act. This theory of Prabhākaras is, therefore, known as that of tripartite perception (*tripuṭī pratyakṣa*).[45]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika have argued against above view and said that the result of cognition cannot be identical with cognition.[46]

It is worth mentioning here that the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas have differed from Prabhākaras and have explained it in this manner that cognition is not only not self-revelatory but it is imperceptible also. It means that cognition is not even amenable to inner perception as held by Vaiśeṣika; rather it is inferred from the result of cognition. It means that a cognition of a known object is qualified with the attribute of being cognised or manifested (*jñātatā*) and is produced by the process of cognition in the object being cognized.[47] This view of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas is technically called the theory of inference based on the probans of cognisedness (*jñātatā-liṅgakānumāna*). Accordingly, one becomes aware of the occurrence of a cognitive process in oneself, i.e. one knows the object first, and then from the knownness (*jñātatā*) of the object, infers that a cognitive occurrence has taken place.[48]

The above view has also been rejected by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars in the following manner – the result of cognition cannot be held to be self-revealed – because it is neither in the form of memory nor experience and there is no third form. Since there is no formless cognition in our view, it cannot be accepted that the cognition is self-revelatory.[49]

Conclusion

What follows from the above is that the nature of consciousness according to Vaiśeṣika is basically ontological, but its role is mainly epistemological in the sense that it is proved and explained with reference to cognition and its numerous processes.

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[45] *Sarvavijñānahetūtthā mitau mātari ca pramā.*
Sākṣātkartṛtvasāmānyāt pratyakṣatvena sammatā. -*Prakaraṇapañcikā* of Śālikanātha (1904), p. 56.

[46] *Svaprakāśamate yuktaṁ na phalaṁ saṁvidātmakam.* -*Nyāyamañjarī* (NM), (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), Part I, p. 20.

[47] *Śāstradīpikā* (Kashi, Vikarma saṁvat, 1964, p. 202) quoted by (Shah, Nagin J. 1992) *A Study of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī*, Part I, p. 114.

[48] *Mīmāṁsā Ślokavārtika*, *Codanāsūtra* Section, verses 33–61.

[49] *Kathaṁ te phalasaṁvittiḥ svaprakāśā bhaviśyati.*
Nābhāti smṛtirūpeṇā na cāpyanubhavātmanā.
Na tṛtīyaḥ prakāro'sti tatkathaṁ sā prakāśatām.
Na ca kvacidanākāra saṁvittiranubhūyate.- NM, Part I, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), p. 20.

To sum up, it needs to be reiterated that according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy, self as the seat of consciousness signifies both the cognisor and the cognised. As a conscious agent, it is the agent for experiencing affective states like pleasure and pain, etc. and also conative aspect of volition and action, etc. In brief, the basic principles, consciousness as well as cognition, are not only singularly significant but also inseparably integrated as per Vaiśeṣika interpretation.

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Chapter 8
Śabda in Vaiśeṣika

Abstract This chapter aims at expounding and examining the nature of *śabda* (word) in the Vaiśeṣika system as a means of valid knowing (*pramāṇa*), although its status as an attribute (*guṇa*) will also be referred to herein. In the original Vaiśeṣika of Kaṇāda, *śabda* was neither enumerated as a separate attribute nor assigned the status of an independent *pramāṇā.* Praśastapāda added it to the list of attributes, and one of his commentators, Vyomaśiva, established for the first time that *śabda* is an independent means of knowing.

Keywords *Śabda · Pada · Artha · Padārtha · Pramāṇa · Guṇa · Pratyakṣa · Laiṅgika · Āpta · Pramā · Hetu · Yogyatā apauruṣeya · Parāmarśa · Liṅga · Vyāpti · Anumāna*

Background

Kaṇāda does not enunciate *śabda* as an attribute, nor does he describe it as an independent means of knowing. However, the ancient Vaiśeṣika, beginning from Praśastapāda and going up to Udayana, talks of *śabda* as a specific attribute (*viśeṣa guṇa*) of the substance ether (*ākāśa*), while the later Vaiśeṣika, starting from its amalgamation with Nyāya, also propounds *śabda* as one of the means of valid knowing (*pramāṇas*).

The Vaiśeṣika is held to be a system of categories (*padārthaśāstra*), and the title itself denotes that this system deals with the world constituted of, and classified in, six (seven in later Vaiśeṣika) categories (*padārthas*). The term *padārtha* is split as:

pada (word) + *artha* (meaning)

The common characteristics of all the six categories are enunciated as follows:

isness (*astitva*), nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and knowability (*jñeyatva*).

It means that all the categories of the world are ontologically real, linguistically communicable and epistemologically knowable. The triple criteria suggest a basic structure of reality, language and thought, which are intertwined and hence interdependent.

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Introduction

On the basis of available Vaiśeṣika literature,[1] we may say that the ancient Vaiśeṣikas did accept that there is knowledge through verbal testimony (non-scriptural) but asserted that it is not an independent means of knowledge, rather reducible to inference. Udayana has argued in support of the classical Vaiśeṣika view and clearly stated that testimony-generated knowledge is an inference.[2] In fact, the ancient system does not grant an independent status to verbal testimony (*śabda*) as a means of knowing (*pramāṇa*), with the sole exception of Vyomaśivā, who rejects the traditional Vaiśeṣika argument of reducing it to inference (*anumāna*) and establishes that it is an independent means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*).[3]

Śabda as an Attribute (*guṇa*)

It is significant to note that Kaṇāda in his aphorisms (*sūtras*) does not enumerate *śabda* in his list of 17 attributes (*guṇas*)[4] although he does talk of it as an attribute to ether (*ākāśa*),[5] since it can neither be ascribed to four tangible substances – earth, water, fire and air – nor to the self (*ātman*). It is only Praśastapāda who added it to the list of 24 attributes (*guṇas*); he has adduced three arguments to prove his point that *śabda* is an attribute (*guṇa*) of ether (*ākāśa*):

- *śabda*, unlike the properties of tangible substances, is not caused by the quality of its cause.
- *śabda* does not sustain in the whole region where its substratum exists.
- *śabda* is heard at different places by a number of persons.[6]

The above three points briefly sum up the nature of *śabda* as an attribute (*guṇa*) in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Vyomaśivā has further elaborated these points in his commentary and has concluded that *śabda* is a real, physical property and not only a subjective sensation since it is cognized by a number of persons through their external sense organs.[7]

It needs to be noted that an important aspect of *śabda* as an attribute (*guṇa*) in Vaiśeṣika is its non-eternality in contrast to the Mīmāṁsā position of *śabda* being

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[1] For details see (Kumar, Shashiprabha 1992) *Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha-Nirūpaṇa* (Hindi), pp. 9–15.

[2] *Śabdādīnāṁ siddhapramāṇabhāvānāmapyanumāne' ntarbhāvaḥ. -Kiraṇāvalī* (Kir.), (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 207.

[3] *Ataḥ śabdasyāptoktatvena prāmāṇyānnānumāne'ntarbhāvaḥ. -Vyomavatī* (Vyo.), (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.), 1930), p. 584.

[4] *The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda* (VS), 1.1.6; 2.1.25–27, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[5] *Pariśeṣālliṅgamākāśasya*.-VS, 2.1.27, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[6] *Praśastapādabhāṣyam*, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 692–693.

[7] Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), pp. 647–48.

eternal. There has been a long debate between these two schools which is quite significant for studying the development of sound theory in Indian philosophy. Moreover, the intra-organic production of sound as well as the wave theory[8] of sound in the Vaiśeṣika is a clear contribution of the system towards the conceptualization of *śabda* as an attribute (*guṇa*).

Śabda as a Means of Knowing (*Pramāṇa*) in Vaiśeṣika

More importantly it is *śabda* as a means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) which signifies a gradual development of Vaiśeṣika, both internally as well as externally. As stated above, Kaṇāda does not accept *śabda* as a separate means of knowing (*pramāṇa*), and after explaining perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*laiṅgika*), he merely says:

> Verbal testimony should be taken as explained with the explanation of inferential cognition.[9]

This has mostly been interpreted to suggest that *śabda* should be included in inference (*anumāna*) itself, and there is no need to explain it as an additional means of knowing. But some scholars have understood this to convey that the process of verbal cognition is like that of inference only and hence it should be explained on the same pattern; just as inferential cognition arises with the knowing of a reason or sign (*liṅga*), similarly verbal cognition arises after knowing the meaning of the word. It does not, in any way, mean that Kaṇāda did not hold *śabda* as an independent means of knowing, as he has himself talked of the validity of verbal testimony at the very beginning of his discourse:

> The validity of the Veda is proved on the basis of being expository of *dharma* (or of being divine statement).[10]

Elsewhere, he has mentioned that the comprehension of meaning from a word is dependent on convention rather than on divine proclamation.[11]

Praśastapāda and one of his commentators, Śrīdhara, have followed the first interpretation of Kaṇāda's statement regarding *śabda* as hinted above and have asserted that judgments derived from verbal authority represent only a variety of inference since they satisfy all the requirements of inference, i.e. they involve perception (auditory) of sounds as well as knowledge of regular concomitance.[12] Vallabha, the author of an independent treatise of Vaiśeṣika titled *Nyāyalīlāvatī,* also accepts the inclusion of verbal authority in inference, since according to him, the

[8] *Nyāyakandalī* (NK), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 692–696.

[9] *Etena śābdaṁ vyākhyātam*.-VS, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986), 9.2.3.

[10] *Tadvacanādāmnāyasya prāmaṇyam*.-VS, 1.1.3, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[11] *Sāmyayikaḥ śabdādarthapratyayaḥ*.-VS, 7.2.20, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[12] NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 512–13.

use of words presupposes previous knowledge of the relations among their meanings; the words merely cause us to recall those relationships.[13]

The second line of interpretation suggested above is put forth by Vyomaśivā, who departed from the tradition and accepted the difference between inference and verbal testimony. It is interesting to note how Vyomaśivā produces a different interpretation to suggest that Praśastapāda's intention is also towards the inclusion of verbal testimony under inference.

Vyomaśiva's predilections rather seem to be closer to the Naiyāyika view that verbal testimony is an independent instrument of knowledge. Though he admits that verbal testimony involves a number of items parallel to inference such as invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), consideration (*parāmarśa*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), etc., still he explicitly says that the object of verbal testimony is beyond the senses and the process involves reference to the conventions governing the use of words.[14] Since neither of these are present in inference, it is different from verbal testimony according to Vyomaśiva.

In the later course of development when the Vaiśeṣika school joined hands with Nyāya in the field of epistemology in order to defend their common, combined standpoint against the onslaught of Buddhism, *śabda* was obviously propounded as an independent means of knowing (*pramāṇa*), and elaborate discussion was appended regarding its nature and types which is also worth discussing here.

In this background it must be mentioned here that Nyāya, the sister school of Vaiśeṣika, also provides valuable inputs in this regard. Gautama, the propounder of the *Nyāyasūtras* has defined *śabda* as being constituted by the teaching of a worthy person, an authority (*āpta*) in himself:

> Verbal testimony is the instructive assertion of a reliable person.[15]

His commentator Vātsyāyana explains that an authority (*āpta*) is one who has direct knowledge of something and is both desirous and capable of speaking about it.[16]

What is more important to note here is that according to the Nyāya view, an authority can be anyone including the sage, the noble man, a foreigner or even a robber who might have conducted himself immorally but still can provide accurate

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[13] *Śabdastu na mānāntaraṁ. Padāni smāritārthasaṁsargavijñaptipūrvakāṇi yogyatāsattimattve sati saṁsṛṣṭārthaparatvāt, gāmabhyājeti padakadambavadityanumānādeva sādhyasiddheḥ. -Nyāyalīlāvatī*, (Śāstrī, Harihara (ed.) 1991), pp. 526–528.

[14] *Tatra śabda ādau yeṣāṁ tāni tathoktāni atasteṣāmanumāne'ntarbhāvo lakṣaṇaikyamiti tadguṇasaṁvijñānabahuvrīhyabhyupagame śabdasyāpyanumāne'ntarbhāvaḥ. Atadguṇasaṁvijñāne śabdaṁ vinā apareṣāmiti.* Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 577. (English translation: (Potter, Karl H. 1978) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, pp. 446–47).

[15] *Āptopodeśaḥ śabdaḥ.Nyāyasūtras* (NS), 1.1.7, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.) Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).

[16] *Āpataḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeṣṭā. -Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh.), (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) 1970) (on NS,1.1.7), p. 40.

information about the way to the next town.[17] Obviously, the Naiyāyikas did not restrict verbal authority to the scriptural sort alone like the Vedāntins, although they did accept that an omniscient person would naturally qualify as an authority on everything.

Interestingly, it appears as if Gautama had anticipated the arguments put up by Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda regarding inclusion of *śabda* under inference (*anumāna*), and so he has already answered all those as follows:

> (Whereas in inference the concomitance is natural and lawful), in verbal authority judgments, the concomitance is based on man-made conventions.[18]

To this Śrīdhara has responded by taking a position that the concomitance in question is between the intention of the speaker and the sounds he emits; when we discern this regularity, which is as natural as anything, then we infer the truth of what he asserts.[19] But, Vācaspati Miśra has clarified that we may infer the validity of what a person says, but what he says is known to us only through an instrument other than inference.[20]

Vātsyāyana, the famous commentator on the *Nyāyasūtras*, has also argued that in inference, the concomitance in question must pertain to two things, both of which can be observed, while verbal authority depends on a denotative relation which may well relate to a word with a type of object never perceived earlier and imperceptible even later.[21] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has taken this debate even further by mentioning that verbal authority operates only through single words while inference requires whole sentences for its operation. Moreover inference cannot prove that a word has the capacity to convey that meaning.[22]

Gaṅgeśa, the author of *Tattvacintāmani* and the founder of Navya-Nyāya, refutes the opinion of Vaiśeṣika in another way. The argument of the Vaiśeṣikas to establish that words are valid means of knowledge in the capacity of inference is as follows: these meanings are mutually related because they have the state of being conveyed by words associated with semantic competency (*yogyatā*), etc. Here semantic competency is a qualification to the reason (*hetu*). But in order to have an instance of inferential knowledge, there should be definite knowledge of the qualification of the reason also. Here, in the inference of the Vaiśeṣikas, semantic competency is a qualification of the reason. Therefore, in order to have the inferential knowledge, there should be definite knowledge of semantic competency which is a qualification of the reason. And a doubt of the qualification leads to the doubt of the qualified. But

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[17] *Mlecchā api hi paripathamavasthitāḥ pānthānāmupahṛtasarvasvānāṁ mārgākhyāne hetudarśanaśunyā bhavantyāptāḥ. Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* (NVTT, Thakur, Anantalal (ed.) 1996), (on NS, 1.1.7).

[18] *Āptopadeśasāmarthyācchabdādarthasaṁpratyayaḥ.*NS, 1.2.69, (Basu, Major B.D. (ed.), Vidyabhūṣaṇa, M.M. Satishchandra (Eng. trans.) 1913).

[19] NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 515–16.

[20] NVTT, (Thakur, Anantalal (ed.) 1996) on NS, 1.2.53.

[21] NBh., (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) 1970) on NS, 1.2.53, p. 205.

[22] *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM), Vol.I, (Śukla, Surya Nārāyana (ed.) 1998), p. 140.

on the contrary, even if there is doubtful knowledge of semantic competency, verbal knowledge arises. Hence, words have to be considered as a separate means of valid knowledge.[23]

The same has been succinctly stated by Viśvanātha, a later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholar, as follows. In the opinion of the Vaiśeṣika, verbal testimony and comparison are not to be considered as separate means of valid knowledge, because their purpose is accomplished by inference. But in view of Nyāya, this is not correct since verbal knowledge. etc. arise without the knowledge of invariable concomitance.[24]

In this way the later Vaiśeṣika scholars have one after the other argued that *śabda* cannot be reduced to inference (*anumāna*); it is an independent and separate means of knowing. On closer analysis one can easily notice that perception is a direct experience, while inference is based on reasoning – both of these are based on one's own authority and are therefore subjective – but *śabda* is based on the authority of another person's experience which is communicated through the medium of language. It is therefore rightly characterized as *śabda.* One may again distinguish between relative authority and absolute authority. Relative authority is mainly to be derived from the experience of the other but can also fall within one's own experience. The question of absolute authority pertains to the impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) mode of knowing, while that of relative authority relates to a person who is reliable and trustworthy in communicating what he has experienced.[25]

This brings us to the question of human agency and provides for a bonding between one person and the other. None of us can experience everything on our own. Therefore, we have to go beyond ourselves and trust anothers' experience as well. Organized social life demands the recognition of authority to what others have to offer. It is in this perspective that in addition to direct experience and reasoning, the third mode of knowing was accepted as verbal testimony (*śabda*) of an authority. It is such a mode of knowing which is usually held to be Veda in other schools of Indian philosophy. But the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika view is more inclusive in its approach and grants authority to ordinary human beings as well.

Conclusion

To conclude, it may be said that *śabda* stands for human speech and hence for linguistic utterances. Such utterances are usually made by a speaker, a person who is a participant in a linguistic community. The mechanism can be understood on the

[23] *Yogyatādimatpadopasthāpitatvam.Tattvacintāmaṇī*, *Śabda Khaṇḍa* (Quoted by Vattanky, John, S. J. 1995 in his *Nyaya Philosophy of Language*, p. 528).

[24] *Śabdopamānayornaiva pṛthakprāmāṇyamiṣyate.*
Anumānagatārthatvāditi vaiśeṣikaṁ matam.
Tanna samyagvinā vyāptibodhaṁ śābdādibodhataḥ.Bhāṣāpariccheda, verses 140–141, (Roer, E. (ed.) 1850).

[25] (Raja Kunhan, C. 1974) *Some Fundamental Problems in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 61–62.

basis of several other considerations such as the knowledge of word in the hearer (derived from hearing, the efficient causal factor or instrument) and his final knowledge of the meaning of the uttered sentence (*pramā* or *phala*).[26] This model is applied to explain the origin of any mental event, specially the cognitive process which we may call knowledge episodes.

In brief, knowledge from this point of view is a cognitive process occurring in the subject generated by a set of causal factors. Consequently, the hearer derives accurate knowledge from words and sentences uttered by a reliable speaker. This type of knowledge is granted a special status by most of the Indian philosophers. They did not favour reducing it either to perception or to inference because knowledge of the words themselves may be perceptual or inferential but the knowledge derived from the words is neither perceptual nor inferential.

Last but not the least, it is the implicit trustworthiness of the speaker which is the most significant factor in such transmission of knowledge through words. It is the trust assigned to the words as linguistic utterances that makes the magic of creating *śabda* as *pramāṇa* in Indian philosophy in general and the Vaiśeṣika (and Nyāya) in particular.

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[26] (Matilal, B.K. 1992) *The Word and the World*, pp. 49–52.

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Chapter 9
Hermeneutical Principles in Vaiśeṣika

Abstract This chapter deals with the principles of hermeneutics pertaining to Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy. Hermeneutics is the method of understanding ancient texts and interpretation of their meaning. It has come to be a tool for explaining reality and language in the area of philosophy. Although the Indian philosophical tradition does not describe hermeneutics as such, yet the principles it adopts are well expressed in different systems of Indian philosophy. The present chapter aims at expounding the same.

Keywords *Padārtha · Vyākhyā · Śabda pramāṇa · Sūtra · Bhāṣya · Vārttika · Saṁgraha · Ṭīkā · Ṭippaṇī · Vṛtti · Sādharmya · Vaidharmya · Astitva · Abhidheyatva · Jñeyatva · Mahodaya · Pramiti*

Background

Hermeneutics is a process of understanding classical texts which originally appeared in the western tradition with reference to the interpretation of the biblical scriptures but later on developed as 'one of the basic methodological procedures in Philosophy'.[1]

The term now connotes 'a tradition of thought that deals with the understanding and interpretation of meaning'.[2] In other words it may be described as a theory pertaining to principles of interpretation which takes up the question of reality and language. Although the term hermeneutics is rooted in Western philosophy, on closer analysis one finds that the 'various elements of a philosophical hermeneutics have been discussed at length in the Indian tradition with great scholarship and accuracy'.[3] In Indian philosophical circles, the term hermeneutics appears only recently, but the nature of hermeneutics seems to be well expressed in various

[1] Frolov, I.T. [ed.] (1967) *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 170.

[2] Kim, Jaegwon and Sosa, Ernest [ed.] (2009) *A Companion to Metaphysics*, Blackwell Reference, p. 298.

[3] Gachter, Othmar (1990) *Hermeneutics and Language in Pūrvamīmāṁsa*, p. 2.

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systems of Indian philosophy, where the original texts are usually in the form of aphorisms (*sūtras*), i.e. short, suggestive statements and there is a chain of explanatory texts thereupon, which is very well laid out and structured according to the rules of interpretation of a text or a theory thereof.

Introduction

In the above background, it would indeed be a rewarding exercise to discuss the principles of hermeneutics available in the Vaiśeṣika system of Indian philosophy, more so in the Vaiśeṣika text *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* of Praśastapāda which is basically a compendium of metaphysics but deals with the problems of reality and language too while discussing the nature of categories (*padārthas*).

It has to be clarified at the outset that Indian tradition of interpretation is basically different from Western hermeneutics in its approach. To put it more precisely, Western hermeneutics lays stress on a pure phenomenological analysis, while the Indian approach has a metaphysical standpoint on the whole. Accordingly the specific answers given to the problems and status of language in Indian thought are primarily determined by the metaphysical view that a particular system adopts. Nevertheless, the general norms of interpretation outlined in Indian tradition are usually followed by all the systems. This is substantiated from the fact that almost all the source texts (*sūtras*) of different philosophical schools begin either with the aim of a desire to know (*jijñasā*) on part of the seeker or for the purpose of explanation (*vyākhyā*) on part of the preceptor – the two predominant pillars for the interpretation of a text.

All philosophical enterprise in Indian tradition is directed towards the proper understanding of reality (*tattvajñāna*), but language has always been an inherent aspect of that understanding, so much so that verbal testimony (*śabda pramāṇa*) is not only accorded the highest status among the various means of knowing (*pramāṇas*) but has also been equated with the ultimate reality (*brahman*) in Indian linguistic tradition and has been expressed as 'śabdabrahman'.[4] Without going into the details of Indian philosophy of language, it needs to be noted that

> Western philosophers sometimes seem to suppose that the 'linguistic turn' in recent philosophy is a unique phenomenon, a turning point in the history of philosophy, perhaps it is, but it took place many centuries ago in India, where attention to grammar was common place by the fourth century B.C. The Nyāya theory of language, of meaning and the meaningfulness of words and sentences shows subtlety, at the level of syntax, semantics and pragmatics.[5]

[4] *Anādinidhanaṁ brahma śabdatattvaṁ yadakṣaram.*
Vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ. -Vākyapadīya, 1.1, (Pillai, K. Raghavan (Eng. trans.) 1971).

[5] Potter, Karl H. (1977) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, pp. 2–3.

Indian Tradition of Interpretation

It is also significant to state in this regard that the Indian system of interpreting scholastic (*śāstric*) texts[6] had developed much earlier than the period when hermeneutic tradition gained ground in Western philosophy: 'Pāṇini's *Asṭādhyāyī* (seventh century BC) indicates the presence of a literature of commentaries, *vyākhyāna*, in the *sūtra*, rule. IV.3.66: *tasya vyākhyāna iti ca vyākhyātavya namana* (*sich*): an affix comes in the sense of its commentary, as well as, in the sense of what occurs there'.[7]

In the later Indian tradition, a whole lot of details are available in this respect, but the most important one seems to be a five-membered definition of interpretation (*vyākhyāna*). The five steps of interpretation mentioned therein are as follows:

- Separation of words (*padacchedaḥ*)
- Statement of word meanings (*padarthoktiḥ*)
- Splitting of compound words (*vigrahaḥ*)
- Arrangement of sentences (*vākyayojanā*)
- Objections and their resolutions (*akṣepeṣu samādhānam*)[8]

All of the above five steps are adopted in different types of interpretative texts of Indian philosophy like *bhāṣya*, *vārttika*, *saṁgraha*, *ṭīkā*, *ṭippaṇī*, *vṛtti*, etc. so that the original text (*sūtra*) could be put into proper context. Besides, the Indian philosophical literature had to follow more stringent style of interpretation due to the following reasons:

- The basic texts of almost all the schools were written in aphoristic 'sūtra'[9] style, which signifies very brief and cryptic statements that are difficult to be understood on their own.
- The subsequent literature mostly owed its allegiance to these aphorisms (*sūtras*) rather than claiming itself to be an independent writing; although there may be many innovative ideas involved, yet this practice was prevalent, may be due to

[6] Note: Interestingly, the interpretative aspect of Sanskrit texts has recently developed another domain in the form of 'Text Science' (meaning system of the commentary text) which proposes the following three theories for analysing the commentary texts in classical Indian philosophy:

- Communication theory
- Quotation theory
- Context theory

– Vide (Hirano, Katsunori 2012) *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy and Text Science*, pp. 4, 15, 28 and 48.

[7] Kapoor, Kapil (2005) *Text and Interpretation –The Indian Tradition*, p. 39.

[8] *Padacchedaḥ padārthoktiḥ vigraho vākyayojanā, Ākṣepeṣu samādhānaṁ vyākhyānaṁ pañcalalṣaṇam. – Parāśara Purāṇa*, Chap. 18 (quoted in *Nyāyakośā*, (Jhalakīkar, Bhimācārya 1978), p. 828).

[9] *Alpākṣaramasandigdhaṁ sāravadviśvatomukham.*
Astobhamanavadyañca sūtraṁ sūtravido viduḥ. – Madhvabhāṣya, 1.11, Introduction, p. 3 (quoted in *Nyāyakośā*, (Jhalakīkar, Bhimācārya 1978), p. 1030).

the oral tradition which made the disciples more closely linked to the main line of thought propounded by their preceptor.[10]

- The development of Indian philosophical thought took place in the form of an interactive exercise between the opponent (*pūrvapakṣa*) and the proponent (*siddhāntapakṣa*) which varied from one school to another. Hence, the scholars had to adopt some broad uniformity in the style of presentation of their views.

Interpretation in Vaiśeṣika Tradition

The hermeneutical process is inherent in Vaiśeṣika tradition since origin as the very first aphorism of Kaṇāda (sixth century B.C.)[11] proclaims to *explain* the nature of 'dharma,' i.e. the means to the proximate as well as the ultimate aims of life:

> Now, therefore, we shall **explain** *dharma*.[12]

Kaṇāda has not only pronounced his intent for explaining the nature of *dharma* but also delineated the hermeneutical method being adopted by him, mainly through discussing similarities (*sādharmyas*) and dissimilarities (*vaidharmyas*) pertaining to various categories of Vaiśeṣika.[13]

Accordingly, Praśastapāda (early sixth century)[14] has elaborated the similarities and dissimilarities among different sets of categories (*padārthas*). Kaṇāda had briefly enumerated a few similarities among various groups of categories, but Praśastapāda has given a detailed delineation[15] in this respect which goes on to demonstrate the hermeneutical aspect in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. As already stated, *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* of Praśastapāda is written as an interpretation of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*. In fact, Praśastapāda is the earliest available commentator of the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms, and his commentary bears another name *Praśastapādabhāṣya* also. It is debatable whether the text under discussion should be technically classified as an interpretative text known as 'bhāṣya'[16] or a compendium termed as

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[10] *Saṁpradāyo nāma śiṣyācāryasaṁbandhasyāvicchedena prāptiḥ.– Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika*, (Thakur, Anantlal (ed.) 1997), p. 21.

[11] Kumar, ShashiPrabha (2013) *Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy*: *On Knowing and What is to be Known*, Introduction, p. 5.

[12] *Athāto dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ. – The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda* (VS), 1.1.1, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[13] *Dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṁ padārthānāṁ sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṁ tattvajñānāniḥśreyasam*. – VS, 1.1.4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[14] Sankaranaryanan, S. (2003) *Vaiśeṣika Catuḥsūtrī – A Historical Perspective*, p. 4.

[15] Please see Chap. 3 of the present volume titled 'Categories in Vaiśeṣika'.

[16] *Sūtrārtho varṇyate yatra padaiḥ sūtrānusāribhiḥ.*
Svapadāni ca varṇyante taṁ bhāṣyaṁ bhāṣyavido viduḥ.– Quoted in *Nyāyakośā*, (Jhalakīkar, Bhimācārya 1978), p. 627.

'saṁgraha',[17] but so far as its contribution to Vaiśeṣika thought is concerned, there is no divergence of opinion among scholars. Some of them have even gone to the extent of suggesting that it is Praśastapāda's description of Vaiśeṣika theories which has made the system more coherent and better known. Besides, there are several new theories which have been brought into the system by Praśastapāda, while there is no mention of those in the *Vaiśeṣkasūtras.*[18] To quote one of the prominent exponents of Vaiśeṣika system in modern times 'The second is the concluding short compendium of the classical system, the *Padārthadharmasaṁgrahaḥ* ('the compendium of the qualities of categories') of Praśastapāda, which is also named, on account of its close connection with the *sūtras* as the *Praśastapādabhāṣyam* (the commentary of Praśataspāda) which has remained for the whole future as the authoritative presentation of the classical Vaiśeṣika system'.[19]

Therefore, hermeneutics with reference to *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* is based on the insights of Praśastapāda, the Vaiśeṣika interpreter of early times. He begins his commentary, a compendium of metaphysical principles, with an aim of explaining the attributes of reality (the *dharmas* of *padārthas*). The critical investigation into Praśastapāda's exposition of categories shows a clear and real link between reality (*artha*) and language (*pada*); that link is the proper understanding (*jñāna*) of the essential nature of things (*tattva*).

It is not without reason then that Praśastapāda has himself characterized his compendium as the great and upcoming text – 'mahodaya'.[20] Udayana, the famous commentator of Praśastapāda, elaborates the meaning of this term by stating that this text is termed as *mahodaya* because this is a significant source for obtaining valuable knowledge.[21]

Interpretation of Similarities Among Six Categories

Following the hermeneutical tradition of Vaiśeṣika, as laid down by Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda dwells upon the similarities among six categories and holds that whatever is real is knowable and expressible through language:

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[17] *Vistareṇopadiṣṭānāmarthānaṁ sūtrabhāṣyayoḥ. Nibandho yaḥ samāsena saṁgrahaṁ taṁ vidurbudhāḥ.* – Quoted in *Nyāyakośā*, (Jhalakīkar, Bhimācārya 1978), p. 908.

[18] Vide Faddegon, B. (1918) *Vaiçeṣika System*, pp. 32–33.

[19] Frauwallner, Erich (1973) *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 4.

[20] *Praṇamya hetumīśvaraṁ muniṁ kaṇādamanvataḥ, Padārthadharmasaṁgrahaḥ pravakṣyate* ***mahodayaḥ****.* – *Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), Introductory verse.

[21] *Tadāha-mahodayaḥ. Mahānudaya udgama udbodha jñānamiti yāvat so'smād bhavatīti mahodayaḥ saṁgrahaḥ uktaḥ.* – *Kiraṇāvalī* (Kir.), (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 4.

Isness, nameability and knowability are the similarities among six categories.[22]

Accordingly, the six categories under which all the reals are subsumed are characterized by the following three features:

1. Isness (*astitva*)
2. Nameability (*abhidheyatva*)
3. Knowability (*jñeyatva*)

The above statement of Praśastapāda proved to be a pioneering point in the history of Vaiśeṣika categoriology, as it denoted the triple aspects of **reality** (*isness*), **language (**nameability) and **thought** (knowability).

Praśastapāda's commentators carried forward the methodology of Vaiśeṣika interpretation and tried to explain the above three terms characterising all the six positive categories (*bhāva padārthas*) in different dimensions as will be clear from the following:

1. **Isness** (*astitva*)

- *Vyomavatī*: Vyomaśiva, the oldest commentator of Praśastapāda, enunciates it as the state of being of these categories and explains it as **knowledge**.[23]
- *Nyāyakandalī*: Śrīdhara, another commentator, expounds it as the very nature of six categories.[24]
- *Kiraṇāvalī*: Last but not the least, Udayana, the third commentator interprets it in terms of **language**.[25]

Obviously the most simple term 'astitva' has been interpreted by three different commentators in triple ways signifying **thought**, **reality** and **language,** respectively.

2. **Nameability** (*abhidheyatva*)

- *Vyomavatī*: Vyomaśiva interprets this special feature of six categories also in terms of **thought/knowledge**.[26]
- *Nyāyakandalī*: Likewise, Śrīdhara explains this as the **nature of reality**.[27]
- *Kiraṇāvalī*: Udayana makes it more explicit when he says that nameability (**language)** denotes the **communicable aspect** of six categories.[28]

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[22] *Ṣaṇṇāmapi padārthānāmastitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni.* – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 6.

[23] *Asteḥ śabdarūpasya bhāvo'stitvaṁ jñānameva.* – *Vyomavatī* (Vyo.), (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), pp. 31–32.

[24] *Yasya vastuno yat svarūpaṁ tadeva tasyāstitvam.* – *Nyāyakandalī* (NK), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 41.

[25] *Astitvaṁ vidhimukhapratyayaviṣayatvam.* – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p.19.

[26] *Abhidheyasya ca bhāvo'bhidheyatvam, abhidheya iti jñānameva.* – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 118.

[27] *Abhidheyatvamapyabhidhānapratipādanayogyatvam, Tacca vastunaḥ svarūpameva.* – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 41.

[28] *Abhidheyatvam abhidhānayogyatā.* – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 19.

3. **Knowability** *(jñeyatva)*

- *Vyomavatī*: *Vyomavatī* interprets the term as of the **nature of knowledge** itself.[29]
- *Nyāyakandalī*: *Nyāyakandalī* explains it as the **nature of being** itself.[30]
- *Kiraṇāvalī*: *Kiraṇāvalī* understands it as the **knowable aspect** of being.[31]

As is clear from the above, the three terms are interpreted by three commentators in different perspectives belonging to different periods in time and different regions in space.[32] Nonetheless, there should not be seen any contradiction – since it is only a shift in focus and not in the basic concept. On a closer study, it becomes clear that Praśastapāda had propounded all these three as inclusive features of categories rather than exclusive ones. Accordingly any object, which is existent, is also knowable and expressible through language. So all the three aspects – reality, language and thought – were well accommodated in the earlier Vaiśeṣika philosophy, while any one of these is emphasized in the later hermeneutical tradition of the commentators.

Language, Thought and Reality

What follows from the above is that not only language reveals a reality but also that there is no reality whatsoever which is not expressible by language.

> Things are *padārthas*, the meanings of words. Categories of reality such as substance, quality, relation, universal etc. are derived from the categories of language. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes that there is total correspondence between language and reality: from the structure of language in which our judgements are expressed we could validly enter the structure of reality.[33]

In other words,

> The concept of *padārtha* (category), which provides the starting point of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought, results in a "compatibility thesis" with regard to the interrelations between reality, thought and language, as is evident from the very definition of *padārtha* as that which has existence (*astitva*), knowability (*jñeyatva*) and expressibility in language (*abhidheyatva*).[34]

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[29] *Jñeyasya bhāvo jñeyatvam, jñeyamiti jñānameva.* – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 118.

[30] *Bhāvasvarūpamevāvasthābhedena jñeyatvamabhidheyatvañcocyate.* – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 41.

[31] *Jñeyatvam jñānayogyatā.* – Kir., (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 19.

[32] Vyomaśiva is held to be the oldest commentator of *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha.* He is said to be from south of India and placed in 948–72 A.D. Śrīdharācārya is stated to be from West Bengal, and he has himself mentioned his period as 991 A.D. Udayanācārya hailed from Mithila, and he has stated his time as 906 Śaka era (984 A.D.) – Vide (Matilal, B.K. 1977) *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, pp. 68–71.

[33] Dravid, R.R. 1976. Language, Thought and Reality. In *Knowledge*, *Culture and Value*, Vol. II, Pandeya, R.C., Bhatt, S.R. (eds.), p. 450.

[34] Bhatt, S.R. 1997. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In *Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy*, p. 134.

It is from this basic exposition that language, communication, interpretation and understanding are brought into focus in Indian thought. The same is echoed in the following statement of Gadamer, the modern exponent of philosophical hermeneutics in the west:

> Language is the universal medium in which understanding itself is realised. The mode of realisation of understanding is interpretation…Thus the hermeneutical phenomenon proves to be a special case of the general relationship between thinking and speaking, the mysterious intimacy of which is bound up with the way in which speech is contained, in a hidden way, in thinking.[35]

Evidently, the hermeneutic approach to reality has striking parallels in Indian thought in general and is visible in the *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* of Praśastapāda in particular. The real, according to Praśastapāda, is a definitely determined fact and possesses a distinctive self-identity and an intrinsic character in the form of self-being (*astitva*). Moreover, the real carries with it the implication that it can be an object of knowledge as also the object of verbal expression.

> These two characteristics of knowability and nameability do not, therefore, add to the concept of isness anything really new, or distinct from, or extraneous to it; they rather bring out explicitly something that was implicit in the latter.[36]

Metaphysically it would be wrong to consider these as mere characteristics (*dharma*) of reality, for the very being of reality is indistinguishable from any one of them and each one of them by itself is an exhaustive expression of reality.[37] It is from this point that Udayana, in his *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, defines that a real is whatever is nameable:

> A category is that which can be communicated through language.[38]

As stated above, the term 'padārtha' literally connotes the meaning (*artha*) of a word (*pada*), i.e. the thing denoted by a name. This suggests that reality (*artha*) is expressible in language (*abhidheyaḥ*). But language presupposes thought or knowledge. Knowledge (*pramiti*) and language (*abhidhāna*) both should, therefore, be held to refer to reality which is objective and has a distinctive self-individuality. Thus the role of language in the knowledge of reality comes out to be very significant according to Praśastapāda's proposition of common criteria among categories.

Moreover it must be clarified here that the Vaiśeṣika viewpoint, upheld by Praśastapāda, is a realistic view, while the Buddhists hold a view totally opposite to the above. For the Buddhists, there are two orders of reality: ultimate and empirical; the ultimate, by definition, is beyond thought and language. According to them, the language does not reveal the real; it rather presents a distorted view of reality; since language is related to concepts and concepts are always relative, they can be under-

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[35] Gadamer, H.G. (1979) *Truth and Method*, pp. 350–351.

[36] Bhaduri, Sadananda (1975) *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, p. 9.

[37] *Abhidheyatvam api …vastunaḥ svarūpam eva. Bhāvasvarūpam evavasthānabhedena jñeyatvam abhidheyatvaṁ cocyate.* – NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 41.

[38] *Abhidheyaḥ padārthaḥ. – Lakṣaṇāvalī*, (Jha, Shashinath (ed.) 1964), p. 1.

stood only in contrast with their opposites. Hence the import of words is basically negative; words do not convey the knowledge of any real positive entity as their meaning rather convey the negation of it.

On the other hand, the grammarians hold an absolutist view of language and assert that the word itself is the ultimate reality: language not only reveals reality; it is reality itself. According to them, it is through the eye of the word that all the diversity of understanding is perceived. It is only thought as expressed in words that can be understood and communicated, there is no thought without word.[39]

To elaborate:

> Philosophy may be re-defined as a critique of language. The problem of what we can know is closely bound up with the question of what we can say. It is only thought, as expressed in words that can be understood, communicated and criticised. Language is not an accidental, dispensable garb which could be put on and put off. It grows with thought, or rather thought grows with it.[40]

Therefore the criteria of reality, as enunciated by Praśastapāda, not only bridges the gap in these extreme positions cited above but also indicates the three important aspects in the character of the real in accordance with the basic philosophical position of the Vaiśeṣika system. 'For Praśastapāda, the *padārthas* are the most comprehensive units of enumeration, the ultimate divisions of reality, and the most basic correlates of thought and speech. They are not structures or projections of language, and thought'.[41]

Conclusion

In brief, the real is, for the Vaiśeṣika, what it is, and not what we imagine it to be. This is clearly in opposition to the views of the subjectivist and the phenomenalist. Moreover by projecting the knowability as a test of reality, Praśastapāda has rejected all sorts of agnosticism. The third criterion, nameability, not only refutes mysticism but also suggests that the knowledge of reality is not to be the private possession of the fortunate few but is accessible to all individuals. Thus the linguistic reference to metaphysical interpretation of the universe assumes much wider significance in *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* of Praśastapāda. This approach asserts hermeneutics as an experience in which every human being participates fully in respect of reality, language and thought as one whole. From this point of view, genuine hermeneutics

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[39] *Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte.*
Anuviddhamiva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsate. – *Vākyapadīya*, 1.123, (Pillai, K. Raghavan (Eng. trans. 1971).

[40] Murti, T.R.V. (1974). Some Comments on the Philosophy of Language in the Indian Context. In *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Toronto. 2:321–22.

[41] Halbfass, Wilhelm (1993) *On Being and What There Is*, *Classical Vaiśeṣika And the History of Indian Ontology*, p. 77.

is the real response to what really is and that includes the response to the outer world with which metaphysics deals.

To sum up, it may be said that in Vaiśeṣika philosophy, a clear perspective on Indian hermeneutical tradition is very profoundly presented. Praśastapāda's view of reality, language and thought as explained above reveals an evident and significant contribution towards the same.

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Chapter 10
Niḥśreyasa in Vyomavatī

Abstract The chapter deals with the Vaiśeṣika view of *niḥśreyasa* (emancipation/liberation), mainly based on the introductory section of *Vyomavatī*, the oldest available commentary on Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*. Other Vaiśeṣika sources will also be referred to wherever relevant. The *Vyomavatī* presents several views of the opponents (*pūrvapakṣas*) regarding *niḥśreyasa* and after rejecting them all one by one, posits the traditional view of Vaiśeṣika as the proponent.

Keywords *Niḥśreyasa · Mahodaya · Mukti · Mokṣa · Nirvāṇa · Kaivalya · Apavarga · Ātman · Abhyudaya · Dharma · Sādharmya · Vaidharmya · Asiddha · Viruddha · Anaikāntika · Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa · Satpratipakṣa*

Background

Primarily, all the systems of Indian philosophy aim at analysing the nature of human existence and posit the *summum bonum* of life as an everlasting and unfailing way of liberation (*mokṣa*) from miseries of life. Liberation is the pivot on which all the systems of Indian philosophy resolve; it is the 'master word' of Indian thought.[1] It is not without reason then that a philosophical system in India is called the science of liberation (*mokṣa-śāstra*). Although various philosophical schools have expounded this idea in different ways; used different terms for denoting it, such as *mukti*, *mokṣa*, *nirvāṇa*, *kaivalya*, *apavarga*, *niḥśreyasa* etc.; and have also elucidated several paths for realising it, the generic term 'niḥśreyasa' can aptly be used

Note: Two untranslated editions of the text have been published till date as follows, and references in this chapter are from the 1930 edition, (unless mentioned otherwise):

(i) *Vyomavatī*, Pandit Gopināth Kavirāj and Ḍhuṇḍhirāj Śāstrī (eds.) (Along with *Setu* of Padmanābha Mishra and *Sūkti* of Jagadisha Tarkālaṁkāra), Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series Office, Benares, 1930.

(ii) *Vyomavatī*, Gaurinath Sastri (ed.), Two Vols., Sampūrṇānand Sanskrit Viśvavidyālaya, Varanasi, 1983.

[1] Lad, Ashok Kumar (1967) *A Comparative Study of The Concept of Liberation in Indian Philosophy*, Introduction, p. 2.

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to denote the highest goal of life as conceived by most of them. This can be substantiated from the fact that the Vaiśeṣika scholars have themselves used all these terms interchangeably.

The term 'niḥśreyasa'[2] can be interpreted in various ways, and all such renderings refer to it as an ultimate, final aim of life which is formulated in Vaiśeṣika as complete cessation of all the specific attributes of self (*ātman*).[3]

Introduction

As already stated, Kaṇāda proposes to delineate upon *dharma*, which leads to 'abhyudaya' and 'niḥśreyasa'[4] and can be attained by knowing both of them through twin methods of similarities (*sādharmyas*) and dissimilarities (*vaidharmyas*). Accordingly, Praśastapāda, the commentator of Kaṇāda's philosophy, elaborates these two aspects of *dharma* in his *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*.[5] Although in his initial invocatory statement, he refers to the idea of 'niḥśreyasa' by using a novel term 'mahodaya'[6] yet goes on to clarify that a proper knowledge of similarities and dissimilarities among the six categories accepted in the system leads to liberation, the ultimate goal of life (*niḥśreyasa*).

Vyomaśiva dwells upon the concept of 'niḥśreyasa' in the very beginning of his commentary entitled *Vyomavatī* which is held to be the earliest commentary[7] of *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*. In this process, he has broadly touched upon the following three aspects of *niḥśreyasa:*

- Arguments for proving the ideal of *niḥśreyasa*
- Means for attaining *niḥśreyasa*
- Nature of *niḥśreyasa*

It must be mentioned here that out of the above three aspects, Vyomaśiva has just briefly referred to the first and the second aspects, while he has dealt with the third one more extensively. Therefore we shall also discuss the first and the second points in brief and delve deeper into the last point for further details.

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[2] *Niścitam śreyaḥ. – Śadakalpadrumaḥ*, Vol-2, (Dev, Raja Radhakant 2006), p. 875.

[3] *Mokṣāvasthā samastaguṇocchedopalakṣitā svarūpasthitireva. – Nyāyakandalī* (NK), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 692.

[4] *Athāto dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāhaḥ.*
Yato'bhyudayaniśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ. – The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda (VS), 1.1.1–2, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[5] According to one of the commentators of the text, the title suggests 'A concise statement of Features/Attributes of the Categories'. – Vide *Sūkti*, (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 1.

[6] *Padārthadharmasaṁgrahaḥ pravakṣyate mahodayaḥ. – Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), Introductory verse, p. 1.

[7] Vide Varadachari, V. In (Potter, Karl H. (ed.) 1977) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Vol. II, footnote 63, pp. 703–704.

Here a question arises as to what is the evidence for proving the existence of 'niḥśreyasa'. Vyomaśiva himself raises the question and then briefly suggests that since 'niḥśreyasa' is not to be perceived, hence it can only be established through inference (*anumāna*). He goes on to elaborate that the existence of 'niḥśreyasa' is logically well founded, for there is no fallacy in the reasoning provided below:

- This chain of nine specific attributes of self (*ātman*) is annihilated forever.
- Since it is a chain/series.
- Whatever is a series is seen to be annihilated forever, just as the flame of a lamp.
- This series of nine specific attributes is like the flame of a lamp.
- Hence this is also annihilated forever.[8]

Elaborating the above argument further, Vyomaśiva specifies that there is no scope for any form of fallacious reasoning (*hetvābhāsa*) herein due to the following reasons:

- There is no fallacy of unproved terms (*asiddha*), for the invariable concomitance between being a series and being annihilated is rationally justified here.
- Neither is there the contradictory (*viruddha*) type of fallacious reasoning (*hetvābhāsa*), because the same concomitance is available in a similar instance of a lamp, etc.
- Since there is no variation in the concomitance of probans and the substratum, hence the fallacy of reason being variable (*anaikāntika*) also does not pertain to the above.
- There is no stronger contrary evidence available, so the fallacy of the reason occurring in the locus and later being sublated by a valid reason (*kalātyayāptdiṣṭa*) is also ruled out.
- Since this does not have any equally strong reason, which may contradict the premise being proved here, hence the reason being unable to prove its substratum due to another equally powerful reason (*satpratipakṣa*) form of fallacious reasoning (*hetvābhāsa*) is also not possible in this case.[9]

Therefore, in Vyomaśiva's view, it is a totally valid form of inference, containing all the five requisite conditions of an accurate reason.

Means for Attaining 'Niḥśreyasa'

Vyomaśiva next deals with the issue of means for accomplishment of 'niḥśreyasa'. He clarifies that a special sort of valid cognition of reality (*tattvajñāna*) accompanied with *yogic* practices like continuous meditation, etc. is the means which paves the path for the ultimate goal. Although Kaṇāda has himself stated 'tattvajñāna' to

[8] *Navānātmaviśeṣaguṇānāṁ santāno'tyantamucchidyate santānatvādyo yaḥ santānaḥ sa so'tyantamucchidyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ yathā pradīpasantānaḥ tathā cāyaṁ santānastasmāt*. – *Vyomavatī* (Vyo.), (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (क).

[9] Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (क).

be the means for attainment of 'niḥśreyasa',[10] it needs to be reiterated on the basis of *Praśastapādabhāṣya* that it is not ordinary valid cognition of reality (*tattvajñāna*) but a particular type of knowledge to be acquired through merits (*dharma*) which is activated by the will of God.[11] Moreover, this specific sort of valid cognition of reality (*tattvajñāna*) cannot be cultivated through scriptural learning only but has to be strengthened with the yogic practice of constant meditation, etc. according to Vyomaśiva. He not only emphasizes upon the blending of textual learning with yogic practices but also highlights a distinctive feature of valid cognition of reality (*tattvajñāna*) which can lead one to liberation.[12] In other words, it is not ordinary knowing of facts, rather an extraordinary type of knowledge accompanied with adequate ethical preparation.

It is worth mentioning in this connection that Śrīdharāchārya, another commentator of Praśastapāda, has also deliberated upon this issue in detail in his *Nyāyakandalī* when he says that a specific sort of merit (*dharma*), which is acquired through the correct knowledge of categories (*padārthas*), is the means for attainment of 'niḥśreyasa'. According to him, this is what has been suggested by Praśastapāda through the usage of 'ca' in his forementioned statement.[13] Elsewhere he has also mentioned that a combination of both knowledge and action is the means for liberation.[14]

What follows from the above is that in the traditional Vaiśeṣika view, it is not only knowledge which leads to liberation but knowledge of a specific sort such as follows:

- Which is based upon similarities and dissimilarities (*sādharmya-vaidharmya*) of categories (*padārthās*)
- Which is caused by a particular type of *dharma*
- Which is activated by the will of God

Nature of 'Niḥśreyasa'

Thereafter Vyomaśiva begins discussing the nature of *niḥśreyasa*, and in this process, he first gives an account of various arguments put up by several schools in the form of opponents' views (*pūrvapakṣas*). In all, he has quoted and refuted eight views such as the following:

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[10] VS, 1.1.4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[11] *Tacceśvaracodanābhivyaktāddharmādeva*. – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 2.

[12] *Viśiṣṭatattvajñānasya niḥśreayasakāraṇatvābhyupagamāt.* – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (क).

[13] *Tanniḥśreyasaṁ dharmādeva bhavati, dravyāditattvajñānaṁ tasya kāraṇatvena niḥśreyasasādharanamityabhiprāyaḥ. …Tacceti cakāro dravyādisādharmyajñānena saha dharmasya niḥśreyasahetutvaṁ samuccinoti. – Nyāyakandalī* (NK), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 18–19.

[14] NK, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 683.

1. *Niḥśreyasa* is of the nature of bliss.[15]

This has been stated in the scriptures and can also be proved from self-experience or mental perception. For example, when one wakes up after deep sleep, he feels that 'I have slept blissfully'. Inference also supports the above view that self (*ātman*) is of the nature of bliss (*ānanda*), and in liberation (*mokṣa*), it stays in its own form.

Vyomaśiva, after carefully examining the above view, has raised several questions against it and refuted it in the following manner:

- Is this bliss eternal or non-eternal?

If it is accepted to be non-eternal, then it must have been produced by some causes. But no such causes are found operating in case of liberation (*mokṣa*), since there is no mind-body contact in this stage and hence no cognition can take place; what to talk of experiencing bliss?

- Now, if this bliss is accepted to be eternal, then it needs to be asked as to why is it not experienced in the stage of bondage?

So, it must be admitted that bliss is not the nature of liberation (*mokṣa*), since even if it be granted for a moment that bliss is eternal and one attains it after proper endeavour, then also one should always be desiring the same and will never be free from desire. Consequentially, real liberation will not be possible.[16]

2. *Discernment of difference between matter (prakṛti) and self (puruṣa) is the means to 'niḥśreyasa':*[17]

Obviously, this is the Sāṁkhya view according to which *niḥśreyasa* is to be attained through distinguishing the constituents (*guṇas*) of matter (*prakṛti*) from self (*puruṣa*). In other words, liberation is the realization of self (*puruṣa*) being distinct from matter (*prakṛti*) and staying only in its own nature of consciousness (*cidrūpeṇāvasthānam*).

Vyomaśiva criticizes and rejects the above theory on the following counts:

- First of all, the existence of 'prakṛti' as such is not acceptable.
- Even if it be accepted for the sake of argument, then the questions will arise as follows:

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[15] *Ānandarūpo mokṣaḥ*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (ख)

- **Note:**It is not very certain as to which particular school is being referred to here by Vyomasiva. Padmanābha Mishra, another commentator of *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*, has also quoted this view in his commentary called *Setu* as that of Mīmāṁsakas. One of the modern interpreters of *Vyomavatī* has referred to this view under the name of Mīmāṁsakas – (Ramanujan, P.S. 1979) *A Study of Vaiśeṣika Philosophy with Special Reference to Vyomaśivācārya*, pp. 198–200.
- (Jhalakīkar, B. 1978) *Nyāyakośa*, p. 413, also supports this idea.
- But Karl H. Potter quotes this view as that of Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva school. – Vide (Potter, Karl. H. 1977) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, p. 701.

[16] Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (ख-घ).

[17] *Guṇapuruṣāntaravivekadarśanaṁ niḥśreyasasādhanamiti*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (घ).

Who motivates 'prakṛti' to approach 'puruṣa'? Moreover, how does insentient 'prakṛti' decide to approach only a 'puruṣa' who is not liberated? Why can't it approach the liberated 'puruṣa' as well?

- How can 'prakṛti', being unconscious in itself, know and distinguish the liberated *puruṣa* from the ones in bondage?[18]

3. *Niḥśreyasa is the staying of individual self in its own essential nature:*[19]

Vyomaśiva next takes up the Yoga view as quoted above and clarifies that although we, the Vaiśeṣikas, also accept that the liberated self (*jīva*) stays in its own essential nature, yet according to us, consciousness is not the nature of self; rather it is an adventitious attribute, and the substratum is not to be identified with its attributes.[20]

Hence, the basic objection which was raised against the Sāṁkhya standpoint remains unanswered in case of Yoga too. Still, if it be retorted by the opponent that 'prakṛti' does not approach the liberated 'puruṣa' once it comes to know that the 'puruṣa' has seen it, then also it cannot satisfy the proponent since 'prakṛti' being unconscious is basically not able to know about 'puruṣa' having seen it.

4. *Liberation is the gaining of true knowledge by contemplating over the momentariness of this world*[21]:

The Buddhists might contend that contemplating over the momentariness of this world leads to liberation which in turn is nothing but gaining a knowledge unmixed with feelings like desire, etc.

Vyomaśiva responds to the above view by asserting that the so-called contemplation over momentariness is conceptually erroneous, since a sense of detachment can be caused by other means as well, and hence it is not necessary to postulate momentariness for that. Moreover, the contemplation over momentariness cannot generate any cognition, what to talk of a pure stream of cognitions.[22]

As regards the Buddhists' (*mādhyamakas*') view of stream of cognitions (*santāna*) and idea of liberation (*mukti*) as the destruction of this stream, Vyomaśiva asserts that it is equally unfounded since it goes against the very Buddhist position of destruction being uncaused.[23]

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[18] Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (घ).

[19] *Draṣṭuḥ svarūpeṇāvasthānam.* – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (घ).

[20] *Guṇaguṇinośca tādātmyapratiṣedhaṁ vakṣyāmaḥ.* – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (घ).

[21] *Anye tu asthirādibhāvanāvaśād āgādiviyuktajñānotpattirniḥśreyasamiti.* – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (घ).

[22] Vyo., Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (ङ).

[23] *Yacca santānocchittirniśreyasāmiti tatra nirhetukatayā vināśasya upāyavaiyarthyam.* – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (ङ).

5. *Liberation is attained by pondering upon the multifaceted nature of reality*[24]:

According to the Jaina view, nature of world-reality is multifaceted (*anekānta*), and meditating upon this nature of the world leads to liberation. A proper knowledge of many-sided nature of the world not only generates a sense of detachment but also results in acquisition of non-decaying bodies in special regions.

Vyomaśiva argues against the above view and asserts that this perception of so-called multiple or dual nature of worldly objects is totally misleading since according to it, the very conception of liberation should also be dual and indefinite in nature, as projected by the Jaina philosophers.

Moreover, the Jaina idea of acquiring undecaying bodies in specific regions is also not tenable because a physical organism is always produced and no product can ever be eternal.

In other words, even a liberated self (*jīva*) cannot be stated to be liberated according to this view, because the nature of liberation will also have to be accepted as multifaceted.[25]

Therefore, the Jaina view of 'niḥśreyasa' also stands refuted according to Vyomaśiva.

6. *Liberation is in fact the merger of individual self into supreme self*[26]:

Vyomaśiva now takes up another significant view for examination according to which self (*ātman*), after realizing oneness of reality is the only reality, and knowledge of this truth results in merger of the individual self into the Supreme Self. Just as little water thrown into the ocean becomes one with it, similarly the apparent differences of worldly objects cease to exist after the unity of existence is realized according to this view which is clearly the Vedānta standpoint.

Vyomaśiva dismisses the above proposition after discussing it very briefly. He says that the essential identity of ultimate reality is not directly evidenced; rather it is the separateness of every soul and distinctness of each object in the world which is experienced by one and all. Therefore, this idea of 'oneness of things' is just an illusion and needs to be rejected.[27]

It is noteworthy here that Vyomaśiva disposes off the above view of Advaita Vedānta in very brief terms, while he devotes a lot of effort and space to criticize the Buddhists. This is a clear indication to the fact that at the time of Vyomaśiva, Advaita view had not gained as much ground as the Buddhist one had held.

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[24] *Anye tu anekāntabhāvanāto viśiṣṭapradeśe'kṣayaśarīrādilābho niḥśreyasamiti*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (ङ).

[25] *Na cotpattidharmāṇāṁ śarīrādīnāmakṣayatvaṁ nyāyyam. Tathā muktāvapyanekānto na vyāvartate iti mukto na muktaśceti syāt. Evañca sati sa eva muktaḥ saṁsārī ceti prasaktam*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (च).

[26] *Ātmaikatvajñānāt paramātmani layaḥ sampadyate*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (च).

[27] *Tadapyasat. Ātmaikatvajñānasya mithyārūpatayā niḥśreyasasādhanatvānupapatteḥ*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (च).

7. *All reality is of the nature of word (śabda) only*[28]:

The above theory known as non-dualism of word (*śabdādvaita*) is equally ill-founded since the very basis of non-dualism has already been eroded in the earlier portion. According to this view, all objects of the universe are in the form of word (*śabda*) only, and liberation rests in acquiring the original nature of the same.

According to Vyomaśiva, this argument of the non-dualists of word (*śabdādvaitin*) is not acceptable, since all cognitions are not verbalized. Anyone can feel air without even knowing its name; his cognition will be unverbalized as his experience of air has no association with any word.

Further it may be asked that if word (*śabda*) or speech (*vāk*) is the one and only reality in the whole world, then there is no rationale for its fourfold classification, namely, *vaikharī*, *madhyamā*, *paśyantī* and *sūkṣmā*. Any classification presupposes diversity and goes against non-dualism of word. Hence the conception of oneness of world in the form of word (*śabda*) stands disproved.[29]

8. *Liberation is attained with the grace of Supreme Lord Maheśvara when the divine properties enter into the individual self*[30]:

Last, but not the least, comes the Śaiva view of liberation according to which the grace of Lord Śiva destroys the evil effects and brings in divine qualities.

According to Vyomaśiva, this theory also does not stand to reason, since the qualities of oneself cannot be acquired by the other. Moreover, the grace of Lord Śiva should continue even in the state of liberation and should keep generating newer properties ad infinitum.[31]

In this way, after posing and disposing various opponents' views (*pūrvapakṣas*), Vyomaśiva proposes that it is quite logical to hold that the valid means for the attainment of *niḥśreyasa* is the knowledge of similarities and dissimilarities among the six categories propounded by sage Kaṇāda the founder of Vaiśeṣika.

The Vaiśeṣika View (*Siddhāntapakṣa*)

Here it must be mentioned that Vyomaśiva has dealt with different conceptions of *niḥśreyasa* as enunciated in various schools of Indian philosophy in great detail but has refrained from presenting details of the Vaiśeṣika standpoint. It goes on to

[28] *Sarvārthānāṁ śabdarūpatā*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (च).

[29] *Ekasmiṅcādvaite pratibandhaamānatayā sarva evādvaitabhedāḥ pratiṣiddhā bhavantītyātmaikatvapratiṣedhādevedaṁ pratiṣiddhaṁ bhavatīti*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (च).

[30] *Maheśvaraprasādādaśuddhaiśvaryavināśe tadguṇasaṁkrāntiḥ*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (च).

[31] *Maheśvaraprasādaśca muktau na pratiṣidhyate tasyāstadadhīnatvāt*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (च).

suggest that he basically agrees with the traditional Vaiśeṣika view[32] in this regard. Therefore, it is appropriate to explore other Vaiśeṣika sources for expounding the nature of 'niḥśreyasa' according to Vaiśeṣika (*siddhāntapakṣa*).

Kaṇāda has defined liberation (*mokṣa*) in the following words:

> Liberation (*mokṣa*) of self (*ātman*) arises from the absence of conjunction with all its attributes and there being no scope for further bondage.[33]

Elaborating the above definition of Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda has stated that due to the cessation of merit and demerit (*dharma-adharma*), self (*ātman*) becomes free from the bondage of the body, sense organs, etc., and when there is no scope for acquisition of new organism, then the state of 'mokṣa' is attained wherein all the passions are quietened like a fire whose fuel is all consumed.[34]

Vyomaśiva is well aware of the oft-quoted gibe against the Vaiśeṣika view of emancipation (*niḥśreyasa*), which says that Vaiśeṣika promotes an aim no better than being a stone as it does not attribute any consciousness or feelings whatsoever to the liberating self; the above might in fact appear quite commonsensical. Moreover, it may be contended by the opponents that since 'mokṣa' means a complete annihilation of all attributes of the self in Vaiśeṣika view, hence it is better to enjoy the worldly pleasures while avoiding the pain rather than aspiring for such a negative goal.

It is in this regard that the following statement of Vyomaśiva is worth quoting:

> No, it is not legitimate to hold so, since the worldly pleasures being necessarily intermingled with pain, are not to be sought by wise persons. In fact, this school of Vaiśeṣika is meant for such wise seekers only, who reject the material pleasures. And if they really require teachings of this system (*śāstra*), then they may even start practising after comprehending the same through some means. Further, proofs have already been adduced for the existence of emancipation (*mokṣa*).[35]

Conclusion

On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that Vyomaśiva has given an extensive survey of various theories about liberation prevalent at his time. This is one aspect in which his commentary excels other available commentaries on

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[32] For details see (Kumar, ShashiPrabha 2013) *Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy*: *On Knowing and What is to be Known*, pp. 104–109.

[33] *Tadabhāve saṁyogābhāvo' prādurbhāvaśca mokṣaḥ*. – VS, 5.2.18, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[34] *Tadā nirodhāt nirbījasyātmanaḥ śarīrādinivṛttiḥ, Punaḥ śarīrādyanutpattau dagdhendhanānalavadupaśamo mokṣaḥ*. – PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 682.

[35] *Atha sarvaguṇocchedād varaṁ vaiṣayikaṁ sukhaṁ duḥkhasādhanaparihāreṇa bhoktavyamiti manyase, tanna, tasya duḥkhānuṣaṅgeṇa duḥkharūpatayā heyatvāt. Yeṣāñcaitadupādeyaṁ na tān pratīdamarthavacchāstram. Santi ca vaiṣayikasukhadveṣiṇaḥ puruṣāstān pratīdaṁ śāstram. Te ca yadyupadeśamapekṣante nopāyāntarādevārthaṁ pratipadyānuṣṭhāne pravartanta iti. Mokṣāstitve ca pramāṇopapatteḥ*. – Vyo., (Kaviraj, Gopinath and Śāstrī, Ḍhuṇḍhirāj (eds.) 1930), p. 20 (ग).

Padārthadharmasaṁgraha since it not only outlines the antiquity of *Vyomavatī* but also highlights its significant contribution in developing and ascertaining the concept *niḥśreyasa* which is so very central to the system of Vaiśeṣika.

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Chapter 11
Are the Vaiśeṣikas Pāśupatas?

Abstract In the present chapter, an effort is being made to explore and examine the religious affiliation of Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy with the Pāśupata sect of Hindu religion. The exposition will mainly be based on several references available in the internal sources of Vaiśeṣika and also gathered from other texts of Indian philosophical tradition.

Keywords *Paśu · Pati · Pāśa · Pāśupata · Paśupati · Maheśvara · Paśupāśavimokṣaṇa*

Background

The first and probably the earliest reference to the religious inclination of Vaiśeṣika is found in *Vāyupurāṇa*. Written probably around the fourth century A.D., the *purāṇa* has a list of 28 incarnations of Śiva, along with his sons and disciples. It mentions the name of Lakulīn or Nakulin as the propounder of Pāśupata sect and describes Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, Ulūka and Vatsa as his disciples.[1] The next evidence in this regard is provided by *Yuktidīpikā,* a commentary of *Sāṁkhyakārikā,* written around A.D. 550, where it is clearly stated that the theistic tendency of Vaiśeṣika school is derived from the influence of Pāśupatas or a Pāśupata.[2]

[1] *Tadāpyahaṁ bhaviṣyāmi Somaśarmā dvijottamāḥ.*
Prabhāsaṁ tīrthamāsādya yogātmā lokaviśrutaḥ.
Tatrāpi mama te putrā bhaviṣyanti tapodhanāḥ.
Akṣapādaḥ Kaṇādaśca Ulūko Vatsa eva ca. – *Vāyupurāṇa*, Chapter 23, Verses 215–216, (Sharma, Sudarshan Kumar (Eng. trans.) 2013).

[2] *Kāṇādānāmīśvaro'stīti pāśupatopajñametat. Yuktidīpikā*, Vol. I, (Wezler, Albrecht and Motegi, Shujun (eds.) 1998), p. 160.

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Introduction

Pāśupata is held to be the oldest among four ancient sects of Śaivism. The symbols of a sect like Pāśupata are available in the remnants of Indus valley civilization,[3] and names such as Maheśvara, Rudra and Śiva as appellations of the divine are popular in Hinduism even today. It has been said that the Pāśupata sect of Śaivism is historically very significant in Indian religious tradition.[4] We do find invocations to Rudra in *Ṛgveda*[5] as well as *Atharvaveda*[6] where Rudra is also addressed as Paśupati; *Śatarudriya* chapter in *Śukla Yajurveda* propounds the greatest grandeur of Rudra and also uses the term Paśupati besides several other epithets for Him.[7] According to one of the interpretations, the terms Rudra, Śiva, Śaṁkara, Śarva, etc. have all been used for the same, single deity-Śiva, who symbolizes fire therein. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* clearly states that Rudra, Sarva, Paśupati, Ugra, Aśani, Bhava, Mahādeva, Iśāna and Kumāra – all the nine – are names of Agni; Rudra, the *pati* (Lord) of *paśu*, is Agni.[8]

Yāska in his *Nirukta* says that the term *paśu* has originated from the verb *paśyati*, so even the seers of the Vedic hymns were called *paśu*, who regarded the Lord as their *pati* or protector.[9] Later on, Paśupati became a proper epithet of Śiva, and the Pāśupata sect became a subsidiary of Śaivism. Therefore it has been suggested by some scholars that the conception of Rudra Śiva is Vedic in origin.[10]

Many later Upaniṣads also expound the splendour and significance of Rudra Śiva. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* identifies Rudrā, Śiva, Īśāna as well as Maheśvara and mentions his powers as Īśānī.[11] So, it may be assumed that the doctrine of *paśu*, *pati* and *pāśa* is available in its germane form in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. The *Atharvaśiras Upaniṣad* describes Rudra, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Skanda, Indra, Agni, Vāyu

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[3] T.N. Ramachandran, Presidential Address at The Agra Session of *Indian History Congress*, pp. 5–10.

[4] The Pāśupata system is not a living religion today and its interest for us is that, historically, it is the fore-runner of the Śaivism of today. – (Chennakesavan, S. 1974) *A Critical Study of Hinduism*, p. 81.

[5] *Ṛgveda*, 1.114.1, 2, 4; 7.46.1, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[6] *Atharvaveda*, 4.28.1-7; 6.93.2; 7.87.1; 9.7.7; 10.1.23; 11.2.1-4, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[7] *Namo hiraṇyabāhave senānye diśāṁ ca pataye namo vṛkśebhyo harikeśebhyaḥ.*
Paśūnāmpataye *namo namaḥ śaspiñjarāya tviṣīmate pathīnaṁ pataye namo.*
Namo harikeśāyopavītine puṣṭānāṁ pataye namaḥ. – Yajurveda, 16.17, (Saraswati, Satya Prakash and Viraj, Udaya Vir (Eng. trans.) 1996).

[8] (a) *Agnirvai sa devaḥ – Paśūnāṁ patī rudro'gniriti. -Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 1.7.3.8, (Deshpande, Maitreyee (ed.) 2008).
(b) *Ete vai sarve paśavaḥ yadagnayāḥ. – Taittrīya Brāhmaṇa*, 3.9.9.2; 1.3, (Sastri, A. Mahadev (ed.) 1908).

[9] *Paśuḥ pāśyateriti rūpopamā. -Nirukta*, 3.16, (Sarup, Lakshman 2002).

[10] (Upadhyaya, Baladev 1977) *Bharatīya Dharma Evaṁ Darśana*, p. 377.

[11] *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, (2009 saṁvat), 3.2,11,12,17; 4.10.

and Sūrya as different deities – all of whom ultimately culminate in Rudra; Īśana, Bhagawān and Maheśvara are also not different from him. Moreover, the penance for Pāśupatas is also enjoined herein according to which besmearing the body after reciting (*japa*) of verses (*mantra*) is a means of liberating one from the bondage of life: '*paśupāśavimokṣaṇa*'.[12] Since this (releasing the *paśu* from the bondage of *pāśa*) is an important trait of the Pāśupatas, hence this Upaniṣad is held to be associated with the sect of Pāśupatas. However, this much can safely be said that although Vedic origin of the sect is still to be proved, yet the usage of terms like *paśu*, *pāśa* and *pati* does indicate that the Pāśupata sect had already developed and been popular in minor Upaniṣads.

Śaiva/Pāśupata/Māheśvara

The Pāśupata sect seems to have grown further in the period of Purāṇas and epics. *Vāyupurāṇa* and *Vāmanapurāṇa*, *Lingapurāṇa* and *Kūrmapurāṇa* give detailed description of Pāśupata theories and practices. The *Vāyupurāṇa* also makes a special mention of Pāśupata Yoga.[13] Mahādeva Śiva is directly stated to be Pāśupati in the *Kūrmapurāṇa*.[14] A verse from a Purāṇa clearly mentions that the Lord is the *pati* or protector of the *paśus* or individual souls.[15]

The *Rāmāyaṇa* does not directly connect Śiva with the Pāśupata sect, while in the *Mahābhārata*, Śiva not only appears as Paśupati on many occasions but also claims to have himself declared the Pāśupata religion.[16] At one place, *Mahābhārata* clearly states that the theories of the sect were first manifested by Lord Paśupati himself.[17] According to *Vāmanapurāṇa*, four schools of Śaivās were popular, namely: Śaiva, Gaṇeśvara, Pāśupata and Kālamukha.[18] *Bhāmatī* and *Ratnaprabhā*, the commentaries of *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, also mention the names of above four schools, the only difference being that the third school has been stated there as '*Kāruṇika Siddhānta*'.[19]

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[12] *Atharvaśiras Upaniṣad* , II: 1-7; IV,V, (Śrī Vāsudevaśarmā (ed.) 2003).

[13] *Vāyupurāṇa*, Chaps. 11 and 14, (Sharma, Sudarshan Kumar (Eng. trans.) 2013).

[14] *Bhavaḥ śarvastatheśānaḥ paśunāṁ patireva ca.*
Bhimaścogro mahādevastāni nāmāni sapta vai. – *Kūrmapurāṇa*, Chap. 10, Verse 26, (Joshi, Kanahaiyalal (ed.) 2011).

[15] *Ahañca sarvavidyānāṁ patirādyaḥ sanātanaḥ.*
Ahaṁ vai patibhāvena paśumadhye vyavasthitaḥ. – Quoted by Rabindrakumar Siddhantashastree (1975) *Śaivisim Through the Ages*, pp. 14–15.

[16] (Chakravarti, Mahadev 2002) *The Concept of Rudra Śiva Through The Ages*, p. 36.

[17] *Mayā pāśupataṁ dakṣa śubhamutpāditaṁ purā. – Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva*, 284.195, (Satavalekara, Sripada Damodara (Hindi trans. and ed.) 1929).

[18] *Vāmanapurāṇa*, Chap. 67, Verses 10–12, (Bimali, Omnath and Joshi, Kanahaiyalal (ed.) 2012).

[19] (i) *Māheśvarāścatvāraḥ-śaivāḥ, pāśupatāḥ, kāruṅikasiddhāntinaḥ, kāpālikāśceti.*
Catvāro'pyamī maheśvaraprañītasiddhāntānuyāyitayā māheśvarāḥ.
(ii) *Catvāro māheśvarāḥ-śaivāḥ, pāśupatāḥ, karuṅika-siddhāntinaḥ, kāpālikāśceti.*

This goes on to prove a close relationship between Pāśupatas and Śaivas. But it needs to be discussed whether Pāśupata and Maheśvara sects are two distinctly separate forms of Śaivism or otherwise.

As mentioned above, the founder of Pāśupata sect is held to be Lakulīśa or Nakulīśa (A.D. 100). It is not without reason then that Mādhavācārya has titled this school as 'Nakulīśa Pāśupata Darśanam' in his *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*.[20] On the basis of an inscription engraved on a pillar found in Mathura, it can be gathered that the Pāśupata sect was founded by Lakulīśa in Gujarat in the second or third century A.D.[21] and gradually it spread all over India. It is also worth mentioning that Lakulin or Lakulīśa is held to be among eight incarnations of Śiva.[22] Lexically, both Maheśvara and Paśupati have been enumerated as synonyms[23] among the numerous names of Śiva. Therefore it may be presumed that some of the Śaiva sects were also popular as 'Māheśvara', while Śiva was held to be the founder of all these sects. The explicit statement of Mādhavācārya that there are certain Māheśvaras who adopt the Pāśupata system[24] goes on to demonstrate these two as separate schools, while there are other scholars like Śaṅkarācārya[25] who seem to be taking them to be two names of the same school.

It is noteworthy that the Kuṣāṇa King 'Wema Kadphises' has expressed himself as Māheśvara in one of the coins (second century A.D.).[26] Now if Māheśvara is taken to be another name of the Pāśupata sect, then this sect must have been present at around century A.D. and perhaps it also had a royal patronage. That is why the Chinese tourist Hiuen Tsang, who visited India in the seventh century A.D., has made several mentions of Pāśupata sect by name. As already stated, the chief trait of the Pāśupatas seems to be that they used to besmear their bodies with ashes, so Varāhamihira has mentioned them as *sabhamasdvijas*,[27] and Hiuen Tsang has

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Sarve'pi amī maheśvara-proktāgamānugāmitvāt māheśvarā ucyante. – *Bhāmatī* (Sharma, Yogeshwardatta (ed.) 2002) and *Ratnaprabhā* (Bholebaba, Yativara (Hindi trans.) 2004) on *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.2.37.

[20] *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, Chap. VI, pp. 103–111, (Cowell, E.B. and Gough, A.E. (eds.) 1978).

[21] *Epigraphica Carnatica*. – Quoted in (Yaduvanshi 1955) *Śaivamata.*

[22] *Saṁvarto Lakulīśaśca Vāḍavo Hastireva ca.*
Caṇḍayakṣo Gaṇapatirmahātmā Bhṛgujo'ṣṭamaḥ. – *Liṅgamahāpurāṇam*, Chapter-27, Verses 109–110, (Shastri, Pandit Dwarikaprasad Mishra (Hindi trans. and ed.) 2012).

[23] *Śaṁbhuriśaḥ Paśupatiḥ Śivaḥ Śūlī Maheśvaraḥ.* – *Amarakośa*, 1.1.32, ('Abhimanyu', Shri Manna Lal (ed.) 1937).

[24] *Kecana Māheśvarāḥ……Pāśupataśāstramāśrayante*. – *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, Chap. VI, p. 103, (Cowell, E.B. and Gough, A.E. (eds.) 1978).

[25] *Māheśvarāstu manyante kāryakāraṇayogavidhiduḥkhāntāḥ pañca padārathāḥ paśupatineśvareṇa paśupāśavimokṣaṇāyopadiṣṭāḥ paśupatirīśvaro nimittakāraṇamiti varṇayanti.* – *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya, Patyadhikaraṇa* (*Satyānandī Dīpikāsahita*), 2.2.37, (Sharma, (ed.) 2002), p. 462.

[26] Vide (Yaduvanshi 1955) *Śaivamata*, pp. 153–54.

[27] *Viṣṇorbhāgavatān magāṅśca savituḥ śambhoḥ sabhasmadvijān.*
(*Viṣṇornārāyaṇasya bhāgavatān, saviturādityasya magān magabrāhmaṇān, Śambhormahādevasya, dvijān brāhmaṇān bhasmasahitān Pāśupatānityarthaḥ*). – *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* Chapter 60,Verse 19, (Sastri, Subrahmanya (Eng. trans.) 1946).

described them as '*bhasmadhārī*.'[28] It is due to such peculiar practices of the Pāśupatas that a modern scholar has compared them with the Greek 'cynics'.[29]

In view of the above, it can be stated that Māheśvara appears to be an older name of the Pāśupata sect. But it still remains an intriguing issue as to whether the Māheśvara sect was in total conformity with the Pāśupata practices or was a different sect of Śaivism.

Pāśupata Theories

The original text of Pāśupata sect is in the form of 168 *sūtras* which has been published under Trivandrum Sanskrit Series along with an ancient commentary, *Kauṇḍinya's Pañcārthabhāṣya*.[30] It needs to be mentioned here that some of the *sūtras* available in this text are attributed to the first five *mantras* of Taittirīya Āraṇyaka (17/1–5).There are five philosophically significant theories of Paśupatas according to Śaṅkarācārya. While commenting on the *Brahmasūtras*, Śaṅkara has said that in view of the Pāśupatas/Māheśvaras, Lord Pāśupati propounded these five principles, namely: *kārya, kāraṇa*, *yoga*, *vidhi* and *dukhānta*.[31] Knowledge of these five concepts is held to be a gate to '*Śivatva*' and it is believed that Lord Pāśupati is the efficient cause of the world. However, there have been some other interpretations of Pāśupata system of Śiva worship according to which the term *paśu* stands for all the animate entities starting from Brahman, the Lord of creation, down to the herbs and that Lord Mahādeva (Śiva), being the protector of all these *paśus* has been named *Paśupati* in the source texts.[32]

Vaiśeṣika and Pāśupata

According to Śaṅkara, the commentator of *Brahmasūtras*, the pluralistic school of Vaiśeṣika is akin to the Pāśupata school from a philosophical point of view, in the sense that God is accepted as an efficient cause of the world here as well.[33] Moreover,

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[28] Quoted in (Yaduvanshi 1955) *Śaivamata.*

[29] Ingalls, H.H. 1962. Cynics and Pāśupatas: The Seeking of Dishonor. In *Harvard Theological Review* , 55.4: 281–98 (Quoted by [Potter, Karl. H, 1977] *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, p. 688).

[30] Sastri, R.A. (1940) [ed.]) *Pāśupata Sūtras* with *Pañcārthabhāṣya* of Kauṇḍinya.

[31] *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (on *Brahmasūtra*, 2.2.37), (Shatshastri, Swami Hanumandas (ed.) 1993).

[32] ……..*Brahmādyāḥ sthāvarāntāśca devadevasya dhīmataḥ.*
Paśavaḥ parikīrtyante saṁsāravaśavartinaḥ.
Teṣāṁ patitvādbhagavān rudraḥ paśupatiḥ smṛtaḥ. – *Liṅgamahāpurāṇam*, Chapter 9, Verses 11–12, (Shastri, Pandit Dwarikaprasad Mishra (ed. and Hindi trans.) 2012).

[33] *Tathā Vaiśeṣikādayo'pi kecit kathañcit svaprakriyānusāreṇa nimittakāraṇamīśvara iti varṇayanti.-Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.2.37, (Shatshastri, Swami Hanumandas (ed.) 1993).

there are several other references which go on to prove that the Vaiśeṣika is closely linked with the Pāśupata sect of Śaivism. We find three main views, such as follow:

- According to the first view, both Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas were Śaivas. A statement of Haribhadra Suri, the author of *'Saḍḍarśanasamuccaya'* is an evidence to this view.

  In the view of Akṣapāda, Lord Śiva is the creator and destroyer of the world; He is omnipresent, eternal, one, omniscient and an abode of eternal knowledge.[34]

  .....

  There is no difference of opinion between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyayikas regarding the nature of God.[35]

- The second view in this regard is that the Naiyāyikas were Śaivas, while the Vaiśeṣikas were Pāśupatas.

  Now we describe the Yoga school (the term yoga means here Nyāya, because the Naiyāyikas are more concerned with *yuktis* or arguments) which is also called as Śaiva. Thereafter we expound the school of Vaiśeṣika which is also called as Pāśupata.[36]

Evidently, the statement of *Yuktidīpikā* quoted above is a testimony to this view, and Guṇaratna, the commentator of *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* by Haribhadra Suri, also echoes the same view.[37] The followers of this view hold that Śiva and Paśupati are different due to āgamic authority.[38]

- The third view suggests that both the Naiyāyikās and Vaiśeṣikas were Pāśupatas as stated by Maṇibhadra, another *vṛttikāra* of *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (by Haribhadra Suri):

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[34] *Akṣapādamate devaḥ ṣṛṣṭisaṁhārakṛchhivaḥ.*
Vibhurnityaikasarvajño nityabuddhisamāśrayaḥ. – *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra Suri, Verse 13, (Jain, Mahendra Kumar (ed.) 2009), p. 51.

[35] *Devatāviṣaye bhedo nāsti naiyāyikaiḥ samam.*
Vaiśeṣikāṇām..... – *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra Suri, Verse 59, (Jain, Mahendra Kumar (ed.) 2009), p. 266.

[36] *Atha yogamataṁ brūmaḥ Śaivamityaparābhidham.*
.....
Atha Vaiśeṣikaṁ brūmaḥ Pāśupatānyanāmakam. – See *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Rajashekhara Suri, (Shastri, Goswami Damodar Lala 1979), pp. 8–9.

[37] *Paraṁ śāstreṣu naiyāyikāḥ sadā śivabhaktatvācchaivā ityucyante, Vaiśeṣikāstu Pāśupatā iti. Tena Naiyāyikaśāsanaṁ Śaivamākhyāyate, Vaiśeṣikadarśanaṁ ca Pāśupatamiti.* – *Tarkarahasyadīpikā of* Guṇaratna on *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra Suri, (Jain, Mahendra Kumar (ed.) 2009), p. 51.

[38] Vide (Mishra, Umesh 1975) *Bhāratīya Darśana*, p. 238.

> The philosophy of Nyāya is (known as) Pāśupata Darśana and the philosophy of Vaiśeṣika is similar to Nyāya in theory as well as with reference to the deity etc. while it is distinct from Nyāya on account of *dravya*, *guṇa* etc.[39]

But the above view of Maṇibhadra seems to be incongruous, since the system of Nyāya is nowhere popularly known as Pāśupata.[40]

Nonetheless, there are some scholars who hold an opposite view to the above: 'This shows that the Nyāya school was already under the influence of the Pāśupata Śaiva sect, just as the Vaiśeṣika school was under the influence of Māheśvara Śaiva sect beginning from Praśastapāda'.[41] Likewise, there are others who assert that: 'It is difficult to find much evidence that the Vaiśeṣika philosophers were Pāśupatas, though there is evidence to show that some of the Naiyāyikās were, all of which may tell once again in favour of the essential identity of the two schools'.[42]

On a closer study, it becomes clear that the basic difference or identity between the nature of Śiva and Pāśupati is in fact the crucial factor for determining the identity or difference between the sects of Śaiva and Pāśupata. Hence no conclusive statement can be made in this respect until the core issue regarding both the sects is resolved.

In other words, none of the above standpoints can be exclusively acceptable because they are not yet substantiated from the internal sources of the Vaiśeṣika system.

Coming to the internal sources of Vaiśeṣika, the most authentic testimony is furnished by none other than Praśastapāda, the illustrious commentator of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, who has mentioned towards the end of his treatise that sage Kaṇāda had pleased Lord Maheśvara with his austerities:

> I bow down to sage Kaṇāda, who propounded the system of Vaiśeṣika after he had satisfied Lord Maheśvara with his 'Yoga' (=Yogic practices, mental control) and '*ācāra*' (= penances, physical discipline).[43]

The above statement of Praśastapāda goes on to suggest that Kaṇāda was a follower of Māheśvara sect. Both the commentators of Praśastapāda, i.e. Vyomaśiva[44] and

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[39] *Naiyāyikaṁ pāśupatadarśanaṁ Vaiśeṣikaṁ Kāṇādadarśanaṁ, darśanadevatādisāmye'pi Naiyāyikebhyo dravyaguṇādisāmagryā viśiṣṭamiti.* – Manibhadra in his *Vṛtti* on *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra Suri, Verse 3, (Shastri, Goswami Damodar 1979), p. 7.

[40] *Asamañjaseyamuktiḥ-Nyāyadarśanasya Pāśupatatvenāprasiddheḥ.* – (Damodara Shastri 1979) on *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, p. 4.

[41] Matilal, B.K. (1977) *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 85.

[42] Potter, Karl H. (1977) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, p. 21.

[43] *Yogācāravibhūtyā yastoṣayitvā Maheśvaram.*
Cakre Vaiśeṣikaṁ śāstraṁ tasmai Kaṇabhuje namaḥ. -Praśastapādabhāṣya with *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdharācārya, (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 786.

[44] *Tacca yathopapannaṁ bhagavānadhikāriṇaṁ dṛṣṭvā samādhi-balādekasminnaṇavutpannaṣatpadārthatattvajñāno Maheśvareṇo 1/2 – (padiṣṭa)..... sūtrakaraṇe pravṛttaḥ. -Vyomavatī* (Vyo.), Vol. I., (Sastri, Gaurinath (ed.) 1983) p. 1.

Udayana,[45] have also referred to the benediction of Lord Maheśvara for Kaṇāda.[46] Another commentary of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, namely, the *Candrānandavṛtti*[47] too, has a suggestion of this sort, although there is no clear statement to the effect that Kaṇāda obtained knowledge from Maheśvara.

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa of Bhāsarvajña also supports the above view.[48] Elsewhere it is stated that God himself, in the form of an owl, preached the doctrine of six categories (*padārthas*) to Kaṇāda, after he was pleased with the yogic austerities practiced by him.[49] The sage thereafter authored the aphorisms (*sūtras*) of Vaiśeṣika for the benefit of people at large. Rājaśekhara, the commentator of *Nyāyakandalī*, has used the term *Īśvara* as an epithet of God, so it is difficult to ascertain whether this term is an exact synonym of Śiva or Paśupati. However, in *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, Kaṇāda's adorable deity has been named as '*Vṛṣabhadhvaja*' (an epithet of Śiva).[50]

Bhāsa in his play *Pratimānāṭakam* has depicted Rāvaṇa as a descendent of Kāśyapa clan and has described him as a scholar of *Māheśvara Yogaśāstra* besides other branches of traditional learning.[51] This is also supported by a statement in another Sanskrit play *Anargharāghava*[52] of Murari Mishra which mentions Rāvaṇa as a scholar of Vaiśesika *Kaṭandī*. According to some scholars, it has been suggested that *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* itself is *Kaṭandī* although it is doubtful as yet.[53]

It needs to be noted here that Kaṇāda is mentioned as Kāśyapa,[54] and his philosophy is also known as *Yogaśāstra*[55] elsewhere. Besides, we have another reference about a *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras,*[56] which is not yet available, but it goes on to prove that the philosophy of Kaṇāda was associated with the Māheśvara sect.

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[45] *Smaryate hi yat Kaṇādo munirmaheśvaraniyogaprasādavadhigamya praṇītavān.… –Kiraṇāvalī*, (Jetli, J. S. (ed.) 1971), p. 3.

[46] *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara is silent on this concluding verse of Praśastapāda.

[47] *Taditi Hiraṇyagarbhaparāmarśaḥ, hiraṇyaṁ reto' syeti kṛtvā bhagavān Maheśvara evocyate. - Candrānandavṛtti* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, 1.1.3, (Sandesara, B. J. (ed.) 1958).

[48] *Sa tathā cāsya bhagavānmaheśvara pratyakṣo'bhūditi śrūyate. –Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Yogindrananda, Swami (ed.) 2004), p. 163.

[49] *Munaye Kaṇādāya svayamīśvara Ulūkarūpadhārī pratyakṣībhūya dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyalakṣaṇaṁ padārthaṣaṭkam upadideśa. - Pañjikā* (*Nyāyakandalītīkā* of Rājaśekhara), (Jetly, J.S. and Parikh, Vasant G. (eds.) 1991).

[50] *Matimatāṁ pravaro Vṛṣabhadhwajaḥ Kaṇabhugādimunipravaraprabhuḥ.-Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajnamuni, 3.264, (Bhauśāstrīvajeh (ed.) 1992).

[51] (*Prakāśaṁ*): *Bhoḥ*! *Kāśyapagotro'smi. Sāṅgopāṅgavedamdhīye, mānavaṁ dharmśāstraṁ, māheśvaraṁ yogaśāstraṁ, bārhaspatyamarthaśāstraṁ, medhātithernyāyaśāstraṁ, prācetasaṁ śrāddhakalpaṁ ca. –Pratimānāṭakaṁ*, Vth Act, (Shastry, C. Sankar Rama (ed.) 1951).

[52] *Vaiśesika-Kaṭandī-Paṇḍitaḥ. -Anargharāghava*, Vth Act, (Sri Lakṣmaṇasūri, 1900).

[53] Kuppuswami Sastri.1978. Rāvaṇa Bhāṣya. *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, 3: 1–5.

[54] *Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 480.

[55] For details see chapter two titled "Yoga and Vaiśeṣika" of this book.

[56] *Prakaṭārthakārāstu yad dvābhyaṁ dvyaṇukābhyāmārabdhe kārye mahattvaṁ dṛśyate, tasya hetuḥ pracayo nāma praśithilāvayavasaṁyoga iti Rāvaṇa-praṇīte bhāṣye dṛśyate iti cirantana Vaiśeṣika-dṛṣṭyā idambhāṣyamityāhuḥ.-Ratnaprabhā*, (Bholebaba, Yativara (Hindi trans.) 2004) (on *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.2.11).

Jayantabhaṭṭa, another noted scholar of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the author of *Nyāyamañjarī*, has written a Sanskrit play titled *Āgamaḍambara.* In this play, Dharmaśiva, a teacher of the Pāśupata school, is described to represent the Vaiśeṣika school and is said to be an expert in the philosophy of Kaṇabhakṣa (Kaṇāda), Akṣapāda (Gautama) and others.[57]

All these references point to the fact that Kaṇāda was a believer and he followed the Māheśvara or Pāśupata sect of Śaivism. But we do not find any supporting evidence for this idea from the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda, while the Vaiśeṣika literature between Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda has unfortunately been lost. So, it is still a matter of discussion among scholars.

It is worth mentioning here that although there is a divergence of opinion among scholars about the theistic orientation of Kaṇāda,[58] yet Praśastapāda has not only paid obeisance to the Supreme Lord in the invocatory verse of his treatise but has also explicitly stated that the desire of Maheśvara is the primal cause of destruction and creation of the world.[59] But since neither Kaṇāda nor even Praśastapāda has enumerated God under the list of substances (*dravyas*), so it remains a debatable point. Two of his commentators, namely, Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara, have followed Praśastapāda in their interpretations, while the third commentator Udayana has followed him in his commentary *Kiraṇāvalī* but taken a conspicuous stand in this case in his independent treatise *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and has classified God as a type of the eighth substance (*dravya*) self (*ātman*).[60]

In fact the theistic tendency of Vaiśeṣika was carried forward to its logical culmination by Udayana in his another work, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, focusing exclusively on theistic arguments.[61] It is interesting to note that Udayana mentions the names of Pāśupatas and Śaivas as separate schools in the beginning of his treatise,[62] while towards the end of this work, he has addressed the omniscient God as '*Kāruṇika*'[63] which is also held to be one of the sects of Śaivism.

In view of this, many scholars believe that there must have been an internal relation between Vaiśeṣikas and Pāśupatas.[64] This is also supported by several references scattered in other sources of Indian philosophical tradition as will be clear from the following pages.

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[57] Vide (Thakur, Anantalal 2003) *Origin and Development of The Vaiśeṣika System*, p. 383.

[58] Bhattacharya, Gopikamohan (1961) *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism*, pp. 160–162.

[59] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 121–131.

[60] *Sa dvividhaśḥ Iśvarānīśvarabhedāt. Tatreśvaraḥ sarvajñaḥ ekaḥ. –Lakṣaṇāvalī*, (Jha, Shashinath (ed.) 1964), p. 14.

[61] *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, V.1, (Goswami, Mahaprabhuulal (ed.) 1972).

[62] *Iha yadyapi.....svatantraśceti mahāpāśupataḥ, śiva iti śaivāḥ.- Nyāyakusumāñjali*, under 1.2, (Goswami, Mahaprabhuulal (ed.) 1972), p. 16.

[63] *Ityevaṁ śrutinītisaṁplavajalairbhūyobhirākṣālite.*
Yeṣāṁ nāspadmādadhāsi hṛdaye te śailasārāśayāḥ.
Kintu prastutavipratīpavidhayo'pyuccairbhavaccintakāḥ.
Kāle Kāruṇika ! tvayaiva kṛpayā te tāraṇīyā narāḥ. – Nyāyakusumāñjali, V.17, (Goswami, Mahaprabhuulal (ed.) 1972).

[64] See (Sastri, R.A. 1940) Introduction to *Pāśupatasūtras*, pp. 2 and 13.

What follows from the foregoing discussion is that the earlier Vaiśeṣika school had no clear cut religious affiliation, but the later Vaiśeṣika scholars, beginning from Praśastapāda, seem to have developed some leanings to the religious belief, which did influence their philosophical theories as well.[65] To illustrate the above point, one may cite the dual division of perception as done by Praśastapāda, – ordinary and the yogic.[66] Obviously this division seems to have been based upon two types of perception suggested by Kauṇḍinya, the commentator of *Pāśupatasūtras*, such as the sensory perception and the soul perception.[67] Similarly, Praśastapāda has divided inference into two types: *dṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*[68]; which is again quite akin to the division of inference made in the *Kauṇḍinyabhāṣya.*[69] So, it appears that Praśastapāda was influenced by Pāśupata view in this case.

Moreover, Kauṇḍinya propounds that the Pāśupatas accept three types of means for valid cognition (*pramāṇas*), namely, perception, inference and verbal testimony. It is significant to note that usually in classical Vaiśeṣika including Praśastapāda, we find a mention of only two means for valid cognition, perception and inference. But Vyomaśiva, an ancient commentator of Praśastapāda, who is himself held to be a follower of Siddhānta Śaiva sect,[70] accepts the above three means of valid cognition.[71] Another Vaiśeṣika scholar, Vādi Vāgiśvara, who belongs to the twelfth century and has authored a Vaiśeṣika manual titled '*Mānamanohara*', is again held to be a Śaiva or Pāśupata;[72] he has also been stated to be a follower of '*Vāmamārga*' by Ānandānubhava.[73]

It also needs to be noted here that some of the Nyāya scholars were also followers of Pāśupata sect. Uddyotakara, the author of *Nyāyavārttika*, has identified himself to be a 'Pāśupatācārya' in the colophon of the fifth chapter of his treatise.[74] Bhāsarvajña, the writer of *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, was also a 'Pāśupatācārya'; he has himself written a small text titled '*Gaṇakārikā*' wherein an essence of the Pāśupata sect has been presented in just eight verses.[75] Mādhavācārya has quoted these verses in his treatise '*Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*' while dealing with Nakulīśa Pāśupata

[65] Frauwallner, Erich. The Original beginning of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras. In *Erich Frauwallner's Posthumous Essays*, Translated from the German (Soni, Jayandra 1994), pp. 35–41.

[66] *Bhāvadravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvādīnāmupalabyādhhārasamavetānāmāśray-agrāhakairindriyairgrahaṇamityetadasmadādīnāṁ pratyakṣam. Asmadviśiṣṭānāṁ tu yogināṁ yuktānāṁ yogajadharmānugṛhītena manasā svātmākāśadikkālaparamāṇuvāyumanassu tatsamvetaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣeṣu samavāye cāvitathaṁ svarūpadarśanamutpadyate*.-PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 464–65.

[67] *Tatra pratyakṣam dvividham indriyapratyakṣam ātmāpratyakṣam ca. –Kauṇḍinyabhāṣya*, (Sastri, R. A. (ed.) 1983), p. 7.

[68] *Tattu dvividham-dṛṣṭaṁ sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ.* –PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 507.

[69] *Tacca dvividham-dṛṣṭaṁ sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ. -Kauṇḍinyabhāṣya*, (Sastri, R. A. (ed.) 1940), p. 7.

[70] Vide Gaurinath Shastri in his Introduction to Vyo., Vol. I, (Sastri, Gaurinath (ed.) 1983), p. viii.

[71] Vyo., Vol. II, (Sastri, Gaurinath (ed.) 1983), p. 163.

[72] Raghavan, V. 1942. The Works of Vādi Vāgiśvara. *Brahmavidyā*, Adyar.(Madras) 6 (1), 35–40.

[73] Quoted by Swami Yogindrananda (1973) in his Introduction to *Mānamanohara* , p. 9.

[74] *Iti śrīparamarṣibhāradvājapāśupatācaryaśrimadudyotakarakṛtaṁ. Nyāya-Vārttikaṁ samāptam.-Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika*, (Thakur, Anantalal, (ed.) 1997), p.530.

[75] Vide (Joshi, L.V. 1986) *A Critical Study of Bhāsarvajñā's Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 7.

Darśana. Some unknown writer has authored a commentary on *Gaṇakārikā* titled *Ratnaṭīkā,* and the same has already been published from Baroda.[76]

It is therefore not wrong to surmise that many post-Kaṇāda scholars in Vaiśeṣika tradition were inclined towards Pāśupata sect.

On the basis of above delineation, it may be gathered that since ancient times several Vaiśeśika (and Naiyāyika) scholars must have been influenced by Pāśupata doctrines. Dr. Bhandarkar has made mention of an inscription (1030 A.D.) wherein Someshwara Suri has been stated to be the developer of Lākula theory (based upon the name of Lakulīśa, the founder), and elsewhere he has also been described as a Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika.[77] There may be many more references scattered in the vast treasures of unexplored material, which may help in affirming the prevailing position in this case.

Till date, the above quoted reference of *Yuktidīpikā* is perhaps the clearest evidence to prove that Vaiśeṣika system is influenced by the Pāśupatas in its theistic tendency.[78] Although it is difficult to say as to when was it that the Vaiśeṣikas actually accepted God as a creator, yet some of the scholars have suggested after quoting a few *sūtras* of Vaiśeṣika that Kaṇāda himself was a theist.[79] The clear mention of God as a creator and destroyer by Praśastapāda is of course an indication to its theistic tendency, but a categorical statement in this regard is still not possible.[80] So, one has to keep grappling with the possibility regarding the influence of Pāśupata sect on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda[81] until the problem of theism in classical Vaiśeṣika is solved on a substantial basis.

In brief, it may be said that even though a definite statement to this effect is yet to be made, there is no doubt about the fact that Vaiśeṣika scholars like Prāsastapāda, Vyomaśiva and Vādi Vāgiśvara and Nyāya scholars like Udyotakara and Bhāsarvajña were definitely influenced by Pāśupata theories. Therefore, Vaiśeṣika (and Nyāya) school must have been closely interacting with the Pāśupats.

This brings us to the point of interrelation between Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya as well. The popularly prevalent view of scholars like Karl Potter regarding the 'essential identity'[82] of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika cannot be accepted, since it is no less than certain that originally both the schools were independent and had different theoretical orientations.[83] But in the course of development, when religious affiliations started influencing their basic standpoints, both these schools drew closer and consolidated

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[76] *Ratnaṭīkā* (commentary on *Gaṇakārikā* of Bhāsarvajña), (Dalal, C.D. (ed.) 1920).

[77] *Epigraphica Karnataka*, 7.1.64, (Quoted by R.G. Bhandarkar in *Vaiśaṇava, Śaiva aur Anya Dhārmika Mata*, Maheshwari Prasad (Hindi trans.), p. 137).

[78] Chemparathy, George.1965. The Testimony of the *Yuktidīpikā* concerning the *Īśvara* doctrine of the *Pāśupatas* and Vaiśeṣikas. In *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sud und Ostasiens*, IX: 130. Vienna.

[79] For details see: (Kumar, Shashiprabha 1992) *Vaiśeṣika Darśana Mein Padārtha Nirupaṇa* (Hindi), pp. 211–216.

[80] See Bronkhorst, Johannes.1966. God's arrival in the Vaiśeṣika System. In *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Springer, 24. 3:281–294.

[81] Shastri, Udayaveera (2006) in his introduction to *Vaiśeṣika Darśana-Vidyodaya Bhāṣya*, p. 16.

[82] Potter, Karl H. (1977) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, p. 12, no. 63.

[83] Vide (Mishra, Umesh 1936) *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, pp. 32–43.

their theories to face the challenge of confronting religious traditions. In this background, it will not be difficult to understand that the religious roots of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya were almost the same:

> ….The original Śivāgama or its philosophical counterpart, the so-called *Īśvaravāda*, out of which, not only the present form of Yoga and Nyāya, but the later Śaiva philosophies also may have well arisen and gradually crystallized themselves into independent systems.[84]

Significantly this historical aspect of the growth and development of Vaiśeṣika in close connection with Nyāya has to be kept in mind before we draw any conclusion in this case.

Conclusion

In view of the above quoted sources, it is not yet possible to decide whether the Vaiśeṣikas actually believed in any scriptural difference between Śiva and Paśupati. Consequently, it also remains uncertain as to whether the Vaiśeṣikas were Śaivas or Pāśupatas? So, it is better to call the Vaiśeṣikas as Māheśvaras. Since the term Maheśvara connotes both – Śiva and Paśupati –[85] hence calling the Vaiśeṣikas as Māheśvaras would cover both the aspects: Śaiva as well as Pāśupata the twin terms which have been used for them in several texts. Besides, it will also be easier to appreciate the import of supporting references which are available to suggest that the Vaiśeṣikas and Pāśupatas are closely related.[86]

To sum up, it would be more appropriate to conclude that the Vaiśeṣikas, beginning from Praśastapāda, were followers of Māheśvara Śaiva sect and they might have been closely connected with the Pāśupatas.

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[84] Vide (Kaviraj, Gopinath 1924) *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature*, p. 6.

[85] Vide (Mishra, Umesh 2002) (Quoted by Narayana Misra in Introduction to *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra*), p. 6.

[86] (Thakur, Anantalal 1957) in his Introduction to *Avijñatakartṛkavyākhyā* of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, p. 16.

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Chapter 12
Ethics in Vaiśeṣika

Abstract The present chapter aims to expound the ethical aspect of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The Vaiśeṣika system of Kaṇāda primarily deals with the metaphysical aspect but at the same time presents a fairly developed description of ethical issues as will be clear from the following pages. The idea of individual, social as well as universal obligations of human beings has been discussed in Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Keywords *Dharma* · *Adharma* · *Abhyudaya* · *Niḥśreyasa* · *Vyaṣṭi* · *Samaṣṭi* · *Dāna* · *Pratigraha* · *Duṣṭa* · *Aduṣṭa* · *Viśiṣṭa* · *Hīna* · *Sama* · *Yamas* · *Niyamas* · *Viśeṣadharmas* · *Sāmānyadharmas* · *Varṇa* · Āśrama

Background

Indian philosophy is basically purposive, and so it holds that all human pursuits tend to fulfil the four ends of life, namely, the ethical end (*dharma*), the economical end (*artha*), the emotional end (*kāma*) and the final end (*mokṣa*). Obviously these four ends are connected with their respective aspects, i.e. intellectual, physical, mental and spiritual, both at the levels of individual and society.

It is also worth mentioning that Indian philosophical thought has been integral, and so ethics was not a separate branch of study herein. However, it does not mean in any way that Indian philosophy never discussed ethical issues. In fact, each philosophical system in India is ethically oriented since spiritual perfection is held to be the highest goal of life in all of them (except *cārvāka*).

Introduction

The system of Vaiśeṣika is usually taken to be a metaphysical theory, as it is primarily interested in the exposition of categories (*padārthas*), but on closer analysis, it becomes clear that:

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> This school, like all other orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, is ethico-metaphysical in its outlook, and subordinates knowledge to action, reason to meditation and empirical experience to spiritual perfection.[1]

It is in accordance with this basic nature of the system that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* commence with a promise to explain the nature of '*dharma*'. This *dharma* in turn is defined and characterized as a means to achieve twin objectives, i.e. material attainment (*abhyudaya*) and spiritual fulfilment (*niḥśreyasa*).[2] Both these objectives can be met through the performance of ceremonial duties and practice of yogic discipline, respectively. The Vaiśeṣika concept of *dharma* is clearly comprehensive in this sense because it not only includes worldly well-being but also utmost welfare in its fold; the latter is said to be acquired through the exact knowledge of reality (*tattvajāna*). Obviously this type of higher knowledge not only requires a balanced coordination between body and sense organs but also a complete concentration of inner organ/mind which implies inner discipline (*yoga*) defined as '*tapas*' in ancient Indian tradition.[3]

Definition of Ethics

As already stated, ethics has always been an inherent part of philosophy in India, but it was never defined as such. Looking at various definitions of ethics available in Western philosophy,[4] it can be said that ethics deals with the ultimate end or supreme good of life, which is based upon propriety of human conduct.

Viewed from this angle, Indian philosophy comes out to be ethical in its approach, for it propounds *mokṣa* as the ultimate goal; it not only describes the nature of mundane reality but also prescribes ethical human duties which would enable one to actualize the highest goal. Hence it would be appropriate to say that ethics in India is not only a rational discussion of right and wrong, but it is also a practical application of moral ideas such as spiritual bonding among all beings and universal welfare that leads to the final goal of emancipation.

However it is important to note here that although Indian philosophy is teleological in approach and *mokṣa* is held to be the ultimate goal of all moral acts herein, it does not in any way mean that ethics in India is dependent on emancipation (*mokṣa* or the *summum bonum*); rather it is based on verbal authority of Vedic scriptures. In other words whatever has been enjoined in the Veda is right and worth following. To put it more precisely, it is not that the path of liberation (*mokṣa*) will make a person moral, but performing one's duties as enjoined in Vedic scriptures will do so. It

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[1] Sharma, I. C. (1991), *Ethical Philosophies of India*, p. 181.

[2] *Yato'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ.-The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda* (VS), 1.1.2, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[3] *Manaśacendriyāṇāñcaikāgrayaṁ paraṁ tapaḥ.- Mahābhārata*, *Śantipārva*, 250.4, (Satavalekara, Sripada Damodara (ed. and Hindi trans.), 1929).

[4] Vide (Sharma, I.C. 1991) *Ethical Philosophies of India*, Introduction, pp. 29–32.

means that although '*mokṣa*' is the final goal in Indian philosophical tradition, it is only a motivation and not the condition of morality.

To quote:

> Be whatever the consequences, if you perform the duties assigned to you as your *dharma* by the śāstras you are moral. Thus what is emphasized here is a deontological morality, a morality which takes duty for duty's sake to be the ideal of morality.[5]

Vaiśeṣika Ethics

In Indian perspective *dharma* is held to be the first and foremost human pursuit. Although the connotations of the term *dharma* are varied and its scope very wide in the Indian tradition, this much can certainly be said that it covers the entire range of Indian ethics.

Accordingly, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* begin with an exposition of *dharma*, which is a means for worldly attainment (*abhyudaya*) as well as ultimate fulfilment (*niḥśreyasa*). In other words, *dharma* leads to twin objectives: material progress and spiritual perfection. Out of these two, the former comprises of *artha* and *kāma*, while the latter stands for *mokṣa*. Hence in the system of Kaṇāda, all the four pursuits of human life enunciated in Indian tradition have been well accommodated, but *dharma* has been given a prime position because it not only covers the mundane pleasures but also leads to the highest goal of life. After defining *dharma*, Kaṇāda has also clarified the above point that the validation of *dharma* as an ethical end is not due to its being a means to *mokṣa*; rather it is rooted in the authority of Veda.[6] Veda is the intelligent work[7] of an omniscient author, so it is the supreme authority for human beings who seek worldly pleasures (*abhyudaya*). Therefore this is a beneficial result of *dharma*, and the same is produced by following Vedic precepts. In essence, Veda is the source of ethical conduct in Vaiśeṣika.

This leads to substantiate the fact that Indian ethical thought is deontological in approach. According to *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, one should behave in conformity with the Vedic norms as this would generate merit and lead to *abhyudaya*, while its opposite behaviour would produce demerit and lead to bondage. It is one's own attitude of desire (*icchā*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) that propels him to act in such a way that more *karmic* residue is accrued to his account, and this goes on and on as long as one is not liberated.

As regards the path to emancipation/release from the influence of *karmas*, it is through purifying and restraining one's internal organ/mind. In the words of Kaṇāda, it is expressed as *yoga* which means the controlling of inner organ/mind (*manas*) in

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[5] Tiwari, Kedar Nath (2017) *Classical Indian Ethical Thought* : *A Philosophical Study of Hindu, Jaina and Bauddha Morals*, Introduction, pp. xxvi–xxvii.

[6] *Tadvacanādāmnāyasya prāmāṇyam*. VS, 1.1.3, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[7] *Buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtirvede.*VS, 6.1.1, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

such a way that it does not come into contact with external sense organs but abides in the self and then results in the absence of pleasure and pain.[8]

Obviously, the founder of Vaiśeṣika proclaims that the path to liberation is in one's own hands; actions issuing from desire and aversion are voluntary actions giving rise to merit and demerit,[9] which in turn again produce desire and aversion; this causal chain is beginning less. It is due to merit and demerit (*dharma-adharma*) that the cycle of birth and death goes on; so to break this chain, one has to observe merit (*dharma*) and shun from demerit (*adharma*). This brings us to the point of *dharma* in relation to one's own action (*karma*). In fact the doctrine of action (*karma*) extends the principle of causation to human conduct and signifies retributive justice. Kaṇāda has himself expressed retributive nature of action (*karma*) when he says that actions performed by one individual cannot cause resultant attributes in another person.[10] More significantly, the regulation of all such cases is brought about by '*dharma*' only. Hence, '*dharma*' as a regulating factor and '*karma*' as an underlying principle are two important pillars of an individual's life as well as the social set-up. Hence the duty of an individual for his own sake and obligation towards society is much deeper in Indian philosophical thought.

In the above background, it can easily be comprehended that among the various connotations of the term '*dharma*,' duty or obligation is quite significant. Although Kaṇāda's philosophy is not a *dharmaśāstra* in this sense, yet there is no denying the fact that it dwells upon the concept of *dharma* in totality, be it individual or social.

As regards the relation between individual and society and the primacy of one over another, it can be said with certainty that Kaṇāda follows the Indian ideal of synthesis and harmony between these two. In Indian viewpoint, the two are not antagonistic to each other; in fact they are like the whole and the part which cannot live without one another; the well-being of one is dependent upon the well-being of the other.[11] To quote:

> It comprises the ethics of sociality as well as the ethics of individual capacity and is thus fuller and more than the Platonic scheme which is the ethics of sociality only.[12]

What follows from the above is that merit and demerit (*dharma-adharma*) are the causal factors for the rise and fall of individual selves. Therefore one should avoid actions which give rise to demerit (*adharma*) and practise those actions which give rise to merit (*dharma*). As mentioned earlier the source of knowing the true nature of *dharma* is Veda only because even the formation of names in the *Brāhmaṇa* texts is an evidence for the testimony of Veda according to Kaṇāda.[13]

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[8] *Tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi śarīrasya duḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ.* VS, 5.2.16, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[9] *Icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ*. VS, 6.2.4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[10] *Ātmāntaraguṇānāmātmāntare'kāraṇatvāt*. VS, 6.1.5, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[11] Kumar, Shashiprabha 2005. Obligations towards Others. In *Self*, *Society and Value*: *Reflections on Indian Philosophical Thought*, p. 141.

[12] Maitra, Sushil Kumar (1963) *The Ethics of the Hindus*, p. 1.

[13] *Brāhmaṇe saṁjñākarma siddhiliṅgam.* VS, 6.1.2, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

It is well known that the Vedic tradition envisages the following two types of duties (*dharmas*):

- Social obligations (*yamas*)
- Individual observances (*niyamas*)

Accordingly Kaṇāda has elucidated both these kinds of actions in the first and second sections of the sixth chapter of his discourse without naming them so. His commentator Praśastapāda has elaborated these under twin headings: universal obligations (*sāmānyadharmas*) and specific duties (*viśeṣadharmas*).[14] It goes without saying that all these rules and regulations pertain to voluntary actions only because non-voluntary actions are meant just for biological survival.[15]

As far as the social morality is concerned, Kaṇāda has enumerated the following ethical values for individuals operating at social level:

- Giving away (*dāna*)
- Accepting (*pratigraha*)

These two values are basic to Indian moral thought because they provide an inherent foundation for a just and equitable social system. But what is worth mentioning here is that in Kaṇāda's view even these simple ethical acts of giving [16] and accepting have to be practised wisely[17] and not indiscriminately.

Obviously in Indian tradition, the virtue of giving away (*dāna*) is said to be practised for various reasons,[18] but Kaṇāda has characterized it with an epithet 'in an intelligent manner' (*buddhipūrva*) and has provided a rational ground to an otherwise ritual act, so that the desired result is produced.

Offering Food (*Bhojana*)

After enunciating *dāna*, Kaṇāda goes on to explain the act of offering food. In this respect, he has described the following three types of people in the society:

- Wicked (*duṣṭa*)
- Non-wicked/good (*aduṣṭa*)
- Especially good (*viśiṣṭa*)

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[14] *Praśastapādabhāṣyam* (PPBh.), (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), pp. 660–676.

[15] *Jīvanayoniyatnatvaṁ ca sāhajikaprāṇasañcāraviṣayakayatnatvam. -Dinakarī* (commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*), (Śāstrī, Harirām Śukla (ed.) 1972), p. 510.

[16] *Buddhipūrvo dadātiḥ*. VS, 6.1.3, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[17] *Tathā pratigrahaḥ*. VS, 6.1.4, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[18] *Śraddhayā deyam. Aśraddhayā deyaṁ. Hriyā deyaṁ. Bhiyā deyaṁ. Saṁvidā deyam. -Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (*Śikṣāvallī*), 1.3, (Śrī Vāsudevaśarmā (ed.) 2003).

Thereafter it is clarified by him that the act of offering food is a noble act no doubt, but if one offers food to a wicked person, then it does not generate any merit (*dharma*), rather contact with a wicked person creates demerit (*adharma*). But if one offers food to a non-wicked person, then there is no harm.[19] In addition to these two types of persons, the third types of especially good (*viśiṣṭa*) persons need to be given special preference.[20] Here it may be asked as to what is the criterion of wickedness; the clear Vaiśeṣika response to this is that those who inflict violence on others are wicked no doubt.[21] Obviously this division of individuals in a social group is based on their personal attitude and not on their birth or status. It must also be clarified here that offering food signifies not only the literal sense of the term but also the implied sense of all material offerings.[22]

Besides the above, Kaṇāda has given another criterion for classification of people in a society as follows:

- Equal (*sama*)
- Inferior (*hīna*)
- Superior (*viśiṣṭa*)

According to him, one should socialize with the equals (*sama*) and also with the inferiors (*hīna*)[23] but forsake those who are opposed to be the path of good. Not only this, it has also been highlighted in *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* that accepting of a gift/offering given by someone else should be based on his/her qualities rather than position. To be precise, one should accept the offering from an inferior, equal or a superior person provided that he/she is a pious person but should never take anything from the one who is opposed to the path of *dharma*.[24]

It is an established fact that the actions performed by any human agent are basically of two types:

- Those whose results are seen (*dṛṣṭa*)
- Not seen (*adṛṣṭa*)

Explaining these two types of actions, Kaṇāda says that those actions whose result is experienced only by the agent after his/her present life are of the latter type, while those actions whose results are enjoyed by all are of the former type. Accordingly '*dṛṣṭaphala*' actions are those whose results are experienced collectively, so these may be understood as the social obligations (*yamas*), while other

[19] *Tadduṣṭabhojane na vidyate.*
Tasya samabhivyāhārato doṣaḥ. VS, 6.1.6.8-9, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[20] *Punarviśiṣṭe pravṛttiḥ*. VS, 6.1.10, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[21] *Duṣṭaṁ hiṁsāyām*. VS,6.1.7, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[22] Vide *Vaiśeṣikadarśanam-Rasāyanākhyavyākhyopetam*, (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. (ed.), 1958), p. 194; *Vaiśeṣika Darśana*: *Vidyodayabhāṣya* (Hindi), (Shastri, Udayaveera 1972), p. 211.

[23] *Same hīne vā pravṛttiḥ.* VS, 6.1.11, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[24] *Etena hīnasamāviṣiṣṭadhārmikebhyaḥ parasvādānaṁ vyākhyātam*. VS, 6.1.12, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).
Tathā viruddhānāṁ tyāgaḥ. VS, 6.1.13, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

actions which produce results for the individuals are '*adṛṣṭaphala*'; these can be understood as individual observances (*niyamas*).[25]

It means that, the actions of the former type (*dṛṣṭa*) are giving away (*dāna*), accepting the gift (*prtigraha*), etc., while observing a fast (*upavāsa*), practising celibacy (*brahmacarya*), staying in the preceptor's hermitage (*gurukulavāsa*), following the path of a recluse (*vānaprastha*), performing fire ritual (*yajña*), reciting Vedic verses (*mantra*), etc. are of the latter type (*adṛṣṭa*).[26]

Praśastapāda, the earliest available commentator of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, has elaborated the above portion of Kaṇāda's text in the form of universal obligations (*sāmānyadharmas*) and specific/individual obligations (*viśeṣadharmas*) as follows:

According to him there are 13 universal duties, namely, conviction (*śraddhā*), non-violence (*ahiṁsā*), kindness to all living beings (*sarvabhūtahitatva*), truthfulness (*satyavacana*), non-stealing (*asteya*), celibacy (*brahmacharya*), mental purity (*anupadhā-bhāvaśuddhi*), freedom from anger (*krodhavarjana*), physical purity (*abhiṣecana*), use of purifying materials (*śucidravyasevana*), devotion to the deity (*viśiṣṭadevtābhakti*), observing fast (*upavāsa*) and above all alertness (*apramāda*) in performing one's duties,[27] which is a universal imperative.

Even a cursory glance at the above list is enough evidence to demonstrate that the list is much wider than the one given by Manu.[28] It also shows the concern of Vaiśeṣika school towards social obligations of human beings.[29] In fact, all human beings are categorically bound to fulfil these.

As regards the particular duties of individuals based on their vocations (*varṇas*) and four stations (*āśramas*) of life, Praśastapāda has mostly followed Kaṇāda's delineation. He has dwelt upon the duties of individuals pertaining to four vocations (*varṇas*) and four stages (*āśramās*) in detail.

It is noteworthy in this regard that Vaiśeṣika ethics is synthetic in nature because it accommodates both the path of renunciation (*nivṛttimārga*)[30] and that of indulgence (*pravṛttimārga*).[31] As regards the question of knowledge or action being a means to liberation, the Vaiśeṣika approach is inclusive rather than exclusive. Śrīdhara has clearly stated that the amalgamation of both knowledge and action is

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[25] *Yamaḥ samānamāśramiṇāṁ dharmasādhanaṁ niyamastu viśiṣṭam. -Nyāyabhāṣya* (Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa (ed.) 1970) (on *Nyāyasūtra*, 4.2.46), p. 588.

[26] *Vide Sugamā Vaiśeṣīkasūtravṛttiḥ*, (Śrī Raṅganāthācārya (ed.) 1979) on VS, 6.2.1-2.

[27] PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 666.

[28] *Ahiṁsā satyamasteyaṁ śaucamindriyanigrahaḥ.*
Etaṁ sāmāsikaṁ dharmaṁ cāturvarṇye'bravīnmanuḥ. Manusmṛti, 10.63, (Dwivedi, Pandit Girija Prasad (ed.) 1917).

[29] Kumar, Shashiprabha 2005. Obligations towards Others. In *Self*, *Society and Value*: *Reflections on Indian Philosophical Thought*, p. 154.

[30] *Evaṁ pravṛttilakṣaṇāddharmādharmasahitāddevamanuṣyatiryaṅnārakeṣu punaḥ punaḥ saṁsārabandho bhavati.* PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 678.

[31] *Rāgādinivṛttau nivrttilakṣaṇaḥ kevalo dharmarḥ paramārthadarśanajaṁ sukhaṁ kṛtvā nivartate.* PPBh., (Sharma, Sri Durgadhara Jha (ed. and Hindi trans.) 1977), p. 682.

the means to liberation in our view.[32] To put it more precisely actions help in purifying the internal organ mind, while knowledge dispels all the attributes of self.

What follows from the above is that the Vaiśeṣika not only focuses upon the ethical duties of an individual but also highlights his/her obligation towards society. There is no doubt about the fact that the ultimate aim of all actions is getting freedom from bondage forever, and that is to be attained by an individual alone. It is true that merit (*dharma*) leads to social solidarity as well as individual freedom, but this merit is not just morality but also an attribute of the individual self. Therefore for attaining final release, this merit must also perish by acquiring knowledge because liberation is the quietening of all attributes like calming of fire when all the fuel has been consumed.[33]

Conclusion

In brief, it may be stated that the ethics of Vaiśeṣika is both absolute and relative because on the one hand it aims at liberation (*niḥśreyasa*) of an individual self but on the other hand it also aspires for social well-being (*abhyudaya*) through observance of obligations (*dharma*) for others.

It is therefore amply clear that the ethical values propounded in Vaiśeṣika source texts present a parity between materialism and spirituality, rationalism and emotionalism, logical theory and practical approach, worldliness and transcendence and individualism and universalism.

To conclude, it would be appropriate to mention that the contribution of Vaiśeṣika philosophy is not only worthwhile in the realm of metaphysics but also invaluable in ethics, because it carries forwards the Indian view of an integrated approach between the individual and society.

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Chapter 13
Recent Sanskrit Commentaries on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*

Abstract This chapter intends to highlight the continuity of Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy in its textual aspect through the Sanskrit commentaries written on its original source text, i.e. *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* in the present era. Five such recent Sanskrit commentaries on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* have come to light; details and salient features of these five are being presented herein.

Keywords *Sūtra · Vṛtti · Vyākhyā · Bhāṣya · Nimitta · Asamavāyi · Samavāyi · Abhyudaya · Sāpekṣa · Nirapekṣa · Karma · Sarvakāryakāraṇatva · Tantvantarasaṁyukta · Tantvantarasaṁyogarahita*

Background

Vaiśeṣikasūtras are not only held to be the earliest available documentary source of this significant stream of Indian philosophy but also stated to be one of the most ancient among *sūtra* texts of other schools in Indian philosophical tradition.[1] These are roughly placed around 600 B.C., and there is no certainty about their exact number; it is put somewhere between 370 and 375.

It is a well-known fact that commentaries written on seminal texts of Indian knowledge systems are a concrete source for understanding the later development of thought, since they help in contextualizing the primary texts of the past in different periods of history. Accordingly, several commentaries and interpretations have been written on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* in the last 2500 years, but *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* of Praśastapāda (600 A.D.) is the most well-known among the classical interpretations of the system. There are others like *Upaskāra* of Śaṁkara Miśra (1600 A.D.), *Vṛtti* of Candrānanda (700 A.D.) and the anonymous commentary (1200 A.D.) published from Mithila, which have kept the system alive for more than two centuries.

[1] (Bodas, M.R. 1974) 'A Historical Survey of Indian Logic', Introduction to *Tarka-saṁgraha* of Annaṁbhaṭṭa, pp. xxiv–xxv.

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Introduction

In contemporary era, while several critical works and volumes are being written on these *sūtras* in English, Hindi and other languages in India and abroad, at least five Sanskrit commentaries have also been published recently which are authored by reputed scholars from different backgrounds and from different parts of India; this speaks volumes about the prevalence and popularity of Vaiśeṣika system in current times.

A brief outline of these five Sanskrit commentaries is given hereunder:

- '*Rasāyana*vyākhyā' of Paṇḍita Śrī U. T. Vīrarāghavācārya, published in 1958 from Madras. It contains 373 *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*.
- '*Vaidikavṛtti*' of Swāmī Hariprasāda. It is based on the Vedic school of interpretation, as the title clearly indicates, and it also contains 373 *sūtras*. It was published from Nirṇayasāgara Press, Mumbai, in Saṁvat 1961.
- '*Bhāṣya*' of Brahmamuni first published in 1962 from Aryakumar Sabhā, Baroda. The number of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* in this interpretation is also 373, and it follows the *Upaskāra* of Śaṁkara Miśra. The second edition has also been published in 1995 from the same place.
- '*Vedabhāskarabhāṣya*' of Paṇḍita Kashinath Sharma. It was first published by the author himself from Maṇḍī, Himachal Pradesh, in 1972. It contains 370 *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*.
- '*Sugamāvṛtti*' of D.T. Tātācārya Śiromaṇī which was published from Ganganath Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Prayag, in 1979. This is edited by V. S. Raṅganāthacārya, and the number of *sūtras* explained in this commentary is 374.

Significant details about these five commentaries are being described below:

Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with *Rasāyanavyākhyā*

This is the earliest and the first among above-mentioned five recent Sanskrit commentaries. The learned commentator Srī Uttamūra T. Vīrarāghvācārya has justified the title of his commentary, i.e. '*rasāyana*' (rejuvenating tonic), by stating that not only the indifference and disinterest of scholars towards this system (*śāstra*) will be removed by this tonic, but it will also nourish the study of Vaiśeṣika.[2] On glancing through the commentary, one can say that the claim is not totally unfounded too, since the exponent has perused all the available interpretations of Vaiśeṣika and prepared a critical list of the aphorisms (*sūtra* text) as well. Besides, a detailed introduction in English and Sanskrit at the beginning of the volume provides ample material for understanding the significance of Vaiśeṣika school in brief and also about its authors and theories.

[2] *Śāstre' traivamidaṁvitsu śaithilyañcāruchiṁ harat.*
Vidhatte' puṣṭmiṣṭārthān Vaiśeṣikarasāyanam. – Vaiśeṣikadarśanam-Rasāyanākhyavyākhyopetam (VRVy.), (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), p. 308.

Moreover, at the end of each daily lesson (*āhnika*), a concluding verse is given which presents the topics discussed earlier in a nutshell. Another distinctive feature of this commentary is that the terms taken from the original *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, names of earlier scholars and other Vaiśeṣika texts have all been underlined throughout the text which will be very useful to the reader.

The style of *rasāyana* commentary is scholarly but simple; the theoretical aspect of Vaiśeṣika is kept intact, and all the technical discussions within the domain of philosophical deliberations have been dealt with subtle and specific nuances of the tradition. The thematic niceties of the commentary can particularly be seen in the following:

- Theory of causation[3]
- Exposition of *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* categories[4]
- Theory of inference and logical fallacies[5]
- Process of proving the 'self' (*ātman*) without quoting scriptural statements[6]
- Establishment of atomic theory and chemical action[7]
- Acceptance of folk activities like *avahanana*[8]
- Enunciation of eight parts of yoga[9]
- Types of perception – *nirvikalpaka* and *yogaja*[10]
- Notion of *abhāva*[11]
- Inferential evidence for *śabda*[12]
- Distinction between *sukha* and *duḥkha*[13]
- Verbal testimony[14]
- Theistic proofs,[15] etc.

In brief, the significance of this commentary can be expressed in the words of Vīrārāghvācārya himself as follows:

> The secrets of Vaiśeṣika theories are distinct from other schools. These will be protected by explaining the *sūtras as* also the lucidity of its style will be demonstrated.[16]

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[3] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 36–40.

[4] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 40–52.

[5] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 111–119.

[6] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 127–138.

[7] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 141–146.

[8] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 160–179.

[9] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), p. 205.

[10] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 250–256 and 270–277.

[11] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 262–270.

[12] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 280–282.

[13] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 293–300.

[14] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), pp. 306–308.

[15] VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), p. 307.

[16] *Vaiśeṣikarahasyārthāḥ matāntaravilakṣaṇāḥ.*
Sūtrairvyutpādya rakṣyante śailīśuddhiśca darśyate. – VRVy., (Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. 1958), p. 2.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra-Vaidikavṛttiḥ

This is another commentary written on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* to explain the Vaiśeṣika theories from Vedic point of view. Notably there is no introduction, index or the list of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* given in this commentary; rather there are several quotations from scriptures, i.e. *Vedas*, *Upaniṣads* and *Smṛtis*, and also from other philosophical schools as well as scholars of Vaiśeṣika as per the following details:

- Views of other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars like Udayana, Vācaspati and Vādi Vāgīśvara have been quoted while delineating the nature of absence (*abhāva*) as an independent category (VS, 1/1/4).[17]
- A quotation from *Kārikāvalī* of Viśvanātha has been given under discussion of generic attributes and specific attributes (VS, 1/1/6).[18]
- Vedic statements have been quoted for proving the plurality of selves.[19]
- Vedic theory of triple reality (*traitavāda*) has also been explained with reference to Vaiśeṣika.[20]
- Idea of watery, airy and fiery bodies discussed in Vaiśeṣika philosophy has also been interpreted in the light of Vedic philosophy.[21] Vaiśeṣika views regarding hailstorm, etc. have also been corroborated with Vedic testimony.[22]
- Several Vedic statements have been quoted regarding obligation of householders for offering reverently to the knowledgeable scholars.[23]
- Killing of animals and eating of meat, etc. have been described as unethical actions and prohibited in the Vedic view.[24]

Besides the above, several other significant views pertaining to Vaiśeṣika theories are expressed in this commentary which need to be noted such as the following:

- Natural colour of earth is black – this is the view of Hariprasad Shastri which has also been substantiated by scriptural statements, while the traditional Vaiśeṣika view in this regard is that earth has all the seven types of colours.[25]
- Natural colour of fire is red according to the Vedic view as also the commentator under discussion, while the prevalent Vaiśeṣika view holds that luminous white colour pertains to fire.[26]

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[17] *Vaiśeṣeikasūtravaidikavṛttiḥ* (VVVr.), (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), pp. 4–5.

[18] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), pp. 7–8.

[19] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), pp. 87.

[20] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), pp. 90–91.

[21] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), p. 95.

[22] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), p. 113.

[23] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), pp. 122–23.

[24] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), p. 124.

[25] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), p. 27.

[26] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), p. 28.

- The word *śabda* is an attribute, and it is non-eternal according to Vaiśeṣika, and this has also been proved by Vedic authority.[27]
- Mind (*manas*) is held to be minute in magnitude and self (*atman*) as all pervasive in classical Vaiśeṣika view, but the present commentator holds otherwise. He proves by quoting scriptural sources that the mind (*manas*) is of medium magnitude, while self (*ātman*) is minute.[28]
- Usually it is supposed that the Vaiśeṣika believes only in two means of knowing (*pramāṇas*), i.e. perception and inference, but this commentary propounds that Kaṇāda also accepts verbal testimony (*śabda*) as an independent means of knowing (*pramāṇa*). So the Vaiśeṣika according to *Vaidikavṛtti* accepts three means of knowing (*pramāṇas*) in all.[29]

In view of the above, the author of *Vaidikavṛtti* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* concludes by saying that:

> This waterbody (*prapā*) of learning was initiated by Kaṇāda but this has been revised by me, i.e., Hariprasad Shastri through this commentary.[30]

Vaiśeṣikadarśana with *Brahmamunibhāṣyaṁ*

This *bhāṣya*[31] which is stated to be the 58th work of the celebrated author begins with an enumeration of the topics treated herein and then gives several classified lists of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* which are very useful. First of all, themes discussed in 373 aphorisms (*sūtras*) of the text are listed in the index, and thereafter those *sūtras* are listed topic wise. Then again a list of such aphorisms (*sūtras*) is provided wherein critical comments on interpretations by other scholars are given. Last but not the least, an alphabetical list of all the *sūtras* is appended. This has really added to the value of the '*bhāṣya*'; popularity of the same can be gauged from the fact that its second edition has also been published from Baroda in 1995.

In the view of Brahmamuni, the nomenclature of Vaiśeṣika, as also of other philosophical schools, is derivative, and all these systems have been manifested along with the Vedas because these are their sub-subsidiaries (*upāṅgas*) only. While discussing about scholars and theories of Vaiśeṣika, the commentator opines that Kaṇāda is a theist, since the idea of God is inherent in his philosophy. Moreover, it has also been asserted by him that the three types of causes, namely, inherent

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[27] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), pp. 51–54.

[28] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), pp. 77–78.

[29] VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), pp. 183–184.

[30] *Kaṇādena praṇīteyamarthajñānodakaprapā.*
Mayā hariprasādena samyak vṛttyā pariṣkṛtā. – VVVr., (Shastri, Swami Hariprasad 1961), p. 201.

[31] *Vaiśeṣeikadarśana* with *Brahmamunibhāṣyam* (VBBh.), (Brahmamuni 1995), on *The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda* (VS), 10.2.7, p. 127.

(*samavāyī*), non-inherent (*asamavāyī*) and instrumental (*nimitta*), have been accepted in Vaiśeṣika; out of these, the last one has actually been designated 'Vaiśeṣika' by Kaṇāda, [31] but usually the same is expressed as instrumental cause (*nimitta*) – it may be due to the influence of other philosophical schools.

Other distinguishing features of the above commentary are as follows:

- References of the foregoing and following *sūtras* have been provided by the commentator for an easy understanding.[32]
- Quotations from the Vedic *Saṁhitās*, *Upaniṣads* and other texts have also been given at appropriate places (VS, 1.1.3, 4.2.11, 6.1.2, 6.1.4 and 6.1.16).[33]
- Critical remarks about the text of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* have also been made by the learned commentator (VS, 2.2.6, 3.3.17 and 6.1.14).[34]
- According to Brahmamuni, the term '*abhyudaya*' in the first *sūtra* of Kaṇāda does not signify heaven as has been suggested by Śaṁkara Miśra in his *Upaskāra* and Jayanarāyaṇa in his *Vivṛitti*; rather it means worldly pleasures (VS, 1.1.2).[35]
- Similarly, the epithet *dharma* not only denotes mundane wealth but also the *summum-bonum*; in fact it suggests a synthesis of both (VS, 1.1.2).[36]

As follows from the above, this commentary is a scholarly one which aims at expounding the themes and theories of Vaiśeṣika in a lucid language and also examining the inappropriate interpretations by other scholars. Whether it has succeeded in this aim or not can only be judged by the scholars.

Vaiśeṣikadarśana with *Vedabhāskarabhāṣyam*

Pt. Kashinath Sharma, another Sanskrit exponent of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* in the last century, claims that his interpretation is based on scientific facts. A detailed English introduction is given at the beginning which is followed by a bilingual (English and Sanskrit) list of contents – both topic wise and chapter wise. Towards the end of the volume, Hindi translation of both the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* and the present commentary is also appended. Moreover, scientific definitions and English equivalents for Sanskrit words have been provided to facilitate the understanding of key concepts of modern science.

Usually, the traditional Sanskrit commentaries explain the contents of aphorisms (*sūtras*) in a routine manner, while this commentary treads a different path in the sense that it tries to blend the traditional knowledge with the contemporary view. It is, therefore, quite possible that the traditional scholars might not hold this interpre-

[32] VBBh., (Brahmamuni 1995), (on VS, 8.1.1, 7.1.15, 7.2.22 and 7.2.23).

[33] VBBh., (Brahmamuni 1995), (p. 2, 63, 78, 79 and p. 86).

[34] VBBh., (Brahmamuni 1995), p. 31, 45 and 81.

[35] VBBh., (Brahmamuni 1995), pp. 1–2.

[36] VBBh., (Brahmamuni 1995), pp. 1–2.

tation to be authentic. Nonetheless, it is a welcome addition to Sanskrit writings of present times. Major innovative and nontraditional views of this commentator are mentioned below:

- The first epithet in *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, i.e. '*atha*' is not auspicious, and the tradition of holding an invocation as auspicious is also not valid.[37]
- '*Abhāva*' is not an additional category, since it is a special type of knowing and can be included under the attribute '*buddhi*' itself.[38]
- The Vaiśeṣika view that darkness (*tamas*) is not an independent substance, rather the absence of light, is correct according to the present interpreter.[39]
- The concepts of unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*) and merit (*dharma*) have been interpreted as destiny (*daiva*) and luck (*bhāgya*), respectively, and their scientific equivalents have been given as 'extrinsic energy' and 'intrinsic energy' in this commentary.[40]
- Last but not the least, this commentary is meant for explaining the views of Vaiśeṣika in the light of Veda, as the title '*Vedabhāskara*' clearly denotes, so nothing has been stated herein which goes against the Vedic knowledge.

Sugamā Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛttiḥ

The fifth Sanskrit commentary on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, written in recent past, is rightly titled '*sugamā*' or the easy one, since it presents the purport of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* in very simple and comprehensible sentences. In his introductory remarks, the commentator has highlighted the authorship, subject matter and the significance of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*. He has also clarified that the allegation of opponents regarding the irrationality, incoherence and the repetitiveness of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*[41] is more or less unfounded because there is an inherent order in the enumeration of these. Thereafter, he has tried to bring out the justified sequence of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*.

Language and style of the above-mentioned commentary is light and lucid, so it is capable in expressing the intent of cryptic statements of Kaṇāda. In the beginning, each epithet of the *sūtras* is separated, and after explaining the correlation among these terms individually, complete meaning of the *sūtra* is given. Towards the end of first daily lesson, the division of *sūtras* according to their topics is mentioned which is very useful. In between the interpretation, certain small statements like 'delinea-

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[37] *Vaiśeṣikadarśanaṁ* with *Vedabhāskara Bhāṣya* (VVBh.), (Sharma, Pandit Kashinath 1972), p. 2.

[38] VVBh., (Sharma, Pandit Kashinath 1972), p. 74.

[39] VVBh., (Sharma, Pandit Kashinath 1972), pp. 182–83.

[40] VVBh., (Sharma, Pandit Kashinath 1972), pp. 185–86.

[41] *Ativirasamasāraṁ mānavartāvihīnaṁ*
Pravitatabahuvelaprakriyājāladuḥkham
……..
Udadhisamamatantraṁ tantrametadvadanti. Quoted in *Sugamā Vaiśeṣīkasūtravṛttiḥ* (Su. VVr.), (Śrī Raṅganāthācārya (ed.) 1979), Introduction, p. 9.

tion of air is over', 'description of space finishes',[42] etc. also help the reader in understanding the context.

Other important features of '*Sugamā*' commentary are as follows:

- While explaining five types of activity (*karma*), the exponent has not only defined each one of them but has also given grammatical background for their denotative terms.[43]
- In the twelfth *sūtra* of the first section and first chapter, Kaṇāda has used twin terms, namely, relative (*śāpekṣa)* and non-relative (*nirapekṣa*),[44] in the course of his discourse regarding the whole and its parts. The present exponent has explained these as one thread of the cloth which is conjoined with another (*tantvantarasaṁyukta*) and one thread which is not conjoined with the other (*tantvantarasaṁyogarahita*).[45]
- Similarly, in his interpretation of the *sūtra* nine of the second section and second chapter,[46] the commentator has used an epithet connoting causality of all the effects '*sarvakāryakāraṇatva*' for explaining the notion of time which is very appropriate in conveying the intention of Kaṇāda.[47]
- In his interpretation of the thirteenth *sūtra* of the second section of seventh chapter, the commentator has explained the term '*yutasiddhi*' in the derivative sense from the root √*yu* which conveys both the senses, i.e. joining as well as disjoining, while most of other commentaries explain it by saying that it means non-connected or not joined only.[48]

In brief, the purpose of T. D. Tatācārya's commentary on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* is that the beginners may also understand the theories of Kaṇāda as per their own intent,[49] and the commentator has certainly succeeded in the same.

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[42] *Avasitaṁ vāyuprakaraṇam.* Su. VVr., (Śrī Raṅganāthācārya (ed.) 1979), p. 31.
Avasitaṁ dikprakaraṇam. Su. VVr., (Śrī Raṅganāthācārya (ed.) 1979), p. 40.

[43] Su. VVr., (Śrī Raṅganāthācārya (ed.) 1979), p. 5.

[44] *Tathā bhavatīti sāpekṣebhyo nirapekṣebhyaśca.* VS, 1.1.12, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[45] Su. VVr., (Śrī Raṅganāthācārya (ed.) 1979), p. 7.

[46] *Nityeṣvabhāvādanityeṣu bhāvāt kāraṇe kālākhyeti*. VS, 2.9.9, (Sinha, Nandalal (Eng. trans.) 1986).

[47] Su. VVr., (Śrī Raṅganāthācārya (ed.) 1979), p. 39.

[48] Su. VVr., (Śrī Raṅganāthācārya (ed.) 1979), p. 103.

[49] *Ye'pi sukumāramatayaste'pyakleśaṁ Kāṇādasūtrāṇām.*
Bhāvaṁ buddhyantāmiti vṛttimimāṁ vitanumaḥ sugamām. – Su VVr., (Śrī Raṅganāthācārya (ed.) 1979), p. 1.

Conclusion

On the basis of above brief outline, it is evident that the rich Sanskrit tradition of scholarly commentaries on philosophical treatises was not only prevalent in the past but is also continuing in present times. Each of the above-mentioned five Sanskrit commentaries deserves an independent study for exploring its exhaustive worth. However this brief presentation is meant only to highlight the fact that even in modern age, not only creative writings are being composed, but such scholastic works are also being authored in Sanskrit.

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Chapter 14
Vaiśeṣika Studies Across the World

Abstract In this chapter, it is intended to highlight the recent researches in the field of Vaiśeṣika philosophy – both textual and contextual. However, the main focus here will be on the later aspect (since the former has already been discussed in another chapter); but the same is also selective and not comprehensive. Accordingly the contribution of a few international scholars* to Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy is being presented in this chapter.

Keywords *Sūtra, bhāṣya · Daśapadārtha-śāstra · Dravya · Sattāsaṁbandha · Yoga · Vibhāga · Saṁsāra · Svasvāmi-saṁbandha · Mokṣa · Ākāśa · Adṛṣṭa · Vākya · Karma · Yogikapratyakṣa · Ayutasiddha · Samavāya*

Background

Vaiśeṣika[1] is one of the oldest systems of Indian philosophy; its history spans over almost 25 centuries. The founder of the school, Kaṇāda (600 B.C. approx.), delivered his discourse in the form of brief and cryptic statements known as *sūtras* (aphorisms) which is followed by a rich tradition of commentaries and other literature written in Sanskrit right up to the twentieth century.

*I am grateful to Prof. Masanobu Nozawa, Karin Preisendanz, Johannes Bronkhorst, Viktoria Lysenko, Harunaga Isaacson and Katsunori Hirano for their valuable inputs to update this chapter.

[1] For details see (Kumar, ShashiPrabha 2017) Vaiśeṣika. In *Oxford Bibliographies in Hinduism* (Online).
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195399318/obo-9780195399318-0176.xml?rskey=J9Auca&result=1&q=vaisesika#firstMatch.

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Accordingly the history of Vaiśeṣika studies can be broadly classified in the following three periods:

Ancient[2] or Classical[3]	500 B.C.–1000 A.D.
Medieval	1000 A.D.
Modern	1700–2000 A.D.

As already stated, this presentation is an attempt to bring out the international status of Vaiśeṣika studies in the last and current century. Justification for such an exposition is based on the fact that while Karl H. Potter has listed the contribution of several scholars in his famous bibliography[4] and Anantlal Thakur has discussed the internal course of development in the system of Vaiśeṣika, yet the global range as well as gradual growth of Vaiśeṣika studies in modern times has not been discussed in detail till date.

It is in this background that the following details are being discussed with an intent to prepare a basic update on one of the most systematic and analytical approaches in Indian philosophy which was unfortunately not only neglected[5] and ridiculed[6] in its own tradition but also labelled as '*adhama*'[7] and '*ardha-vainā́śika*'[8] by its opponents.

Introduction

It needs to be noted at the outset that after a long gap in the original Sanskrit writings on Vaiśeṣika, a sort of revival in Vaiśeṣika studies is visible in modern times. The same can be described in two dimensions as follows:

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[2] (Vidyabhushan, S.C. 1978) *History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Medieval and Modern Schools)*, Introduction, pp. xiii–xv.

[3] (Kumar, ShashiPrabha 2013) *Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy* : *On Knowing and What is to be Known.*

[4] Potter, Karl H. (1977) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. I, pp. 677–688.

[5] Vacaspati Miśra, the renowned commentator for the source texts of various schools of Indian Philosophy, has totally ignored the Vaiśeṣika system and not written any commentary on it.

[6] *Dharmaṁ vyākhyatukāmasya ṣaṭ padārthopavarṇanam.*
Sāgaraṁ gantukāmasya himavadgamanopamam.-Quoted by S. Sankaranarayanan (2003), *Vaiśeṣika-Catuḥsūtrī, A Historical Perspective*, p. 42, pp. 57–58.

[7] *Vaiśeṣiko hi āstikānām adhamaḥ*. -Brahmananda Saraswati in *Nyāyaratnāvalī* on Madhusudana Saraswati's *Siddhānatabindu*, Quoted by S. Sankaranarayanan in his paper- Śaṅkara and the Vaiśeṣika-Naiyāyika Schools. In *Perspectives of Śaṅkara*, (Balasubramanian, R., and Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban (eds.) 1989), p. 150.

[8] *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (on *Brahmasūtra*, 2.2.18), (Shatshastri, Swami Hanumandas (ed.) 1993).

1. *Textual*: Five recent Sanskrit commentaries on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*[9] have come to light which have already been discussed in the previous chapter. Archibald Edward Gough[10] was perhaps the first foreign scholar who translated the earliest text of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, i.e. Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* in English and made it accessible for the European scholars. This translation of the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms was first published in the *Pandit*, a monthly publication of Benaras Sanskrit College and later published in the form of a volume from E.J. Lazarus & Co., Benares in 1873.[11] The second Indian edition has been published from Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi, in 1975, after more than a hundred years. The special feature of this first English translation of Vaiśeṣika aphorisms is that comments from the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra and *Vivritti* of Jayanārāyana Tarkapañchānana have also been incorporated in original at the end of each page.

   It can be said with certainty that this pioneering translation of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* by A.E. Gough had prepared the fertile ground for Vaiśeṣika studies in Europe in the twentieth century.
2. *Contextual*: This covers the critical studies on Vaiśeṣika philosophy in the last and current century in India as well as abroad. These can again be classified in two kinds as follows:

   - By Indian authors
   - By foreign scholars

– Among Indian scholars, some notable names are those of Umesh Mishra, Sadananda Bhaduri, Dharmendra Nath Shastri, Anantlal Thakur, Sri Narayan Mishra, Kishor Nath Jha, Udayaveer Shastri, S. Sankaranarayanan, Veena Gajendragadkar, P.S. Ramanujan and others. The contribution of these Indian scholars to Vaiśeṣika studies is in no way lesser in substance or style, but the scope of the present paper is restricted to the contribution of foreign scholars only as it aims at indicating the international status of Vaiśeṣika studies.
– Barend Faddegon, Erich Frauwallner, Massaki Hattori, Wilhelm Halbfass, Hajime Nakamura, Masanobu Nozawa, Viktoria Lysenko, Albrecht Wezler, Megumu Honda, Johannes Bronkhorst, Karin Preisendanz, Harunaga Isaacson, Keiichi Miyamoto and Katsunori Hirano are few important names of foreign scholars who have been consistently working in the area of Vaiśeṣika studies. It is due to their untiring efforts that Vaiśeṣika studies have gained ground across the world in modern times. Therefore a brief sketch of their work is being outlined in the following pages:

[9] For details see chapter 13 of this volume titled "Recent Sanskrit Commentaries on Vaiśeṣikasūtras".

[10] Gough, Archibald Edward (1873) (Eng. trans.), *The Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda* (with comments from the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra and the *Vivritti* of Jayanārāyāṇa Tarkapañchānana).

[11] However there were other foreign scholars like E. Roer who translated the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* of Viśvanatha in English which was published from Calcutta under Bibliotheca Indica series as early as in 1850.

Barend Faddegon

Faddegon was a Dutch scholar with good knowledge of Sanskrit. He wrote several papers on Indian philosophy.

More significantly, the earliest available critical work on Vaiśeṣika philosophy in the twentieth century by a foreign scholar[12] is by B. Faddegon only. The same is titled as follows:

- "The Vaiçeṣika System" (614 pages) Johannes Mueller, Amsterdam, 1918.

The love and admiration of Faddegon for the philosophy of Vaiśeṣika can be summed up in his own words:

> .....this philosophy owes its origin to a purely theoretical attitude of mind and not to that craze for liberation which dominates nearly all forms of Indian thought. Therefore it is not the wish to discriminate soul from that which is not soul, ego from non-ego, as conceived by later scholiasts, but it is the theoretical desire for a correct classification and system of definition which has been the starting point of Vaiçeṣika system.[13]

This study of Vaiśeṣika by Faddegon is principally based on Kaṇāda's *sūtras*, Praśastapādas's *bhāṣya* and Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī*. Faddegon has discussed the dates, works and the interrelation of these three Vaiśeṣika texts and expounded the historical development of Vaiśeṣika theories through the sources mentioned above. Besides, he has also analysed the study of Indian philosophy in Europe and the necessity of comparative philosophy. At the same time, he has also quoted other works like *Ślokavārtika* of Kumārila, *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* of Mādhavācārya, etc. Different tables and appendices at the end of the volume have definitely enhanced the thematic value of his work.

There is no doubt about the fact that the above-mentioned book by Faddegon actually paved the path for Vaiśeṣika studies in Europe in recent times. Although the book is now not easily available in Indian libraries[14] and so not widely read as such, but the contribution of Faddegon really needs to be highlighted for a fair tribute to the labour of the scholar.

Erich Frauwallner

Erich Frauwallner was an Austrian scholar, Professor of Indology, member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences in Göttingen and honorary member of the German Oriental Society; he died in Vienna on July 5, 1974.

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[12] Although Hakuju Ui, the Japanese scholar, had translated *Daśapadārtha-Śāstra* of Maticandra, the Chinese text of Vaiśeṣika school, in English and it was published by Royal Asiatic Society, London, in 1917 after being edited by F.W. Thomas. But it did not make much impact on Vaiśeṣika studies since the text and its tradition were not very popular among later Indian Vaiśeṣika scholars.

[13] Faddegon, B. (1918) *The Vaiçeṣika System*, p. 12.

[14] Notably an Indian edition of the book being edited by the writer of these lines is under publication from D.K. Printworld, New Delhi.

Frauwallner has contributed immensely to the study of Indian philosophy in Europe, as can be evidenced by his enormous work[15] in the area. Frauwallner published the following paper on Vaiśeṣika:

- "Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram." In *Studia Indologica*. Festschrift für Willibald Kirfel. Bonn 1955, pp.65–85.

Most important of his works is the volume as per following details:

- Frauwallner, Erich, 1973, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, English Translation by V. M. Bedekar, Delhi : Motilal Banarasidass.

The above book of Frauwallner deals primarily with the system of Vaiśeṣika wherein he has discussed in detail the development of Vaiśeṣika categories.[16] He not only characterizes the Vaiśeṣika philosophy as a 'Nature-Philosophical School' but also puts the Jaina school and the materialism under this title. He has shown the character of Vaiśeṣika and its 'surpassing importance' as well as its original beginning. To quote:

> In this way the Vaiśeṣika system is characterized as a doctrine of liberation. It is nonetheless clear that this contradicts the spirit of the system, because Vaiśeṣika is pure natural philosophy, which attempts to understand and explain the world of phenomena, and has nothing to do with a doctrine of liberation. And this is not just a European impression. Indians have also felt it. Thus, for example, Durveka says in his *Arcaṭālokaḥ: nāpyādivākye satyapyāśvāso yujyate, anyapratijñātavatām apyanyavyutpādanadarśanāt, yathā 'athāto dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ' iti pratijñāya ṣaṭpadārthpāpratipādanaṁ Kaṇādasya*. It seems reasonable, however, to suggest that the above quoted beginning of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras is a later addition which, under the influence of the religious trends, replaced another, older commencement.[17]

In short, the single most contribution by E. Frauwallner to Vaiśeṣika studies[18] in the twentieth century is unparalleled. His admiration for the Vaiśeṣika School can be summed up in his own words as follows:

> Finally the Vaiśeṣika-the most important of the systems of Nature-philosophy-brought forth with its doctrine of the categories a creation which represents an important constituent of the thought-wealth of Indian philosophy.[19]

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[15] For details see A complete bibliography of his work complied by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz in Erich Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*. 5th edition. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010, pp. xxxiv–xl.

[16] Frauwallner, Erich (1973) *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass. V. M. Bedekar, (Eng. trans. from original German) (Original German edition published in 1956 from Salzburg), Foreword, p. vii.

[17] Frauwallner, Erich (1994) The Original Beginning of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras. In *Erich Frauwallner's Posthumous Essays* (Translated from the German by Jayandra Soni), p. 37.

[18] *Note***:** It is worth mentioning here that Debashis Ghosh was awarded M.Phil. degree for his dissertation titled *Erich Frauwallner's Contribution to Vaiśeṣika Studies* which was completed under the supervision of Shashiprabha Kumar at Special Centre for Sanskrit Studies, JNU, New Delhi in 2009.

[19] Frauwallner, Erich (1973) *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, Foreword, p. vii.

Massaki Hattori

Massaki Hattori was a well-known Japanese scholar of Indian philosophy in general and Buddhism in particular. He was a professor at Kyoto University, Japan. He has published the following articles on Vaiśeṣika:

- "Two Types of Non-qualificative Perception." In *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* (WZKS), 12–13, 1968–1969, pp. 161–169.
- "Praśastapāda and Dignāga: A Note on the Development of the Vaiśeṣika Theory of Anumāna." In *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* (WZKS), 16, 1972, pp. 169–180.
- "Kaṇāda (Ulūka, Kaṇabhakṣa, Kaṇabhuj, Kāśyapa)." In *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol.II, *The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa*, K.H. Potter (ed.), Delhi, 1977, pp. 211–220.
- "The Vaiśeṣikasūtra as Referred to by Bhāvaviveka in His Tarkajvālā." In *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* (AS/ÉA), 48/2, 1994, pp. 699–706.
- "Studies of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana (I): On the Vaiśeṣikasūtra III, 1, 13." In *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (JIBS), Tokyo, Japan, 14/2, 1996, pp. 890–902.

Wilhelm Halbfass

An eminent German scholar who taught at the University of Pennsylvania, USA, Wilhelm Halbfass, has been stated to possess an 'Indological-philosophical personality'[20] by his fellow scholars. He has written extensively on diverse areas of Indian philosophy and religion.

Most significantly, Halbfass has made a remarkable contribution to Vaiśeṣika studies[21] in contemporary times through his numerous writings including several papers on Vaiśeṣika as per following details:

- "Remarks on the Vaiśeṣika Concept of Sāmānya." In *Anjali, Papers on Indology and Buddhism*: *A Felicitation Volume Presented to Oliver Hector de Alwis Wijesekera on his 60th Birthday*, J. Tilakasiri (ed.), Peradeniya: University of Ceylon, 1970, pp. 137–151.

[20] Vide: (Franco, Eli and Preisendanz, Karin [eds.] 1997) *Beyond Orientalism*, The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, p. 1.

[21] *Note*: An M.Phil. research titled *Wilhelm Halbfass' Contribution to Indian Philosophy with Special Reference to Vaiśeṣika Philosophy* was undertaken by a research scholar Ms. Vandana Upadhyaya under the supervision of Shashiprabha Kumar at Special Centre for Sanskrit Studies, JNU in 2014.

- "Conceptualizations of 'Being' in Classical Vaiśeṣika." In *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* (WZKS), 19, 1975, pp. 183–198.
- "Zum Begriff der Substance (dravya) in Vaiśeṣika." In *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* (WZKS), 20, 1976, pp. 141–166.
- "On Being and What there Is: Indian Perspectives on the Questions of Being." In *The Question of Being: East-West Perspectives*, Mervyn Sprung (ed.), University Park, London: Pennsylvania University Press, 1978, pp. 95–109.
- "The Vaiśeṣika Concept of Guṇa and the Problem of Universals." In *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* (WZKS), 24, 1980, pp. 225–238.
- "Praśastapāda's Concept of Substance (Dravya)." In *Ṛtam: Ludwik Sternbach Felicitation Volume*, Part-I, J.P. Sinha (ed.), Lucknow: Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, 1979, pp. 537–544 (published in 1981).
- "Mallavādin and Early Vaiśeṣika Ontology." In *Adyar Library Bulletin*, 50, 1986, pp. 271–286 (Golden Jubilee Volume).
- "Vyomaśiva on Sattāsambandha." In *Studies in Indian Culture: A Volume of Essays Presented to Sahitya Siromani Professor S. Ramachandra Rao*, G. Ramakrishna et al. (eds.), Bangalore: Professor S. Ramachandra Felicitation Committee, 1987, pp. 65–80.
- "Observations on Sattāsambandha and the History of Vaiśeṣika Ontology." In *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 109/4, 1989, pp. 553–557 (Ernest Bender Felicitation Volume).
- "Happiness: A Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Perspective." In *Relativism, Suffering and Beyond: B.K. Matilal Memorial Volume*. I, Purusottama Bilimoria and Jitendra Nath Mohanty (eds.), Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 148–161.
- "Ākāśa: The Elusive Element." In Maya Burger and Peter Schtreiner (eds.) *The Perception of the Elements in the Hindu Traditions/La perception des éléments dans les traditions hindoues*. Bern: Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 159–180.

Besides the above and further papers on Indian philosophy, Halbfass has authored the following three voluminous books on Indian philosophy, the last of which is focussed specifically on Vaiśeṣika philosophy:

- *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988.
- *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991.
- *On Being and What there Is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology*. Sri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 168, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1993. (Originally published by State University of New York Press, 1992)

In fact, the third book listed above is a trendsetting work in the area of Vaiśeṣika studies; it has generated serious interest of scholars from all over the world to study and understand the Vaiśeṣika perspective.

Hajime Nakamura

A versatile Japanese scholar, Hajime Nakamura was a Professor at Tokyo Imperial University. After retiring from Tokyo University, he established Toho Gakuen (The Eastern Institute, Inc.).

He had authored more than a hundred books on different aspects of Indian Philosophy, mainly Buddhist thought, out of which the following need special mention here:

Japanese translation of the following source texts of Vaiśeṣika:

- *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* with the collation of three commentaries. In *Annals of the Sanko Research Institute for the Studies of Buddhism*, No. 10–11, 1977–78, pp. 1–156.
- *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*. In *Annual of the Sanko Research Institute for the Studies of Buddhism*, 1979, pp. 157–316.

Masanobu Nozawa

Masanobu Nozawa, a Japanese scholar who taught at the Numazu College of Technology, has retired a few years ago. He has published the following articles on Vaiśeṣika:

- "The sūtrapāṭha of the Vaiçeṣikasūtra-vyākhyā." In *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (JIBS), Vol.23, no.1, 1974, pp. 471–474.
- "The Vaiśeṣikasūtra referred to in the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha." In *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (JIBS), Vol.24, no.2, 1976, pp. 1000–1006.
- "Vaishêshika ni okeru shôji nit suite (The Vaiśeṣika Theory of Metempsychosis)." In *Nihon-bukkyö-gakkai Nenpö (The Journal of Nippon Buddhist Research Association)* 46, 1981, pp. 459–472.
- "A Comparative Table of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra." In *Numazu Kōgyō Kōtō Senmon Gakkō Kenkyū Hōkoku*, 27, 1992 (appeared in 1993), pp. 97–116.
- "Inferential Marks in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra." In *Saṃbhāṣā*, 12, 1991, pp. 25–38.
- "The Vaiśeṣikasūtras with Candrānanda's Commentary (1), (Translated)." In *Numazu College of Technology Research Annual*, No.27, 1992, pp. 97–116.
- "Theory of Perception in the 8th Adhyāya of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra." In *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (JIBS), Tokyo, Japan, 41/2, 1993, pp. 1150–1156.
- "On the Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.2.3." In *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* (AS/ÉA) 48/2, 1994, pp. 833–844.
- "Concept of yoga in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra." In *Indian Thoughts and Buddhist Culture: Essays in Honour of Professor Junkichi Imanishi on His Sixtieth Birthday*, Tokyo, 1996, pp. 919–932.
- "Is Vaiśeṣika a Philosophy of Nature?" In *Hokkaido Journal of Indological and Buddhist Studies*, 12, 1997, pp. 67–78.

- "On vibhāga in the Vaiśeṣika System." In *Hokkaido Journal of Indological and Buddhist Studies*, 14, 1999, pp. 112–130.
- "The Theory of saṃsāra of the Early Vaiśeṣika referred to by the Naiyāyikas." In *Hokkaido Journal of Indological and Buddhist Studies*, 15, 2000, pp. 114–130.
- "Svasvāmisambandha in the Vaiśeṣika System." In S. Hino and T. Wada (eds.) *Three Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof. Musashi Tachikawa's Felicitation Volume*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004, pp. 407–420.
- "On the Vaiśeṣika Definition of Mokṣa." In: K. Preisendanz, (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizon: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass,* ÖAWPHKD 351 [= BKGA 53], Vienna, 2007, pp. 385–399.

Viktoria Lysenko

A Russian scholar, Viktoria Lysenko is the Head, Department for Oriental Philosophy Studies, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences and Moscow State University.

Viktoria Lysenko has authored several papers on Vaiśeṣika as per following details:

- "Atomism of the Vaiśeṣika and Atomism of Democritus (An Essay of Comparative Analysis)." In *Ancient India: the Historical and Cultural Connections*. Vostochnaya literatura (Eastern literature), Moscow, 1981, pp. 187–201. (in Russian)
- "The Vaiśeṣika doctrine of motion." In *Ancient India. Language. Culture*. *Text*. Vostochnaya literatura (Eastern literature), Moscow, 1985, pp. 195–208. (in Russian)
- "Philosophy of Space and Time in India: the Vaiśeṣika school." In *Indian Rationalist Tradition and Modernity*. Vostochnaya literatura (Eastern literature), Moscow, 1988, pp. 75–102. (in Russian)
- "Atomistic Mode of Thinking as Exemplified by the Vaisheshika Philosophy of Number." In *Asiatische Studien*, XLVIII, 2, 1994, pp. 781–806.
- "The Vaiśeṣika Notions of Ākāsha and Diś from the Perspective of Indian Ideas of Space." In *Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies*. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and Humanities. Vol. 47, Amsterdam, 1996, pp. 417–447.
- "La doctrine des atomes chez Kaṇāda et Praśastapāda." In *Journal Asiatique*. Vol. 248, No. 1, Paris, 1996, pp. 137–158. (in French)
- "Fire: Destruction and Creation. From the Vedic Myth and Ritual to the Vaiśeṣika Atomic theory." In *Historical and Philosophical Yearbook '97*, Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1999, pp. 203–247. (in Russian)

- "Metaphysics of Size (The Reading of the "Chapter on Size." In Prashastapāda's "Collection of the Categories' Characteristics" and Śrīdhara's comment "Nyāyakandalī" thereon)." In *History of Philosophy. Vol.7*, Moscow: Institute of Philosophy, 2000, pp. 70–93. (in Russian)
- "Categories of the Vaiśeṣika and the Linguistic tradition of India." In *Historical and Philosophical Yearbook '98*, Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 2000, pp. 260–286. (in Russian)
- "The problem of Universals in the Vaiśeṣika and the Indian Linguistic Philosophy. (Invitation to a slow text reading)." In *Universals of Eastern cultures*. Vostochnaya literatura (Eastern literature) Moscow, 2001, pp. 77–121. (in Russian)
- "Correspondence Principle: Praśastapāda's version." In *Scripta Grigoriana. Collection of papers in honor of the 70th anniversary of academician G.M.Bongarda-Levin*, Vostochnaya literatura (Eastern literature), Moscow, 2003, pp. 99–106. (in Russian)
- "The Human Body Composition in Statics and Dynamics: Āyurveda and the Philosophical schools of Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya." In *Journal of Indian philosophy*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2004, pp. 31–56.
- "Movement or Action: the Grammatical Tradition and the Vaiśeṣika." In *Historical and Philosophical Yearbook 2005*, Nauka Publishers, 2005, pp. 358–386 (in Russian)
- "Śaṅkara, critique du Vaiśeṣika. Une lecture de Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (II, 2, 11–17)." In *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatique*, Lousanne, LIX, 2, 2005, pp. 533–580.
- "Le principe de correspondence: la version de Praśastapāda." In *Categories de langue et categories de pensée en Inde et en Occident*. P. : L'Harmattan (ed.), 2005, pp. 79–90. (in French)
- "Vacāspati Miśra on Direct and Indirect Perception. Fragment from "Nyāyavārttika-tatparyaṭīkā." Transl. from Sanskrit, Introduction and Notes by V.G. Lysenko." In *Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy)*, 2006, No.8. C.111–127. (in Russian)
- "A Direct and Indirect Sense Perception: Dignāga and Praśastapāda." In *Voprosy Filosofii (Problems of Philosophy)*, No.5, 2006, pp. 137–147. (in Russian)
- "Origin of the Idea of Universals: Vaiśeṣika or Vyākaraṇa," In *Classical Indian Philosophy Reinterpreted*. Victoria Lyssenko, Michel Hulin. New Delhi: Decent Books, 2007, pp. 27–46.
- "Natural philosophy of Body in India: Āyurveda, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika." In *Embodiment as Epistemological Phenomenon*. Moscow: Institute of Philosophy, 2009, pp. 103–123. (in Russian)
- "The Atomistic Theory of Vaiśeṣika: Problems of Interpretation." In *History of Indian Philosophy*, a Russian Viewpoint, Delhi, 2010.

- "Buddhist Motives in Some Doctrines of Praśastapāda." In *Vacaspativaibhavam. A Volume in Felicitation of Professor Vacaspati Upadhyaya* (eds.), Delhi: D. K. Printworld, 2011, pp. 1223–1233.
- Le "determinisme linguistique" de Benviniste et le cas du Vaiśeṣika. – Indologica. In *Orientalia et Classica. Collection of articles in memory of T.Ya. Elizarenkova*. Book 2: Institute of Oriental cultures and Antiquity, Russian State Humanitarian University, Moscow, 2012, pp. 381–396. (in French)

She has also published the following books on Vaiśeṣika in Russian Language:

- *Philosophy of Nature in India. Atomism of the* Vaiśeṣika *School.* Moscow: Nauka Publishers, Vostochnaya Literatura (Eastern literature), 1986, 201 pages. (in Russian)
- *Universum of the Vaiśeṣika*. Vostochnaya Literatura, Moscow, 2003, 600 pages. (in Russian)
- *"Padārtha-dharma-sangraha" of Praśastapāda with Nyayakandali of Shrīdhara*. Translation from Sanskrit into Russian, Introduction, Historico-philosophical commentary, Notes and Indices by Victoria Lysenko. Vostochnaya Literatura, Moscow, 2005, 760p. (in Russian).
- *Classical Indian Philosophy Reinterpreted*, (Co-authored with Michel Hulin), New Delhi: Decent Books. 2007 (in English)

Albrecht Wezler

Professor Albrecht Wezler was the Director of the Institute for Culture and History of India and Tibet at the University of Hamburg, Germany. He has contributed immensely to the field of Indian philosophy in diverse areas and has authored following papers specifically on Vaiśeṣika:

- "Remarks on the Definition of "yoga" in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra." In *Indological and Buddhist Studies*, Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday, L. A. Hercus (eds.) et al., Canberra, 1982, pp. 643–686.
- "A Note on the Concept of adṛṣṭa as used in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra." In *Aruṇa-Bhāratī. Professor A. N. Jani Felicitation Volume*, B. Datta (eds.) et al., Baroda, 1983, pp. 35–58.
- "Further References to the Vaiśeṣikasūtra in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (Studies in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa III)." In *Amṛtadhārā. Prof. R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume*, S. D. Joshi (ed.), Delhi, 1984, pp. 457–472.
- "Bemerkungen zu Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra 6.1.1-3 (Resümee)." In *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*. Supplement VI: XXII. Deutscher Orientalistentag ... . Ausgewählte Vorträge, W. Röllig (ed.), Stuttgart, 1985, 282.

Megumu Honda

Another Japanese scholar, Megumu Honda, was a Professor at Doho University, Nagoya, Japan. He has published following works on *Vaiśeṣika* in Japanese language:

- *Vaiśeṣika Tetsugaku Taikei* (The System of Vaiśeṣika Philosophy), Tokyo: Kokusyo-kanko-kai. (Translation of Nyāyakandalī in Japanese), 1990.
- "Did the early Vaiśeṣika admit the notion of "I" as a means to prove the existence of the soul?" In *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* (AS/ÉA), 1994, pp. 707–709.
- *Vaiśeṣika Tetsugaku, Jyoukan*, Kokuu no Gotoku (Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, I), Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten. (Translation of Vyomavatī in Japanese), 2009 a.
- *Vaiśeṣika Tesugaku, Gekan*, Kouki no Tsuranari (Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, II), Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten. (Translation of Kiraṇāvalī in Japanese), 2009b.

Note: Each work shows a complete translation.

Johannes Bronkhorst

A renowned scholar from Switzerland, Johannes Bronkhorst is an emeritus Professor at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. His writings on various aspects of Indian philosophy are innumerable, but here an outline of his work on Vaiśeṣika is being given.

He has published several papers on Vaiśeṣika as follows:

- "Quelques axiomes du Vaiśeṣika." In *Les Cahiers de Philosophie*, 14, 1992, pp. 95–110.
- "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 5: Bhartṛhari and Vaiśeṣika." In *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques*, 47(1), 1993, pp. 75–94.
- "The Vaiśeṣika vākya and bhāṣya." In *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental* Research Institute, 72–73 (1991–92), 1993, pp. 145–169.
- "Mysticism and Rationality in India: the case of Vaiśeṣika," In *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques*, 47 (4), 1993, pp. 559–569.
- "Once again Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 3.1.13." In *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques*, 48 (2), 1994, pp. 665–681.
- "God's arrival in the Vaiśeṣika system." In *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 24 (3), 1997, pp. 281–294.
- "Mimamsa versus Vaisesika: Parthasarathi and Kumarila on the creation and dissolution of the world." In *Le Parole e i Marmi. Studi in onore di Raniero Gnoli nel suo 70° compleanno*. Torella R (eds.), Rome, Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma XCII, 1), 2002, pp. 171–181.
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Besides the above papers, Bronkhorst had organized a panel titled 'Early Vaiśeṣika' in Hong Kong in August 1993; the proceedings of this panel have been edited by him and published as per following details:

- 'Early Vaiśeṣika.' In *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques*, Germany: Peter Lang, 1994, 48/2.

He has also published the following book on Vaiśeṣika:

- *Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1994, (With Yves Ramseier.) Reprint 1999, pp. xvi + 169.

Note: There are, of course, a number of books and articles by J. Bronkhorst that do not mention Vaiśeṣika in their title but which deal at least in part with this philosophy. These include the following articles:

- "Systematic philosophy between the empires: some determining features." In *Between the Empires: Society in India 300 BCE to 400 CE*. Patrick Olivelle, Oxford etc (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 287–313.
- "The origin of categories in Indian philosophy." ["Ontological categories in early Indian philosophy."] In *Categorisation in Indian Philosophy: Thinking Inside the Box*. Jessica Frazier (ed.), Ashgate. (Dialogues in South Asian Traditions: Religion, Philosophy, Literature and History.), 2014, pp. 147–151, ISBN: 978-1-4094-4690-3.
- "Abhidharma and Indian thinking." In *Text, History, and Philosophy: Abhidharma across Buddhist scholastic traditions*, Bart Dessein & Weijen Teng. (ed.), Leiden-Boston: Brill, (Brill's Indological Library, 50.), 2016, pp. 29–46.

And the following books:

- *Karma and Teleology: A problem and its solutions in Indian philosophy*. Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, (Studia Philologica, Monograph Series, XV.), 2000, pp. iii, 142, ISBN: 4-906267-44-0.
- Aux origines de la philosophie indienne. Gollion: Infolio éditions, 2008, pp. 156, ISBN: 978-2-88474-094-4.
- Language and Reality: On an episode in Indian thought. Translated from the French by Michael S. Allen and Rajam Raghunathan. Revised and with a new appendix. Leiden - Boston: Brill, (Brill's Indological Library, 36.), 2011, pp. xiii, 175, ISBN: 978-90-04-20435-5.

Karin Preisendanz

Karin Preisendanz is the Professor (Chair) of Indology at the University of Vienna and former Head of Department of the Department of Indology and the Department of South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna.

She has published following articles specifically on Vaiśeṣika:

- "Vaiśeṣikasūtra IV.1.9 and its two Traditions of Interpretation." In *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* XLVIII, 2, 1994, pp. 859–881
- "Vaiśeṣika." In J. Ritter and K. Gründer (eds.), *Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie*, Vol. 11, Basel: Schwabe 2001, pp. 540–542
- "Vaiśeṣika." In Knut A. Jacobsen et al. (eds.), In *Brill's Encyclopedia of Hinduism*, Vol. 3, Leiden: Brill 2011, pp. 699–718

Besides the above, she has published a book on Nyāyasūtra as per following details:

- *Nyāyasūtra.* In *Studien zu Nyāyasūtra III.1 mit dem Nyāyatattvāloka Vācaspati Miśras* II., ANIS 46, Stuttgart, 1994) in which she has discussed several issues regarding Vaiśeṣika also

Further, her following papers on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are worth mention:

- "On ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣa and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Vision." In *Berliner Indologische Studien* 4/5, 1989, pp. 141–213.

Contribution to Encyclopedias:

- "Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika." In E. Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London: Routledge, 1998, Vol. 7, pp. 57–67 [together with Eli Franco]

Work in Progress
Currently, she is preparing *an Annotated Translation of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra with Candrānanda's Commentary*.

Harunaga Isaacson

Prof. Dr. Harunaga Isaacson is currently Professor of Sanskrit, Faculty of Humanities, Asia-Africa Institute, Department of Indian and Tibet Studies, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany.Besides his numerous papers and books on Buddhism and other aspects of Indian philosophy, he has published following articles on Vaiśeṣika:

- "Notes on the manuscript transmission of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and its earliest commentaries." In *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques*, 48 (2), 1994, pp. 665–681.
- "Yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) in early Vaiśeṣika." In *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 18, 1994, pp. 139–160.

In addition to the above articles, he has published the following book which is very valuable for the study of Vaiśeṣika:

- *Materials for the Study of the Vaiśeṣika System*, Ph.D. thesis, Leiden University, The Netherlands, 1995, pp. ii–369

Keiichi Miyamoto

Prof. Keiichi Miyamoto of Kokugakuin University, Tokyo, Japan, has done a great service to Vaiśeṣika studies. He has reconstructed the Sanskrit text of *Daśapadārthī* of Maticandra from its Chinese translation and published it as per following details:

- *The Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Early Vaiśeṣikas, with an Appendix Daśapadārthī of Candramati* (A Translation with a Reconstructed Sanskrit Text, Notes and a Critical Edition of the Chinese Version), Bhandarkar Oriental Series No. 28, Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1996.

He has also translated Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* in Japanese:

- *Indo no Tagenron Tetsugaku wo Yomu, Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* (A Study of Pluralistic Philosophy in India, Translation of the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha of Praśastapāda) Tokyo: Shunjusha (in Japanese), 2008.

Katsunori Hirano

Dr. Katsunori Hirano is a research fellow at the Nakamura Hajime Eastern Institute, Japan. He has written a few papers on Vaiśeṣika as follows:

- "On the System of the Commentary Text in Indian Philosophy." In *Journal of Studies for the Integrated Text Sciences* (SITES), Vol. 1, No.1, 2003, pp. 81–92.
- "The Two Types of Cognitive Process in the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy." In S. Hino and T.Wada (eds.), *Three Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof. Musashi Tachikawa's Felicitation Volume*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004, pp. 421–429.
- "On Differential Cognition in the Vyomavatī." In *Nyāya-Vasiṣṭha, Felicitation Volume of Prof. V.N. Jha*. U. Jha, T. Wada, N. Kulkarni, and A. R. Mishra (eds.), Kolkata: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 2006, pp. 505–515.
- "New Light on the Commentary Texts of Ancient India." In *Indian Philosophy and Text Science*, T. Wada (ed.), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, 2010a, pp. 135–156.
- "The Definition of Inherence in the Kiraṇāvalī as the Meta-text on the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha." In *Journal of Hermeneutic Study and Education of Textual Configuration* (SITES II) (HERSETEC), Vol. 4. No. 1, 2010b, pp. 43–49.
- "Historical Significance of the Definition of Universal in the Vyomavatī." In *Saṁskṛta-sādhutā (Goodness of Sanskrit), Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar*. C. Watanabe, M. Desmarais, and Y. Honda (eds.), New Delhi: D.K. Printworld, 2012, pp. 297–310.

- "An Annotated Translation of the Definition of Inherence (samavāya) Chapter in the Vyomavatī." In *An Indian Ending, Rediscovering the Grandeur of Indian Heritage for a Sustainable Future, Essays in Honour of Professor Dr. John Vattanky SJ*, On Completing Eighty Years, Kuruvilla Pandikattu SJ and Binoy Pichalakkattu SJ (eds.), Delhi: Serial Publishers, 2013, pp. 135–153.
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Besides the above papers, he has also published a book as per following details:

- *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy and Text Science*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2012.

Conclusion

On the basis of the above brief delineation, it can be concluded that contributions made by these foreign scholars have not only aroused and sustained the interest of academic fraternity in Vaiśeṣika studies but also widened the horizons of philosophical discussion all over the world.

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